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Abstract 
This study presents findings from evaluating, ex ante, the options, implications and 
feasibility of a major health financing policy change from a largely tax-based to a 
contribution-based system following universal national health insurance (NHI) principles. 
The case country used is Jamaica a small middle-income country faced with persistent 
fiscal and health financing constraints and prodded into the policy choice of NHI in 1996 
by recommendations of consultants, international organizations as well as the opportunity 
provided by its externally funded Health Reform Programme (1997-2005). 
The approach adopted was to define NHI options by commencing with government's 
proposals in its 1997 Green Paper on NH! as the baseline; ascertaining from local 
stakeholders their recommendations for an NHI plan and eliciting lessons and design 
variables from the international experience with NHI-type systems to derive a prototype. 
This was followed by financial modelling of likely inflows and outflows in each option; 
assessment of their merits and viability using criteria such as population coverage, 
benefits, risk pooling, equity, efficiency, and size of contributions by workers and 
government; and ranking of scores to derive a preferred option. 
As an ex ante analysis (since NHI has not been implemented in Jamaica), the study found 
the prototype to be the highest ranked option. It also found that continuing 
macroeconomic difficulties, institutional weaknesses and likely opposition from some 
key stakeholders - factors which affected confidence and derailed the 1997 NHI proposals 
- would still pose major challenges for decision makers and planners. 
In terms of overall significance, the study highlights international ambivalence over key 
design aspects of NHI such as single vs. multiple payers; phased vs. comprehensive 
benefit package and timing of universal coverage. For implementing NHI in Jamaica, it 
suggests areas for further research and action such as specifying and phasing benefits; 
improving collection systems, quality of health services and targeting subsidised groups 
as well as achieving stakeholder consensus. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION AND RATIONALE FOR STUDY 
1.1 Overview 
This study is primarily concerned with evaluating, ex ante, the options, merits, 
implications and overall feasibility of a major health financing policy change from a 
universal coverage system largely funded by taxes (budgetary allocations) to one 
based on national health insurance (NHI) principles largely funded by earmarked 
compulsory contributions. The case country used in the evaluation is Jamaica -a small, 
middle income developing country' located in the Caribbean region with a population 
of 2.67 million persons and Gross National Income (GNI) per capita of US$3480 or 
PPP$4030 in 2006 (World Bank, 2007). 
Given the global surge of interest in public policy reforms and in health and health 
financing reforms engendered by neo-liberal adjustment approaches since the 1980's 
(World Bank 1987 and 1993; OECD, 1992; Kutzin, 1995; Musgrove, 1996; Bennett, 
Russell and Mills, 1996; Mills, 1999), the study draws on theoretical discussions and 
lessons of international experience in health financing, with emphasis on compulsory 
health insurance systems, to examine the specific contextual and design factors that 
influenced the policy choice of a universal NHI approach in Jamaica in 1997. In the 
examination, a mix of stakeholder analysis, emerging best practice, financial 
modelling and an assessment matrix are utilized to define, evaluate and explore the 
implementability of a `preferred option' from among alternative NHI designs. 
By NHI in Jamaica is meant a health financing system that has 6 main features: 
> it aims to cover all persons in the population (universal coverage) from the 
outset rather than selective groups such as formal sector workers or groups 
defined by income, geographical location, age or health condition; 
> it is based on social solidarity and community insurance principles which 
emphasise pooling and cross-subsidy of health risks and income i. e., 
contributions which are broadly payroll-related and based on 
` The definition and classification of a `small' country is taken from the Commonwealth Advisory Group (1997) which posits population size of less'than 1.5 million and/or having the 'characteristics of 
smallness' as key features such as small land mass and GDP. The Group deemed Jamaica as having the `characteristics of smallness'. That of `middle income' is taken from the World Bank (2007) with Gross 
National Income (GNI) per capita of $906-$3,595 used as the range for `lower middle income' countries 
and $3,596-$11,115 for `upper middle income'. 
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individual/household ability to pay along with targeted State support for those 
unable to contribute; 
> it emphasizes prepayment rather than direct out of pocket payment at the time 
of accessing health services; 
¢ it has a generally well-defined health care services benefit package and defined 
relations with health providers; 
> access to the benefits package is directly linked to one's membership status 
(rather than more open-ended as in most tax-financed health systems); 
> it is defined by specific facilitating legislation and is administered separately 
from the established Ministry of Health by a new public statutory body or 
through formal agreements with private insurance entities. 
The roots of NHI may be traced to social health insurance (SHI) schemes in the early 
1880's in Germany among formal sector workers and their dependents. Variants of 
this `Bismarckian' model have been proposed, attempted or established worldwide in 
industrialized and developing countries (ICs and DCs respectively) in subsequent 
years (Ron, Abel-Smith and Tamburi, 1990; Glaser, 1991; Roemer, 1993; World Bank, 
1993; World Health Organisation (WHO), 2000; Carrin and James, 2004; Mills, 2007). 
Recognising the need to avoid the negative implications of exclusion of certain groups 
in these schemes, more vigorous and systematic attempts (reforms) have been made 
(and are being made) especially since the 1980's to extend population coverage to all 
groups. Around the same time, the challenges of general financial constraints, 
managerial inefficiencies and weaknesses in the delivery of health services in several 
countries with tax-funded health systems were eliciting proposals and programs for 
new risk pooling, management and financing arrangements (Donaldson and Gerard, 
1993; World Bank, 1993; Mills, 1999). With universal coverage and sustainability as 
the main goals, these initiatives in countries with dominant SHI and tax-funded 
mechanisms have resulted in more blended health financing systems characterized by 
more defined linkages between taxes and compulsory contributions as sources of funds 
for health services (Mills, 1998 and 2007; WHO, 2000; Savedoff, 2003; Gottret and 
Schieber, 2006). 
A fairly substantial body of literature now exists describing the features, successes, 
shortcomings and policies adopted or attempted as national health financing systems 
sought to adjust to changing social, economic and health imperatives. Issues such as 
-12- 
universality of coverage, components of the benefit package, cost control, fiscal space, 
efficiency and sustainability feature prominently in the debates and proposals for 
improving performance of NHI-type financing systems (Hoffineyer and McCarthy, 
1994; Nitayarumphong and Mills, 1998; Normand, 1999; WHO, 2000; Saltman, Busse 
and Figueras 2004; Heller, 2006; Wagstaff, 2007). 
Small middle income DCs, with health and health financing challenges that reflect a 
mix of those in ICs and low income DCs, have largely been ignored in this broad body 
of research. Yet, for many of them, recommendations from multilateral agencies and 
policy analysts have repeatedly identified NHI as a potentially useful financing 
mechanism. As such, the mix of the multi-faceted international experience with NHI 
as described in the research literature and policy recommendations from influential 
groups and international organizations forms the basis in this thesis for exploring the 
choice and applicability of NHI-type systems in Jamaica -a small DC struggling to 
secure an adequate, stable and equitable source of financing to meet current and 
projected health needs. 
1.2 NHI Systems and Global Interest 
There are several terms which are used regularly and in some instances, 
interchangeably when defining and discussing NHI systems. Among these are "public 
health insurance"; "statutory health insurance"; "social health insurance"; "universal 
social health insurance"; "compulsory health insurance", "national health insurance", 
"Bismarckian model" and "social health protection". Some confusion can arise since 
each of these involves a large measure of compulsion through a mix of taxes and 
statutory deductions (i. e. specific mandatory payments to be made from one's income 
or earnings) as against voluntary payments such as private health insurance premiums 
and out of pocket payments. The situation is not helped by the formal descriptions and 
references of some NHI subsystems as "national" e. g. the financing plan for the poor 
and disabled in Japan (Glaser, 1991; Ikegami and Hasegawa, 1995) or "social" e. g. 
Medicare and Medicaid in the United States of America (USA) (Fuchs, 1993; Aaron, 
1996; Glied, 2008). 
For clarity and consistency, this study uses NHI to mean a mandatory plan aimed at 
covering all residents as contributors and/or beneficiaries (i. e. universal coverage2) 
2 Universal coverage is defined by Gilson et. al (2007) as an absolute concept meaning that the whole 
population of a country (100%) has access to good quality care regardless of income, social status or 
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with compulsory payments being made from one's earnings or income either through 
earmarked payroll taxes or other health specific levies. Persons who are not in formal 
employment and from whom deductions cannot be made as above are also mandated 
to contribute to the NHI plan either through fixed percentages of their assessed income 
or through fixed absolute payments (with or without subsidies from the State). The 
contributions for persons who are unable to pay e. g. the poor, the unemployed and 
their dependents are made by the State wholly or partly from tax funds. The funds 
collected through these deductions are specifically and totally targeted to purchasing 
health services rather than placed into a government's consolidated fiscal account 
for 
allocation to various Ministries including health after internal budgetary debates. The 
funds are pooled and managed by a single or several public agencies or 
by competing 
public and private agencies. These agencies are also responsible 
for developing 
purchasing plans to secure health services for their members and reimbursing 
providers of the health services. 
Examples of this NHI-type system where pooled contributions represent the dominant 
source of funds and general tax-based collections provide targeted support are to be 
found in Germany, France, South Korea, Japan, Taiwan and Costa Rica. The social 
security based health insurance plans in most of Latin America, Asia and some parts of 
Francophone Africa which generally cover formal sector workers can be seen as 
limited and incomplete NHI systems since they do not provide universal coverage and 
are quite segmented (Roemer, 1993; World Bank, 1993; Londono and Frenk, 1997; 
Carrin and James, 2004; Gottret and Schieber, 2006). NHI is one possible approach 
towards universal health coverage i. e. general access to health services for all citizens 
(Fuchs, 1993; Hoffman and McCarthy, 1994; Mills, 1998 and 2007; WHO, 2000; 
Gottret and Schieber, 2006; Wagstaff, 2007). In this approach, access to the package 
of services covered is a right of entitlement as a current member i. e., one's 
contribution obligations are up-to-date. 
In contrast, universal coverage can also be achieved through largely tax-funded health 
systems such as in the United Kingdom (UK), Sweden, New Zealand, Canada and 
Denmark where access is a right of citizenship or one's resident status (legal) and is 
not dependent on a specific earmarked contribution for health services from the 
residency. Mills (1998 and 2007) and Evans (2007) extend the definition to incorporate the policy 
objectives of equity in payments (the rich pay more than the poor); financial protection (persons should 
not become impoverished as a result of using health care) and equity in access or utilization (implying 
distribution according to need rather than ability to pay). 
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individual or household. More recently, as in Thailand, universal coverage may be 
achieved through a more deliberate and targeted mix of dominant tax-based financing 
alongside social insurance contributions and out of pocket payments (Nitayarumphong 
and Pannarunothai, 1998; Jongudomsuk, 2006). In some countries, targeted voluntary 
community health insurance and private health insurance may serve as complementary 
sources of funds to compulsory contributions so that blended systems emerge with the 
key criteria being pre-payment and appropriate access to services (WHO, 2000; ILO 
(International Labour Organisation), 2007; Gottret and Schieber, 2006). 
Despite wide differences in objectives and starting conditions, the current upsurge of 
interest in NHI systems among policy-makers and researchers in ICs and DCs 
generally emanated from actions, proposals and ongoing programmes for reforming 
their public expenditure systems, health sector and health financing mechanisms 
(World Bank, 1987 and 1993; Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD), 1992; Mills, 1999; WHO, 2000; Mills, Bennett and Russell, 
2001; Docteur and Oxley, 2003; Heller, 2005). More specifically: 
a) In DCs with fairly significant tax-funded health systems and limited social 
health insurance programmes, economic and budgetary difficulties have 
constrained the ability of the State to continue to fund the health sector at 
previous levels. Attempts to find alternative sources of financing led to the 
implementation or expansion of user fee programmes and some social and 
community health insurance schemes (Abel-Smith and Creese, 1989; WHO, 
1993; World Bank, 1993; Shaw and Griffin, 1995). The examples of NHI- 
type programmes in several ICs and DCs (Ron, Abel-Smith and Tamburi, 
1990; Glaser, 1991; Roemer, 1993; La Forgia, 1993; Saltman and Figueras, 
1997) as well as the recommendations of several international organisations 
such as the World Bank (World Bank, 1987 and 1993; Shaw and 
Ainsworth, 1993), the ILO (Ron, 1993; Normand and Weber, 1994; Dror, 
2000) and WHO (Kutzin and Barnum, 1994; Sergeant and Carrin, 1995) 
encouraged policy makers to explore the possibilities of NHI as a key 
financing option; 
b) In DCs with traditionally selective social health insurance programmes e. g. 
Mexico, Colombia, Argentina and Egypt problems of segmented 
population groups, access, choice of benefit packages and cost escalation 
led to serious concerns over inequalities in access and fiscal sustainability 
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necessitating major reforms with universal coverage as a key objective 
(Mesa-Lago, 1989; Griffin, 1990; Londono and Frenk, 1997; Gottret and 
Schieber, 2006, Hsiao, 2006; Wagstaff, 2007); 
c) In some formerly socialist countries of Eastern Europe, the decline of the 
paramount State and the "Semashko" model of public integrated health 
systems as well as the negative social impact of privatised approaches to 
health services have led policy makers to establish or propose NHI systems 
(Sheiman, 1992 and 1994; Ensor, 1993; Preker et al., 1996; WHO, 2000; 
Carrin and James, 2004; Kutzin, 2007); 
d) In ICs without substantial NHI programmes and which rely more on private 
health insurance such as the USA, problems of cost escalation, 
international competitiveness of firms, under- and un-insured groups and 
inequity have led to an intensification of the debate over health financing 
reforms including the role of a NHI programme (Navarro, 1989; Blendon 
and Donelan, 1990; Glaser, 1993; Fuchs, 1993; Hoff neyer and McCarthy, 
1994; Steinmo and Watts, 1995; Docteur et al., 2003, Gottret and Schieber, 
2006); 
e) In some ICs such as Italy, Portugal and Spain, persistent issues with 
solvency, fragmentation and differential access to benefits by members and 
non-members in their traditional social health insurance programmes led to 
their dissolution and adoption of more tax-based financing methods (OECD, 
1992; Roemer, 1993; Saltman and Figueras, 1997; Preker, 1998); 
f) In ICs with NHI based on established SHI programmes such as Germany, 
Holland, France and Japan concerns over cost containment, efficiency of 
pooling, choice and competitiveness led to major reforms in consolidation 
of insurers, benefit coverage and blending general taxes with payroll 
deductions. (OECD, 1987 and 1992; Ham, 1997; Saltman and Figueras, 
1997; Docteur and Oxley, 2003; Mossialos and Thompson, 2004). 
Based on the above it seems that while some countries are considering or moving 
towards the adoption of NHI-type programmes, others are busily engaged in reforming 
their schemes while others opted to terminate them. At the operational level, this 
suggests the need for ongoing review, assessment, validation and continuous re- 
engineering to ensure that the objectives of the programme and the overall health 
system are being met. More specifically, at the policy making level in those countries 
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seriously contemplating the introduction of NHI-type programmes, it calls for detailed 
examination of the theory and empirical basis i. e., the underlying macroeconomic, 
macrosocial and health-specific factors to inform decisions on programme choice, 
design and implementation so as to avoid the pitfalls and optimise the gains of NHI. 
1.3 Health Financing Concerns in Jamaica 
The health financing concerns facing Jamaican policy makers in 1997 (when field 
research commenced) and which have continued to the present bore several 
similarities to those in most DCs - how to increase and sustain health gains with an 
adequately funded, universal coverage financing system. 1997 was a landmark year for 
the health system, since after several months of discussing proposals and options, a 
formal agreement for a loan-funded Health Reform Programme (HRP) was signed 
with the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB). The design and implementation of 
NHI was specified as one of the principal reform measures in the HRP. 
Jamaica's health system reflects a mix of public and private financing and provision of 
services. The public sector provides (in publicly owned facilities) and finances 
(through tax funds) the majority of secondary/tertiary care services while the private 
sector is more dominant in providing ambulatory services (office consultations, drugs, 
diagnostics) usually financed through direct payments. The health status of the 
population has improved significantly over the last few decades. However, economic 
difficulties since the late 1970's followed by rigorous structural adjustment measures 
in the 1980's and slow, uneven growth in the 1990's and early 2000's placed 
considerable stress on the ability of the State to provide the level of support needed in 
the health sector (Abel-Smith, 1989; Cumper, 1993; Trevor Hamilton and Associates, 
1989; Theodore, 1997; World Bank (WB), 1996). This was exacerbated by the 
substantial reduction in external grants and aid from the late 1980's as the Cold War 
receded and the country's middle income status made it less deserving in the eyes of 
international donor groups (Abel-Smith, 1989; World Bank, 1994). 
On the other hand, the demand for and cost of health services has been increasing 
inexorably due to a mix of influences - some inevitable, some avoidable. These cost- 
drivers include: 
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a) population growth and the changing demographics with additional 
demands placed on health services to cope with the needs of the growing 
elderly cohort; 
b) the changed epidemiological profile with the predominance of chronic non- 
communicable diseases and trauma-related health conditions (violence and 
accidents) substantially replacing infectious and communicable diseases as 
the main causes of morbidity and mortality; 
c) the need to find funds for keeping abreast of changing health technologies 
(medicines, equipment; medical procedures); 
d) the persistence of inefficiencies in the allocation and use of health 
resources; 
e) pressures to keep apace with improving compensation packages to health 
workers; 
f) growing incomes and expectations of the population for more customer- 
oriented and modernized health service delivery norms. 
At the household level, the capacity to finance health services has varied in view of 
sharp income differentials, poverty levels of about 15% of the population and private 
health insurance cover for about 14% of the population. The result was much inequity 
in access to and utilisation of health services and the entrenchment of a two- (perhaps 
three-) tiered health system given the contrasting levels of utilisation of public, private 
and overseas care by persons at different income levels (Abel-Smith, 1989; Cumper, 
1992; World Bank, 1994; Gertler and Sturm, 1997; Theodore and La Foucade, 1998; 
van Doorslaer and Wagstaff, 1998). 
Figure 1.1 graphically summarises the health financing dilemma facing the State. 
Shortages of staff and supplies, delayed maintenance, long waiting times and general 
frustration of health workers and patients were cited among the principal effects of 
resource shortfalls in the public health sector (Abel-Smith, 1989; Cumper, 1992 and 
1993; World Bank, 1994). The increasing gap between resource availability and 
resource needs made adequate health financing a critical factor if health gains were to 
be sustained. 
Policy makers accepted that the growing health financing imbalance was unsustainable 
and that muddling through with minor changes would not bring system-wide 
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improvements. They debated whether financing alternatives should supplement or 
reduce public funds to health. However, all recognized the need for a better health 
financing system which could bring adequate resources, was equitable, sustainable and 
could provide increased health security at the household and national levels. Among 
the options recommended (not necessarily in isolation) in various consultancy studies 
in the 1980's and 1990's were: 
" increased taxes or reallocations from the public budget; 
" expanded user fee programme; 
" efficiency savings; 
" more private health insurance; 
" financing from a national lottery programme; 
" health savings accounts linked to pension plans; 
" increased aid and charitable donations; 
"a compulsory NHI programme. 
Figure 1.1 The Health Financing Dilemma in the Public Sector 
$ 
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Source: Author's representation. 
With the exception of NHI and to a lesser extent, user fees, most of the other options 
were considered by policyrnakers as either inadequate, uncertain or unacceptable 
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(Ogle Committee, 1988; Abel-Smith, 1989; World Bank, 1994; Green Paper, 1997). In 
the case of NHI, despite various studies, proposals and policy announcements since 
the 1960's, by 1997, it remained a desired choice but elusive, unlaunched mechanism 
to address the country's current and projected health financing dilemma. 
1.4 Goal and Objectives of Study 
The overall goal of the study is, through NHI in Jamaica, to explore, ex ante, the 
policy challenges, options, financial implications and socio-economic concerns that 
emanate from attempting radical changes in the mix of health financing mechanisms in 
a country. The approach is to examine the structural and operational factors 
necessitating changes in the existing financing system and to assess NHI options 
drawing on international best practices as well as on local dictates and 
recommendations. 
The specific objectives, with respect to Jamaica, are to: 
> delineate the factors influencing the policy drive for an NHI programme; 
> define the key elements of proposed and potentially feasible NHI options; 
> quantify the financial implications of the options and test their robustness using 
scenario analyses; 
> assess the relative merits of each option using criteria such as coverage, 
efficiency, equity and government's liability; and 
> explore the overall policy, operational implications and implementability of 
the preferred NHI option in terms of impact on stakeholders, linkages with 
other health financing mechanisms and meeting the goals of the health system. 
1.5 Organisation of Thesis 
The approach, methods, findings and conclusions of the thesis are presented in 8 
chapters. Following this Introduction (Chapter 1), the discussion is taken up in: 
Chapter 2... which examines the international experience (using published 
materials) with health financing systems and NHI to elicit theoretical 
perspectives and lessons learnt from implementation. It identifies the key 
factors and components in designing NHI, reviews performance in ICs and 
DCs and outlines implications for its adoption in Jamaica. It also highlights 
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some of the key issues pertaining to the applicability of stakeholder 
analysis as a tool to assist in designing an NHI programme. 
> Chapter 3... which provides information on the objectives and 
methodology of the study. It presents the conceptual framework for the 
research, the data collection methods and analyses-quantitative and 
qualitative, financial modelling and stakeholder analysis-and the 
derivation of the NHI prototype as one of the design options. In addition, it 
comments on the quality of the data and the likely influences of the results 
of the study. 
¢ Chapter 4... which provides a situation analysis of the demographic, 
epidemiological, macroeconomic, health financing factors and policy 
process in Jamaica. In addition, it identifies the broad pathways through 
which key contextual factors are likely to have influenced the specific NHI 
design options. 
¢ Chapter 5... which traces the development of NHI as a major public policy 
issue and outlines the key features of and responses to proposals by the 
Government for an NHI. In particular, it consolidates the government's 
1997 proposals and findings on NHI recommendations from key 
stakeholders into specific design options for evaluation. 
¢ Chapter 6... which focuses on financial modelling of the 3 design options. 
It specifies the range and magnitudes of the variables affecting inflows and 
outflows, the assumptions made, scenarios explored and results of 
sensitivity analyses. 
¢ Chapter 7... which examines to what extent the NHI design options 
measure up to the evaluative criteria of coverage, risk pooling, net revenue 
generation; equity; efficiency and contribution requirements by workers 
and the government. It also points out what seems to be emerging as a 
preferred NHI option for Jamaica and the extent to which this is consistent 
with emerging best practice internationally. 
¢ Chapter 8... which reflects on the overall methodology and findings and 
reviews the feasibility of the preferred option in relation to the range of 
preconditions and facilitating factors outlined in the literature. In addition, 
it indicates some of the limitations of the study and discusses the role of 
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key stakeholders in influencing the pattern and pace of health financing 
policy change. 
¢ Chapter 9... which presents the overall conclusions of the study and 
indicates the areas where the study has made an incremental addition to 
knowledge of health financing systems as well as aspects which could 
benefit from continuing research. 
1.6 Significance of Study 
The study has both intrinsic and practical significance. In relation to transferability of 
health financing models, it can advance the conceptual and empirical knowledge base 
on the type, range and intensity of issues encountered in approaching the 
design of 
universal NHI systems in different socioeconomic and health settings. In this regard, 
policy recommendations by researchers, funding institutions or other groups 
for health 
financing through NHI in low income or middle income DCs may be seen more as 
starting points for rigorous analysis and assessment rather than prescriptions 
for 
-implementation because of its purported conceptual advantages and performance 
in 
ICs and other DCs. 
It can point out or reaffirm the most robust and the most sensitive variables in terms of 
the approach to NHI systems and can suggest a mix of evaluative criteria and 
indicators to assess the viability of NHI systems in the design stage. The significance 
of an ex ante evaluation framework may be gauged from the relatively limited 
attention it has received compared to the greater preponderance in the literature on ex 
post analyses. 
It can provide valuable additional information for policymakers in Jamaica and other 
small developing countries on the ideological, institutional, stakeholder and financial 
aspects of NHI, the challenges of accommodating NHI in a formerly tax-funded 
system and on integrating NHI with other financing mechanisms to enhance universal 
coverage and health security for all. In addition it can re-emphasise that NHI and 
`getting the financing right' are not just narrow issues of more money for health but 
also of macrosocial equity and macroeconomic balance. 
Finally, it can highlight that, despite or in addition to sound technical and financial 
design, there are other crucial socio-economic factors influencing the confidence of 
policymakers and stakeholders in NHI. High among these factors are the underlying 
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macroeconomic conditions, real or perceived concerns over other simultaneous 
reforms and policies and the capacity of public sector agencies to manage the 
membership, collection of contributions, payments to providers, and overall, access to 
what many deem as a critical personal good - one's health. This confidence factor 
assumes greater prominence in a socio-economic environment where social solidarity 
has diminished in relation to individualism and personal choice, informal sector 
activities thrive, private health providers effectively compete with public providers, 
the historical performance of public agencies has been less than exemplary and key 
stakeholders have strong positions on all the above. 
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Key Areas to be Examined and Review Sources 
Compulsory contribution-based health insurance programmes with NHI-type features, 
whether completely or incompletely universal, have a chequered history of 
implementation among ICs and DCs. Some countries, with programmes spanning 
several decades, have persisted and have reformed their programmes at various times 
such as Germany, Netherlands, Israel, France, Japan, South Korea, Costa Rica; a few 
middle income countries have embarked on major reforms such as Mexico, Colombia, 
and Argentina. Other countries have recently commenced implementation (i. e., within 
the 2 decades) e. g., Viet Nam and some formerly socialist countries in Eastern Europe 
such as Moldova, Slovenia and Kyrgyzstan while some countries are still 
contemplating full implementation e. g., South Africa, Nigeria and Kenya. 
On the other hand, there are some countries which discarded their established 
programmes for other types of financing mechanisms that rely more heavily on 
general taxes such as Italy, Spain and Portugal. Brazil recently joined this group in the 
early 1990's (Savedoff, 2003). 
Several international and bilateral organizations, through technical and financial 
support activities, have played key roles in seeking to assist middle and low income 
countries to improve the functioning of their health systems and have included 
recommendations, implicitly or explicitly, for the design and implementation of NHI- 
type programmes (World Bank, 1993; IDB, 1996; WHO, 1999; Preker and Carrin, 
2004; GTZ, 2005; ILO, 2007). 
Given this spectrum of action, this Chapter examines -in more detail the international 
experience, both theoretical perspectives and empirical analyses, with NHI-type 
programmes funded largely through compulsory contributions to gain insights into its 
appeal, role, performance and policy concerns. It highlights key design features, 
facilitating and frustrating factors and implementation experiences with a view to 
identifying some of the major design implications for adoption of NHI as a 
. 
major 
health financing mechanism by Jamaica. 
In addition, with the increasing levels of attention being placed on the crucial role of 
stakeholder involvement in the design and decision-making aspects of health policy 
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(Walt, 1994; Reich and Cooper, 1996; Gilson et al, 1999; Brugha and Varvasovszky, 
2000; Mills, 2007), this Chapter also provides a brief review of the techniques of 
stakeholder analysis and political mapping and the extent to which they could be 
usefully applied in the development of and decisions on an NHI programme for 
Jamaica. 
The discussion is organized around the following themes: 
9 the goals and expectations of an appropriate health financing system and the 
relative merits of NHI in such a system; 
" key aspects of the theory of health insurance and the extent to which its 
positive features and dilemmas are transmitted to NHI; 
" purported benefits, pre-conditions and major design features of NHI; 
" performance of NHI systems in relation to the broad goals (expressed and/or 
implied) of national health systems and of health financing in IC's and DC's; 
" the possibilities and limitations of stakeholder analysis as a tool to assist in 
NHI design; 
" lessons and implications of international experience for NHI design in Jamaica. 
In terms of the sources of data, the literature review covered materials generated 
through 2 main search strategies: scanning and selection of materials from relevant 
online databases and identification of books, reports and articles from traditional 
catalogues/index cards in libraries. Given the range of issues generated by the subject 
matter of the research (health reform, public policy, health financing, insurance, 
policymaking, social protection), the online (advanced) search used a number of key 
words, phrases and in some cases, authors. These included social health insurance; 
national health insurance; compulsory health insurance; public health insurance; 
national health service; provider payment methods; health financing policy; private 
health insurance; stakeholder analysis; political mapping; prepaid health plans; 
managed care; health management and policy; fiscal space and health financing reform. 
The search included general and subject specific databases and focused on published 
materials from 1980 to 2006. 
The main online databases searched are listed as follows. 
> HealthSTAR: produced by National Library of Medicine (NLM) and American 
Hospital Association and containing citations and abstracts of journal articles, 
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monographs, technical reports, meeting abstracts, papers, books/chapters, 
government documents from 1975. This subject specialist database provided 
specific materials on health services, administration, health insurance; health 
policy; health economics and financial management. 
¢ Global Health: published by CABI and having international coverage of 
journal articles, conference proceedings, grey literature on all aspects of 
international public health from 1910 such as health policy and planning, 
community health, health economics, social medicine, public health practice 
and epidemiology. 
> LILACS: published by the Latin American and Caribbean Center for Health 
Sciences Information and containing journal articles, books, theses, technical 
and scientific reports (mostly bibliographic but some full-text) from 1982 on 
most aspects of health and health sciences. 
¢ MEDLINE: produced by NLM and containing a bibliographic database of 
mainly journal articles on medicine, health and allied fields from 1950. 
> EMBASE: the Excerpta Medica database with strong coverage of European 
material and containing biomedical and health policy literature from 1947. 
> POPLINE: produced by NLM, National Institutes of Health, Johns Hopkins 
University and containing abstracts of scientific articles, reports, books and 
unpublished information on population, family planning and related health. 
> British Medical Journal database: produced by the British Medical Association 
with a range of biomedical and health related articles from 1966. 
> LSHTM database: produced by the London School of Hygiene and Tropical 
Medicine with a wide range of materials, theses and publications on public 
health, health management and policy, social sciences and economics. 
> MEDCARIBE: produced by Caribbean Net and the Medical Library of the 
University of the West Indies with books, journals, theses, technical and 
scientific reports (mostly bibliographic references and some full text materials) 
on health sciences in the Caribbean. 
In addition, other helpful materials including some from 2007 and 2008 came from 
regular scanning and downloads of materials from the online databases of the World 
Bank, World Health Organisation, Inter-American Development Bank and Pan 
American Health Organisation. 
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The second search strategy involved identification and selection of materials from 
standard catalogues and index cards as well as abstracts from the Social Science 
Citation index (Social SCISEARCH) in 3 libraries. The bulk of the materials were 
sourced from the library at the LSHTM; other helpful materials were secured from the 
libraries of the London School of Economics and Political Science (London) and the 
University of the West Indies in Jamaica. In addition to information in the books, 
journal articles, reports and other commentaries generated in this search, their 
bibliographies provided clues to additional relevant material. The `snowballing' effect 
of using one reference to generate several other references was a key strategy adopted 
in the overall literature review. 
2.2 Goals of Health Financing and Relative Merits of NHI 
Health system goals emphasise improving levels and distribution of health, attaining 
equity in access and financing, securing efficiency (macroeconomic and 
microeconomic) in the allocation and use of resources; enhancing consumer choice 
and protecting members from catastrophic losses arising from health spending (OECD, 
1992; Normand, 1999; WHO, 2000; ILO, 2007; Gilson et al., 2007). The relative 
significance of these goals vary across time and countries and health financing 
mechanisms are expected to be sufficiently dynamic to respond to these changes in 
meeting the overall goals of the health system (Cumper, 1993; Fuchs, 1993; 
Chernichovsky et al., 2003; Wagstaff, 2007, McIntyre and Mooney, 2007). Health 
financing contributes to achievement of these goals through the key functions of 
revenue generation and collection, pooling of persons and funds and purchasing of 
appropriate health services (Mills, 1983; WHO, 1999; Preker and Carrin, 2004; 
Goffret and Schieber, 2006; Kutzin, 2007). As such, the choice of health financing 
mechanisms determines more than just the level of resources generated. It also 
influences the institutional arrangements for collecting and managing funds, 
organisational pattern for delivering health services, the quantity and quality of care 
provided, the way in which scarce resources are utilized and ultimately, the general 
level of health in society. In addition, the choice of a health financing system has 
implications for broader macroeconomic and macrosocial progress in a country (IDB, 
1996; WHO, 2001; ILO/GTZ/WHO, 2007). 
Health financing policies and operational arrangements to achieve these health goals 
involve decisions on a spectrum of activities from payment to utilization. More 
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specifically, these decisions relate to who pays, what types and mix of mechanisms are 
used to secure financing; who pools and manages the funds; what are the provider 
payment mechanisms; who provides the services; what services are bought and who 
benefits. The interface and linkages among these activities and actors are shown in 
Figure 2.1. 
i) Who Pays 
Whatever the health financing mechanism, the required funds come from the pockets 
of the general public as householders-income earners and from business entities- 
employers. The overall level of per capita income and the sharing of the financing 
burden between households and employers (and different groups within each) have 
implications for the adequacy of resources and equity in health financing i. e. whether 
payments-contribution are made in relation to ability to pay or some other criteria 
(WHO, 2000; Preker and Carrin, 2004; Gilson et al., 2007; McIntyre and Mooney, 
2007). 
ii) Types of Financing Mechanisms 
All countries employ a mix of financing mechanisms though the composition and 
balance varies. Empirically, using national health accounts data (WHO, 2000; Carrin 
et al., 2004; Wagstaff, 2007; Mills, 2007), one can identify a dominant mechanism 
either resulting from expressed policy design or from the observed pattern of health 
spending in a country. In most ICs - with the exception of the US and Switzerland 
where private insurance is dominant - there is greater dependence on public financing 
sources such as taxes e. g., in England, Canada and Sweden or compulsory social 
insurance deductions e. g., Germany, France and Japan. Private insurance and out of 
pocket payments have relatively minor roles in these countries. (Glaser, 1991; Roemer, 
1993; World Bank, 1993; WHO, 2000; Gottret and Schieber, 2006). 
In DCs there is greater diversity in the mix of financing mechanisms and in the extent 
to which there is an observed dominant mechanism. Public financing through taxes are 
dominant in some countries; in others, it is social health insurance; in some, direct 
payments and in a few aid, grants and gifts. Additionally, there are varying levels of 
financing through private insurance and community insurance schemes (World Bank, 
1993; Bennett, Creese and Monash, 1998; WHO, 2000; Arhin, 2001; Gottret and 
Schieber, 2006; Mills, 2007). 
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As dominant financing mechanisms, the level of taxes and social insurance deductions 
have implications for overall public sector financing and expenditure balances; fiscal 
space, incentives to business firms and workers; cost control and varied responses from 
groups of residents in their roles as payers and beneficiaries (World Bank, 1993; Reich, 
1994; WHO, 2001; Docteur and Oxley, 2003; Heller, 2005). 
iii) Management of Funds 
The source of financing influences the choice of agencies to manage the funds. Tax funds 
are generally managed by public agencies such as a Ministry/Department of Health e. g., 
UK; premiums and private insurance payments by private for profit or non-profit 
companies e. g., US; community health plans by local community agencies e. g., Burundi; 
Ghana, India and compulsory social insurance deductions by a single agency e. g., Taiwan, 
Costa Rica or multiple (competing and/or non-competing) pooling agencies e. g., 
Germany, Netherlands, Japan, and Colombia. Funds generated through aid, grants and 
gifts are handled by a mix of international, bilateral and private donor organizations and 
are managed in recipient countries by Ministries of Health or other public organizations, 
private agencies or sometimes directly by arms of the donor organizations. 
iv) Provider Payment Mechanisms 
The choice and mix of provider payment mechanisms (to health professionals and health 
facilities) such as salary, budgets, fee for services, case based payments, capitation have 
direct implications for the technical efficiency of service delivery (quantity and quality of 
services), the level of cost control and administrative complexity (Donaldson and Gerard, 
1993; Liu, 1997; Barnum, Kutzin and Saxenian, 1997; WHO, 2000; Glied, 2008). Table 
2.1 compares some of these key features of payment mechanisms as applied to health 
professionals and health facilities and their likely implications for the delivery of services, 
cost control and ease of administration. Generally, as pointed out by Bennett and Mills 
(1993), there are 3 aspects of the payment mechanism which administrators must get 
right: the mode and frequency of payment, the level of payment and the arrangements for 
reviews if one is to strike a sustainable balance between adequate returns to providers and 
cost control. 
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Table 2.1 Features of Provider Payment Mechanisms 
Payment Unit/ mode incentives for Incentives for Cost control Administrative 
mechanism of payment quantity of services quality of services and efficiency complexity 
A. Health Professionals 
Salary Per time None: reward not Limited Some cost Much effort in 
period linked to effort control but setting and 
problems with negotiating 
non-salary salary scales 
payments 
Capitation Per member Limited to just Limited Yes: fixed Some effort to 
or patients, enough care to keep payments negotiate rates 
on list members 
Fee for Per item or Encourages activity: Reasonable No: more Effort needed to 
service procedure reward linked to activity, more negotiate fees 
effort. earnings. and monitor 
Some induced billing 
demand and 
billing fraud 
B. Health Facilities 
Budget Per time Limited: no extra Limited to quality Good cost Some initial 
period and payments to do guidelines control effort in fixing 
mix of staff more budget. 
and services 
Per Diem Per bed day Encourages activity: Mixed: adequate Limited: more Effort needed to 
of care - admissions and care but some also care for fix rates and 
includes all length of stay unnecessary inpatients than monitor activity 
services outpatients 
Per Case Per episode Encourages focus on Reasonable Limited: Very complex 
Mix of care e. g., high- cost, short- cream to fix rates and 
diagnosis or stay cases skimming is monitor activity 
case group common 
Fee for Per item or Encourages activity Reasonable Minimal Effort needed to 
service procedure to and procedures negotiate fees 
patient and monitor 
billing 
Source: c; ompiiea from aata in iau kivy i); tjamum, Kutzin and Saxenian (1997); Saltman et. al (2004) 
v) Providers of Services 
Service providers are identified by the type of ownership, and organizational and 
accountability arrangements i. e. public, private or quasi-public health facilities. 
(Individual health providers also fit into the above categories and are generally grouped 
according to the type of facilities in which they work). However, there are notable 
exceptions where private providers operate in public facilities and vice versa (sometimes 
referred to as `private practice' or `dual practice'). For all providers, the matter of choice 
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is important in terms of whether patients as consumers have free or restricted choice of 
providers and alternatively whether providers have the right to turn away some patients. 
Vi) Mix of'Services 
A substantial body of literature has been developed in recent years to draw attention to 
allocative efficiency in terms of what services to provide, to ration and to exclude from 
benefit packages (World Bank, 1993; Jamison et al., 1993; Musgrove, 1996; Bobadilla, 
1996; Saltman and Figueras, 1997; WHO, 2000; Schreyogg et al., 2005). Issues of cost 
effectiveness, public versus private goods, rationing, and measures of outcomes such as 
QALY'S, DALY'S and HALES dominate this literature. As indicated in Figure 2.2, there 
is a common recognition that not all health services are equally effective or essential and 
that health spending may best be allocated using cost effectiveness principles (such as 
Cost per DALY). However, health financing is also expected to provide financial 
protection to members against catastrophic health expenses which may be incurred by the 
need for Category III services (WHO, 2000; Murray et al., 2003; ILO, 2007). In pure 
insurance teens, some have suggested that coverage of rare, low probability high cost 
catastrophic cases should he the primary role of health insurance rather than coverage of 
low cost, more predictable cases and expenses. 
Figure 2.2 Allocative Cfficieucy in ! /eahh Financing 
Health 
f° Services 
ö Category 
u 
m C 
LL 
Health 
Services 
Category 
11 
Health 
Services 
Category 
III 
f Cost effective interventions 
at low cost per DALY. 
f Full financing and prutection 
for all. 
1 f Less cost effective 
interventions. 
f Partial subsidies or use mix 
of public and mandated 
financing. 
f Least cost ef(c ctive 
interventions, i. e., where 
cast per DALY exceeds 
maximum social willingness 
to pay. 
f Leave to private financing 
services or rationing. 
Cost per DALY 
Source: Adapted from J. L. Bobadilla (1996) 
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Mills (2007) emphasizes that the definition of the benefit package is key in making 
universal coverage feasible and sustainable since no country could afford to include all 
technically available health services. While the majority of countries with or without NHI 
plans are struggling to define benefit packages, private health insurers have been doing so 
for decades. Appendix 2.1 lists the range of services usually covered and excluded in full 
package private health insurance plans. 
vii) Who Benefits 
This is determined by the extent of universal access and pooling of risks in the health 
system i. e. whether ability to pay out of pocket or membership in/contributions to a 
particular financing agency or rights of citizenship is the primary factor in determining 
who gets services. Musgrove (1996) suggests that for health services which can be 
classified as `public goods' (with non-rival, non-excludable properties) this issue may not 
be problematic since it is expected that tax revenues will fund these services. However, 
for most personal care services access will be dependent on the type of financing 
mechanism(s) in place i. e., the extent to which there are income and health risk pooling 
systems such as taxes and compulsory or voluntary health insurance plans as against 
members having to rely on personal out of pocket funds for covering required health 
services (WHO, 2000; Preker and Carrin, 2004; McIntyre, Gilson and Mutyambizi, 2005; 
Gottret and Schieber, 2006). 
Overall, health financing systems and mechanisms are expected to yield adequate 
resources, foster efficiency and equity and be sustainable. These expectations/criteria, 
among others, are also used in evaluating the functioning of health systems. Based on the 
theoretical debates and empirical evidence in ICs and DCs there is some general 
agreement in the literature (OECD, 1992; Ham, 1997; WHO, 2000; Preker and Carrin, 
2004; Gottret and Schieber, 2006; Mills, 2007) that 4 key principles characterize a 
desirable health financing system: 
Principle 1: mandatory pooling of income and health risk in the population 
through tax funded or compulsory health insurance plans; 
Principle 2: individual and household contributions on the basis of ability 
(capacity) to pay and access to services on the basis of need; 
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Principle 3: limited direct out of pocket payments (especially at time of 
utilization) to encourage access and avoid catastrophic payments and health- 
induced poverty; 
Principle 4: purchasing plans based on health priorities and value for money 
along with remuneration systems that are prospective and performance related. 
Figure 2.3 below shows the interaction among the first 3 principles: pooling of income 
and health risk; contributions based on ability to pay and access based on need; and limits 
on out of pocket/catastrophic payments. It depicts optimal pooling and cross subsidies or 
transfer. Firstly, on the contribution side, those with equal incomes but different health 
risk should make equal contributions. However, utilization levels will differ according to 
the level of health risk and need tier care. Secondly, those with differing levels of income 
contribute according to ability while utilizing equal levels of services because their health 
risks are equal. The varying size of the arrows indicates the quantum of expected 
contribution and utilization of services. 
Equal 
incomes 
Low 
risk 
High 
risk 
L7730-ý 
F- 
Source: WHO, 2000. 
Note: Varying size of arrow indicates the quantum of expected contribution and utilization of services. 
Figure 2.3 Risk Pooling and Utilisation in Tax-Financed 
and Social Insurance health Systems 
Contribution Net transfer Utilisation 
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The above discussion highlights the following aspects of health financing and NHI in 
relation to the achievement of health system goals: 
" the need to generate adequate revenue to cover the cost of health services and 
administration. However, adequacy is relative and resources could easily 
become inadequate if the benefit package is not properly defined as well as if 
there is poor management and incorrect incentives; 
" since no country relies exclusively on any single financing mechanism, there 
is need to manage a mix of mechanisms for better targeting of health services 
as public and private goods. Optimally, this involves the choice of a dominant 
financing mechanism such as tax-based or contribution-based system and 
selective use of supplementary mechanisms such as direct payments, aid and 
grants, and private health insurance; 
" the design, choice and implementation of NHI as a dominant financing 
mechanism has implications for broader health and social goals such as equity, 
efficiency of resource use, control of inflation and possibly, competitiveness 
of business firms. 
2.3 NHI and the Theory of Health Insurance 
In general terms, insurance is a risk-pooling mechanism to mitigate expected financial 
loss resulting from an unpredictable event. Adam Smith saw it as providing "great 
security to the fortunes of private people and by dividing among a great many that loss 
which would ruin an individual makes it fall light and easy upon the whole society" 
(Borch, 1990). Hall (1994) defines insurance as "the economic and legal vehicle for risk 
shifting... Insurance is a contract whereby a third party agrees to compensate the 
subscriber for specified costs incurred when a specified loss occurs". 
When applied to the health sector, one can distinguish between `voluntary' as in private 
and most community health insurance plans and `compulsory' or mandated health 
insurance. In terms of the latter, there is ongoing debate whether tax-based funds for 
health services which are compulsory and serve the insurance function of pooling'risk and 
income can properly be called `insurance' as against premiums in private insurance and 
compulsory contributions from earnings in social insurance (Glaser, 1991; Roemer, 1993; 
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Musgrove, 1996; Kutzin, 1998 and 2007; Normand, 1999). In this study, the definition of 
Soderlund and Khosa (1997) will be used in referring to health insurance as "all forms of 
subscription-funded (versus tax-funded) third party cover for health costs". 
As shown in Table 2.2, Bennett and Mills (1993) developed a typology of health 
insurance schemes outlining the main types of insuring organizations (private non-profit, 
private for profit, employer-provided or self-insurance and public insurer) along with the 
characteristics of the insurance plans i. e. compulsory or voluntary, and within these, 
whether there are group or individual plans. 
There are certain aspects of the general theory of insurance which heavily influence the 
design and practice of private as well as mandatory (national) health insurance. These 
include risk aversion and utility maximization; insurability of risks; market failure and 
information asymmetry. 
Table 2.2 Typology of Health Insurance Schemes 
COMPULSORY VOLUNTARY 
INSURER 
INDIVIDUAL INDIVIDUAL GROUP 
" Social Security Funds " Medical Aid Societies in 
1. Private Non- (Sickness Funds) in Zimbabwe and South 
Profit Holland, Germany, Africa 
Belgium, Switzerland " MASM in Malawi 
" Private carriers in 
2. Private for Thailand " Medical aid society in Profit " Top up private insurance Papua New Guinea 
in South Africa 
3. Employer- 
" Mining Companies in " Medical aid plans for based (Self South Africa " Employer health plans public sector workers in insurance) several countries 
" Social Security in 
4. Public Thailand, Mexico, India, " Thailand Health Card 
Pakistan 
L)uurce: nenneu ana Mills (1993). 
a) Risk-aversion and Utility Maximisation: 
Faced with future financial uncertainties (when the "state of the world" is unknown) risk- 
averse individuals (as compared to risk-neutral and risk-loving persons) wishing to 
maximise expected utility and minimise loss of wealth may be quite willing to pay a fair 
-36- 
premium (i. e. equal to the expected loss or the probability of the loss multiplied by the 
value of the loss) to an insurer for protection against the risks. Paying a fair premium may 
mean a reduction in current wealth but if this is compensated by increased utility in the 
future state then the risk-averter (and society as a whole if many more persons behave 
similarly) will be better-off (Arrow, 1963; Mehr, Cammack and Rose, 1985; Dionne, 
1992; Feldstein, 1993; Jacobs, 1996). 
Figure 2.4 illustrates this risk aversion - utility maximisation behaviour and the role of the 
fair premium. The line AEDB shows the actual utility schedule for the rational risk- 
averse individual with assumed diminishing marginal utility while the straight line (ACB) 
shows expected utility for different probabilities that illness will occur. The individual's 
current wealth W1 provides the level of utility U1. The cost of illness could reduce his 
wealth to the point W2 and utility to U2. However, to insure against this probable loss 
(especially if it is `catastrophic' rather than `small'), he is willing to pay the maximum 
premium of a+b. This reduces his wealth to W3 and his utility to U3 but he is better off 
with insurance than without it although not as well off if he could exactly predict the risk 
of illness and pay the fair premium, b, which would have provided him with a higher 
level of wealth, W4, and utility, U4. Since it is inconceivable that all possible risks can be 
covered (given imperfect information of the future), the rational risk-averse individual 
will tend to purchase more insurance protection for events which are "low probability- 
high loss" rather than those of an opposite nature. 
Several aspects of this theory of risk-averse behaviour are applicable to health. Health 
risks are ubiquitous and generally unpredictable whether one is speaking of diseases, 
accidents or invalidity. The determinant factors range from the physiological and 
behavioural to those which are more environmental and socio-economic (Arrow, 1963; 
Akin, 1989; Henke, 1992; Jacobs, 1996; Dunn et al., 1996; Chollet and Lewis, 1997). 
This leads to considerable uncertainty over the timing, nature and cost of illness 
(including outcomes of treatment). As such risk-averse individuals, especially income 
earners and heads of households, will seek health insurance as a rational choice. 
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Figure 2.4 Risk Aversion, Expected Utility and Health Insurance 
Utility (U) 
ul 
U4 
U3 
U2 
Wealth (W) 
Notes: b= fair premium; a+b = maximum premium 
The demand for health insurance generally depends on the premium, self-assessment of 
the probability and magnitude of the loss, and the degree of risk aversion (Mills, 1983; 
Stone, 1993; Chollet and Lewis, 1997). At an individual level there are several other 
specific variables which are taken account in determining the type and amount of 
insurance bought such as income, occupational class, household size and the extent to 
which subsidised health services are available (Propper and Eastwood, 1989; Shaw and 
Ainsworth, 1996; Dunn et al., 1996). In addition, for many people, particular medical 
services and the ability to choose one's caregiver, increase utility levels (on top of risk 
aversion utility) so they may choose to purchase more insurance, perhaps at a higher 
premium than that predicted by the pure risk aversion theory. This may partially explain 
why some persons `double insure' or buy `custom-designed' insurance coverage. 
In practice, this rational risk-averse behavioural model where health is treated as a 
consumption item yielding specific measurable individual benefits and the consequent 
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Wz W3 W4 Wi 
Source: Adapted from Feldstein (1993) 
purchase of health insurance along a typical demand curve does not fully reflect the 
complexities of the health product. There are several, largely social, reasons for this: 
" the asset in question, the human body, has intrinsic value and cannot be related 
solely to utilitarian considerations such as protection against income or 
employment losses. This has implications for a social as against purely individual 
role for health insurance (Donaldson and Gerard, 1993; Stone, 1993); 
" health has dual properties as a consumption and investment (human capital) good 
(World Bank, 1993; Chollet, 1994; Grossman, 1999; Dror, 2000; WHO, 2001). 
The latter aspect makes the decision to purchase health insurance a concern for 
national as well as business development and hence contingent on other variables 
than those reflective of individual risk-aversion behaviour only; 
" individual health has properties which also extend to the rest of the society i. e. 
positive and negative externalities. This implies that a health insurance market 
which responds to individual valuation of health risk and purchase of the 
necessary health insurance based on individual ability and willingness to pay may 
under-provide the level of socially necessary health insurance (Mills, 1983; Akin, 
1989; World Bank, 1993; Dror, 2000; Chemichovsky et al., 2001). 
Given this broader context of social benefits (utility), a strong case can be made for 
universal health insurance coverage (like NHI). 
viii) Insurability of Risks: 
Not all risks are insurable, can be pooled or will be covered by an insurer (at an 
affordable premium). Given current information, insurers do not generally cover risks 
which are certain to occur (within a defined time period) or eventualities already 
occurring ("burning houses"). Also, consumers generally do not insure for events which 
are certain not to occur nor do they seek cover for events which will have fairly negligible 
effects on their welfare (Arrow, 1963; Louberge, 1989; Dionne and Harrington, 1992; 
Feldstein, 1993; Chollet and Lewis, 1997). An insurable event/risk is one which: 
" is catastrophic i. e. causes large, measurable losses (not easily contrived); 
" affects a large number of people independently; 
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" is rare with a low probability of occurring; 
" occurs randomly for each individual but is known for the population. 
Certain health risks satisfy the conditions for insurability as outlined above. However 
there are many other health risks, perhaps the majority, which do not fit the above criteria. 
In fact, as, pointed out by La Forgia (1993), insurance companies and actuaries generally 
considered health insurance as an "oxymoron" and began to develop health insurance 
products much later as compared to the availability of other types of insurance e. g., life, 
shipping and property. The reasons for this can be found in the nature of many health 
risks and the health seeking behaviour of individuals: 
" health risks are not always infrequent or unpredictable. Several are based on 
discretionary actions or omissions and others result from natural aging processes; 
" not all illnesses occur randomly or are independent. Externalities and 
interdependence are significant aspects of health and illness; 
" not all costs are high or catastrophic. Many are quite small and could easily be 
paid directly by the consumer. 
While primarily designed as a risk-pooling mechanism enhancing access to care and 
financial protection against catastrophic and near catastrophic losses due to health 
(Zschock, 1986; Stone, 1993; Murray et al., 2003), health insurance has grown to become 
" more of a total health financing instrument covering all types of health services, some of 
which are highly probable or almost certain. This has far-reaching implications for the 
design of private and compulsory health insurance plans and, in particular, for the 
package of services covered, the reimbursement mechanism and the incentives for 
appropriate behaviour by consumers and providers (Evans, 1986; Barnum et al., 1997; 
Chollet and Lewis, 1997; Dror, 2000). 
ix) The Insurance Market: 
Using the Paretian definition, an efficient insurance market is one in which the 
distribution is such that no one can be made better off without making someone worse off 
(Rothschild and Stiglitz, 1976; Glied, 2008). The welfare of each buyer and seller will be 
maximised if certain market conditions are met. These are: 
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" there are many suppliers and buyers so none can influence the market in a 
particular direction; 
" there are no obstacles to entry and exit; 
" there is no price discrimination and the product being sold is homogeneous; 
" there is perfect information so consumers are sovereign and can make rational 
choices; 
" there are no externalities i. e., only those in the market can benefit or lose from 
transactions; 
" the price (premium) clears the market and maximises the utility functions of both 
insurers and buyer i. e. it is adequate to cover the expected claims on the supplier 
plus its loading costs while still being fair to the consumer (Rothschild and 
Stiglitz, 1976; Borch, 1992; Feldstein, 1993; Jacobs, 1996). 
However, the health insurance market (compared to the Paretian model and to other 
markets) is more generally characterised by incomplete and asymmetric information; 
lumpiness of investment so entry and exit are not easy; product differentiation, price 
discrimination and externalities (Arrow, 1963; Pauly, 1968; Rothschild and Stiglitz, 1976; 
Wilson, 1977: Chollet and Lewis, 1997). These have resulted in widespread market 
failure and disequilibria with the most common being adverse selection, moral hazard and 
over- and under-insurance and industry concentration. 
a) Adverse Selection: This occurs when consumers know more about their health risks 
and expected expenses than the insurers. So pooling consumers without perfect 
knowledge of risks will lead to inefficient pricing. At this pooled or community price, 
more high risk persons find it attractive to come on board and as such the selection of 
customers is adverse to the insurer rather than random. This leads to frequent payments 
by the insurer, higher premia and smaller membership and eventually the collapse of the 
market since there is no price at which the insurer may break even. Alternatively the 
market will persist but there will be an unstable or no equilibrium (Rothschild and Stiglitz, 
1976; Wilson, 1977; Stone, 1993). 
In seeking to counteract adverse selection and to set a fair premium which relates 
individual risks and expected loss as close as possible, insurers have developed 
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sophisticated rating and underwriting techniques based on risk signals and market 
segmentation. These are part of the experience rating systems used particularly by private 
insurers as compared to community rating used by social insurance organizations. The 
general objective of these techniques is to develop a risk profile of individuals and groups 
by including and rating any factor which can predict future health cost: age, sex, race, 
education, occupation, location of residence, lifestyle, current health status and medical 
history (Donaldson and Gerard, 1993; Stone, 1993; Dunn et. al. 1996; Chollet and Lewis, 
1997). This divides and stratifies the risk pool into varying levels of high and low risk (re: 
standard, preferred and sub-standard risk categories) with appropriate changes in the price 
or the benefit package or both. However, as van Vliet and van de Ven (1992) and van 
Barneveld (1997) pointed out, these techniques predict less than ten percent of the 
variations in health costs among individuals in any one year. The percentage of predicted 
variation is slightly higher if one is comparing groups (Hall, 1994; Dunn et al., 1996). 
Insurers respond to adverse selection by: 
" Cherry-picking or cream-skimming: in competitive markets this refers to the 
screening out of potentially high risk persons through risk assessments or through 
offering particular packages which only low risk persons would want to buy. 
" Blacklisting i. e., systematic screening out and denial of cover to particular social 
or occupational groups. 
" Other administrative techniques such as exclusions of certain categories of 
illnesses from cover, waiting periods before one can become eligible for benefits 
and insistence on total group cover in some occupations. 
b) Moral Hazard: The tendency for individuals, once insured, to behave in a manner 
which increases the probability of the covered risk occurring or to consume significantly 
more services than would have occurred without insurance. Figure 2.5 shows the 
expected effects of moral hazard and of cost sharing arrangements to curb the problem. 
The point Q1 is the socially optimal level of consumption where marginal cost equals 
marginal benefit (which is reflected in the demand curve). With full reimbursement 
insurance, consumption shifts to Q2 giving a social welfare loss of BCQ2. The 
implementation of a copayment at P* leads to a fall in consumption to Q3 and a smaller 
social welfare loss of BDE (Folland, et al., 1993). 
-42- 
Figure 2.5 Health Insurance, Moral Hazard and Impact of Copayments 
P 
P1 
P4 
Notes: Q, = Quantity demanded without insurance; Q2 = Quantity demanded with full cover insurance; Q3 
= Quantity demanded with copayment; Q2-Q1 = Extent of Moral Hazard; Q2-Q3 = Reduction in Demand 
due to Copayment. P= Price P* = Copayment implemented. 
Source: Adapted from Folland, Goodman and Stano (1993) 
Moral hazard has major implications for cost and utilisation management by the insurer. 
This is complicated by the actions of providers who, recognising that they do not have to 
bear the costs of their treatment decisions and that these costs are being met by a third- 
party and not the consumer, are more prone to overtreat and overprescribe. As such 
provider moral hazard becomes a major concern since with his unique skills he knows 
more about the health condition and treatment than the consumer. As such he can induce 
a higher level of demand (sometimes referred to as `supplier-induced demand') higher 
than that which would have been registered by a fully-informed consumer (Borch, 1992; 
Fuchs, 1993; Donaldson and Gerard, 1993; Chollet and Lewis, 1997). 
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As the third-party intermediary, the insurer has to be a more `active purchaser' (Mills and 
Bennett, 2001; WHO, 2000; Docteur and Oxley, 2003, Saltman, 2004) with various cost- 
sharing (such as coinsurance, deductibles and copayments), supply and utilisation 
management measures (such as benefit limits and restrictions on use of providers) to 
contain demand on the one hand and on the other, unnecessary treatments by the 
providers (such as prior authorisation for certain treatments, second opinions for elective 
surgery, concurrent reviews and strict claims adjudication). Figure 2.6 displays some of 
these techniques and their application along the various points in the utilization-payments 
spectrum starting at the primary care or first contact point in the delivery system. 
Figure 2.6 Techniques of Managing Patient Utilization and Provider Behaviour 
PATIENT 
'Cost sharing 
Hospital 
Admission 
Hospital 
Discharge 
Claim 
Submission 
"Contact / 
Claims 
Adjudication 
-Pre-Admission Testing 
"Case Management 
"Second Opinion 
PRIMARY CARE 
PROVIDER 
"Concurrent Review 
-Case Management 
"Discharge Planning 
Source: Adapted from P. Jacobs, (1996) 
"Retrospective Review 
"Case Management 
*Claims Adjudication 
Evans (1986) takes a different view on the utilisation deterrent argument by indicating 
that moral hazard has to be distinguished from the additional demand resulting from the 
reduction of financial barriers to care due to insurance coverage. He suggests that in the 
case of "health needs" and "externalities" some moral hazard may be justifiable. 
c) Over- and Under-Insurance: In the absence of perfect information, the market may 
not appropriately match the real "needs" of consumers for insurance so that some may 
end up with more cover and higher costs than warranted while the opposite may occur for 
other persons. In health, over-insurance is more likely where insurance is subsidised. As 
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such, policies which make insurance payments fully tax deductible for employers and 
employees are more likely to result in less rigorous search for appropriate health plans 
(Folland et al., 1993; Hall, 1994; Steinmo and Watts, 1995; Docteur et al., 2003). 
Underinsurance occurs because the existing health plans fail to match the needs of a 
consumer due to inadequate information on the part of the insurer or because the price of 
the plan is beyond a potential subscriber's ability to pay. For many, from a social point of 
view, may still represent a reasonable choice for many under private market conditions 
(Feldstein, 1993; Jacobs, 1996; Chollett and Lewis, 1997). 
d) Monopolies and Industry Concentration in Insurance: Monopolies can develop in 
the health insurance industry through a deliberate policy decision to establish a single 
public company to provide all health insurance as in some 
NHI programmes (Frech, 
1996). In private markets monopolies can also develop because the high entry and 
operational costs (i. e. the cost of establishment, gathering 
information, claims 
management etc. ) may either discourage potential firms from entering the market or may 
cause difficulties for marginal firms thus leading to a series of mergers. In the case of the 
latter there will be a tendency for more concentration of firms leading to an oligopolistic 
market or the dominance of a particular firm e. g., with a controlling share of more than 
60% of the market. 
However, not all situations where a single insurer exists can be described as one of 
monopoly. Some markets may deliberately be based on a contestable rather than 
competitive model. Ex ante bidding among prospective firms to provide insurance cover 
for a particular population group may lead to a single firm winning the contract and 
serving as the sole carrier for a specified period. 
The presence of a monopolistic provider of health insurance can have the following 
negative consequences (which may not have occurred in a more competitive market): 
" more standardisation and less innovativeness in health plans with loss of 
consumer sovereignty and choice (Frech, 1996); 
" use of price discrimination strategies with consumers as price takers leading to 
some segments of the market being more favoured or squeezed than others 
(Dionne and Harrington, 1992; Jacobs, 1996; Dror, 2000); 
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9 the loss of competition could lead to administrative and other inefficiencies as 
well as excess profits in the monopoly firm (i. e. high loading costs) which are 
transmitted directly to subscribers through higher premiums. (Jacobs, 1996). 
On the other hand, it can be argued that a monopolist insurer can benefit from 
administrative economies of scale in having a single pool of members and can exert 
greater influence over service providers by bringing more bargaining power to the table in 
order to secure the benefits and welfare of the consumer (Fuchs, 1993; Anderson and 
Hussey, 2004; Gottret and Schieber, 2006). 
The persistence of the above market failures (despite efforts to regulate, control, offer 
incentives for efficiency etc. ) has resulted in serious doubts over the ability of the private 
and unregulated health insurance market to provide optimal solutions for risk-sharing and 
financial protection (Rothschild and Stiglitz, 1976; Stone, 1993; Gottret and ISchieber 
2006). These concerns are increased when issues of equity are considered (in relation to 
unmet health needs and the exclusion of many persons from the market through risk 
selection mechanisms) as well as the overall compatibility of the unregulated health 
insurance market (led by the "invisible hand") with the health objectives of a country. 
Some of these concerns can be addressed in compulsory contributions systems such as 
NHI programmes which are based on "social solidarity" and "collective equivalence" 
(Glaser, 1991; Henke, 1992; WHO, 2000; ILO, 2007) and which are not just "upscaling" 
of private health insurance products. However, it should be noted that, an NHI 
programme is essentially another mechanism for insurance, pooling of risks and financial 
protection and is not immune from all the challenges, shortcomings and failures that 
characterize private health insurance markets. Their ability to cope with and circumvent 
insurance and related market failures depends to a large extent on the design of the 
programme. This is examined below. 
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2.4 NHI: Benefits, Preconditions, and Key Design Features 
a) Expected Benefits of NHI 
As a health financing mechanism drawing heavily on the principles of social insurance, 
NHI has more of the features associated with social solidarity rather than private 
- insurance markets and actuarial fairness. At the individual and household level, it is seen 
as a primary source of health security and financial protection enabling access to 
necessary care . At the national 
level it is a major source of health funds to pay providers 
and to contribute to the goals of the health sector i. e., 
" mobilising adequate funds for services to meet health needs and demands; 
" allocating funds and organising the delivery of services efficiently and effectively; 
" ensuring universal and equitable access to health services. 
In examining the expected benefits and design of NHI programmes, the dual functions in 
terms of meeting individual and national objectives must be borne in mind if it is to be 
acceptable. The tendency to focus exclusively or disproportionately on national objectives 
and implications while ignoring its role in satisfying the objectives of the individual is an 
important aspect of ongoing reforms to ensure greater choice, responsiveness and 
efficiency in NHI programmes (Docteur and Oxley, 2003; Saltman, 2004; Gottret and 
Schieber, 2006; Mills, 2007). . 
Various analysts have pointed to the following potential benefits of contribution-based as 
compared to other health financing mechanisms (Ron et al., 1990; Glaser, 1991; Abel- 
Smith, 1992; Normand and Weber, 1994; Normand, 2001; Saltman, 2004): 
" it is a stable source of financing with funds dedicated to health services; 
" it can pay for the full cost of health services; 
" it enhances equity by combining risk-pooling with mutual support thus reducing 
adverse selection and redistributing benefits and costs "from each according to his 
ability to each according to his needs". Those contributing more than they benefit 
by utilising health services are the high wage earners, single persons, small 
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families and the young while those receiving more benefits than they contribute 
are low wage earners, the disabled/invalid, large families and the old; 
it is an earned benefit and establishes the rights of the individual as a member with 
entitlements rather than just a recipient of a welfare benefit; 
" it provides more bargaining power to the purchaser in negotiations with providers; 
" it can be used more effectively to contain costs than private health insurance; 
" it can build on existing Social Security arrangements; 
" it can co-exist and blend with other health financing mechanisms. 
Securing these benefits in an NHI plan is not automatic. It depends largely on the extent 
to which certain pre-conditions are realized, the particular design chosen, administrative 
efficiency and facilitating environmental factors (Normand, 2001; Gottret and Schieber, 
2006; Wagstaff, 2007; Kwon, 2007). 
x) Pre-conditions and Facilitating Factors 
Drawing on lessons of experience, various analysts have suggested certain key pre- 
conditions and factors which facilitate the development and sustainability of SHI, and by 
extension, NHI-type programmes (Normand and Weber, 1994; Shaw and Ainsworth, 
1996; Kutzin, 1997; Ensor, 1999; Barnighausen and Sauerborn, 2002). These include: 
> general macroeconomic growth sustained over long periods; 
> high labour force participation rate with substantially more persons employed in 
the formal wage-earning sectors than in the self-employed and informal sectors; 
> reasonably acceptable burden of taxes and other statutory deductions; 
> efficient collection system and enforceable arrangements to deter non-compliance; 
> general confidence in the competence and integrity of pooling agencies; 
> effective mechanisms to target the poor and other vulnerable social groups; 
> acceptability and confidence in the availability and-quality of health services; 
>a system of user fees and co-payments to deter free riders and moral hazard; 
> general support of key stakeholders; 
> supportive legislative framework. 
The above pre-conditions are generally satisfied in ICs and some middle income DCs. 
However, there have been and are major reservations about the presence and 
sustainability of these pre-conditions in most DCs. Shaw and Ainsworth (1993) and Ensor 
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(1999) developed a set of quantitative indicators based on some of these pre-conditions to 
assess and rank a number of low and middle income DCs in terms of the theoretical 
feasibility of establishing compulsory insurance like SHI and NHI (notwithstanding the 
fact that several DCs in their assessment already had or had plans for such programmes). 
Their analyses considered factors relating to the supply of insurance (such as population 
density; urban density; formal sector labour force and aid flows to the health sector) and 
demand for insurance (such as per capita income; private spending on health; availability 
of health services). Based on the evaluation, Ensor (1999) developed a ranking which 
showed that only 5 of 81 countries (Trinidad and Tobago, South Korea, Mexico, Belarus 
and Estonia) attained scores that suggest general feasibility; 13 showed some positive 
features and scores suggesting some scope while the majority of low and middle income 
countries (including Jamaica) were scattered along the spectrum of some to extreme 
difficulties in establishing compulsory health insurance programmes. 
xi) Issues In Designing NHI-type Programmes 
The OECD's (1992) outline of the Public Contract Model of a health system (Figure 2.7) 
provides a broad framework for conceptualizing and examining the design of a 
compulsory health insurance programme like NHI. It shows compulsory income-related 
contributions being made by enterprises and the population to pooling-funding agencies 
(i. e. public or private insurers) which contract with health providers for the supply of 
services to beneficiaries. Copayments may or may not be featured in these contracts. 
In reviewing the international literature, it would appear that, apart from having 
compulsory contributions (through payroll deductions or other income-based charges) as 
the main source of finance, there are significant differences among countries in terms of 
the design and functioning of their NHI-type systems. These differences lead to a broad 
typology with the following characteristics and country examples: 
" Universal (National) Coverage, single pooling agency, complete: Taiwan, Costa 
Rica, South Korea; 
" Universal coverage, single-pooling, incomplete: VietNam, Phillipines, Moldova; 
" Universal coverage, multiple pools, complete: Germany, Japan, Belgium; 
" Universal coverage, multiple pools, incomplete: Colombia, Uruguay, Argentina. 
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Figure 2.7 Public Contract Model in Health 
Funding Bodies: 
Public or Private 
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Source: Adapted from OECD (1992) 
The case of Singapore is interesting since its basic Medical Savings Account Plan 
(Medisave) is compulsory and national in coverage but it is not a pooled arrangement. On 
the other hand its catastrophic care coverage plan (Medishield) which uses a percentage 
of the contributions from the Medisave programme is compulsory and pools the 
population. As such it can be seen as a NHI-type mechanism for a limited package of 
benefits (Hsiao, 1995; Ministry of Health, 1997; Phua, 1997; Asher and Nandy, 2006). 
Based on the particular forms observed among IC's and DC's (reflecting their specific 
needs, vision, objectives and capabilities) and on the theoretical underpinnings of NHI, it 
would appear that there are 9 key components (each with associated policy options) 
which need to be considered in the design and development of NHI-type programmes 
(Ron et al., 1990; Normand and Weber, 1994; Normand, 2001; Carrin and James, 2004; 
Gottret and Schieber, 2006; Mills, 2007). 
a) Conceptual Framework and Policy Goals: 
Definition of policy goals such as universal coverage, equitable financing and access to 
care, additional revenue; dominant or supplementary financing mechanism; role of 
duplicate or coordinated benefits and payments in private insurance plans. 
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b) Administrative Arrangements: 
Administration through a single statutory fund or several competing or non-competing 
funds; organization of funds by industry, region, occupational groups or on an open 
enrollment basis; penalties for excluding prospective members; establishment of a central 
governing body to collect contributions and distribute among the competing funds - based 
on contracts or open choice by members - according to the risk profile of their 
membership, to regulate and monitor these funds and to manage risk equalization 
arrangements; specification of rules for e. g. competition at the front end among 
insurers/competing funds in terms of deciding on the package and contributions, as well 
as at the provider end in terms of negotiating separate contracts and payments plans with 
health providers or competition for the former only or the latter; relationship (degree of 
autonomy) between these funds or the single statutory fund and the Ministry of Health or 
Ministry of Finance and the existing Social Security agencies. 
The issue of risk adjustment mechanisms is perhaps the most intractable when the NHI 
programme is organised on a competitive basis but within a community rating framework. 
Since insurers are not permitted to risk-rate and to select subscribers risk adjustment 
mechanisms are needed to induce their participation in the market. The example of 
Holland is particularly instructive in this respect even though the risk adjusted capitation 
system being used is questionable (Van Barneveld et al., 1997; Docteur and Oxley, 2003). 
Several other countries as diverse as Russia (Sheiman, 1992), Israel (Chernikovsky and 
Chinitz, 1995), Germany (Saltman and Figueras, 1997) and South Africa (Soderlund and 
Khosa, 1997) have contemplated its introduction as the key feature of their NHI 
programme. (A major study on health systems in OECD countries, Hoffineyer and 
McCarthy, 1994, also recommended risk adjusted payments as a central feature of a 
recommended "prototype" of a health system. ) 
Soderlund and Khosa (1997) looked at several options in designing risk adjustment 
mechanisms even while conceding that the risk-predictors in current use can only explain 
a relatively small part on the variation in utilization and health expenses among 
individuals. Table 2.3 below summarises their main findings. (See also Dunn et al.; 1996). 
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c) Package of Services to be Covered 
Specification of the package or packages of services such as comprehensive covering 
primary, secondary and tertiary services in the public and private sectors, or catastrophic 
care only with the option of securing complementary `wrap-around' or `top-up' insurance 
from alternative sources, or a basic package covering a selected mix of primary and 
secondary care services. The 2 main alternative approaches as defined by Creese and 
Bennett (1997) are Type 1 consisting of high cost, low frequency, hospital centred 
services vs. Type 2 containing low cost, high frequency, community based services. 
d) Coverage of Population 
Enrolment (coverage) of the entire population or selected groups such as those in the 
formal sector (private and public sectors); opting out clauses; coverage of dependents, 
pensioners and the poor; special regimes to enlist farmers, the self-employed, informal 
sector workers such as lower premium, lower cost-sharing, lower income ceiling. 
e) Contributions/Premium 
Determination of who pays; how much; the basis of the contribution whether income or 
earnings; contribution based on fixed rates or percentage of income; similar or varying 
levels of contributions from wage earners, self-employed; pensioners; sharing of the 
contribution among the worker, employer and government; differential rates for classes of 
risks; setting of rates by the State or by the statutory fund or by each competing fund; 
ceilings and floors for insurable earnings; tax deductible contributions; indexation of rates 
to the rate of inflation or to wage indices. 
f) Co-payments and Utilisation Limits 
Specification of copayments--zero or small payments; on all or some items of service; as 
a fixed fee or a, percentage of cost; establishment of rates centrally or by each fund; 
provisions for extra-billing; utilisation and expenditure limits fixed per illness or per 
service such as drugs, bed-days; visits; surgery. 
g) Provision of Services 
Provision of services by the funding agency(ies) through own health facilities or purchase 
of services from competing or non- competing public and private providers; stipulations 
of eligibility to be a participating provider and terms of provider contract; role of overseas 
providers and of open market sourcing of overseas services or of contracts with third 
party administrators to source, monitor and manage overseas care. 
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h) Remuneration Arrangements 
Establishment of rules and arrangements for remunerating providers such as fee for 
service, capitation, salary, global budgets, per diem, per case; specification of service 
contracts such as cost, volume or both; time-frames and provisions for processing of 
claims whether electronic, paper-based or a mix of both. 
i) Phasing of the Programme 
Specification of phasing of programme in terms of a gradual or aggressive approach to 
implementation and which services, providers and population groups will be covered in 
the various phases. 
The above range of issues to be considered in designing an NHI programme has major 
implications for stakeholders and some are more vocal than others in articulating their 
concerns and positions. As such, the final design of the NHI programme will reflect a mix 
of financial, social, political and health considerations (Normand and Weber, 1994; Mills, 
1996; Ensor and Thompson, 1998). In addition, experience suggests that the final design 
cannot be "fixed in stone" but must be constantly monitored, evaluated and re-engineered 
to ensure objectives are being met and that contributors, patients and providers are 
satisfied (Barnighausen and Sauerborn, 2002; Docteur and Oxley, 2003; Saltman, 2004; 
Wagstaff, 2005). 
2.5 Performance of NHI-Type Systems 
In assessing the performance of NHI-type systems across countries, there are 3 
observations which can be made: 
> no country relies exclusively on any one financing mechanism to raise revenue, 
facilitate access to care and remunerate providers. In practice, one can identify a 
dominant financing mechanism and the performance assessment will consider 
impact in terms of the influence this dominant mechanism; 
> discussion of performance may be more helpful in a comparative context which 
shows experiences of different systems e. g., NHI, tax-based and private health 
insurance in coping with the challenges of financing health services; 
> it is quite difficult to disentangle the overall performance of a health system by 
looking at the source of financing only. As discussed in Chapter 2, there are 7 
aspects of the health financing framework which come together to make a 
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"system" and to focus on the mode of raising the funds alone will not be very 
meaningful. However, there are some reasonably broad features which distinguish 
NHI-type systems from tax-based and private insurance-led ones and observations 
and inferences from these will be used in the evaluation. 
i) Assessing Performance 
While there is a wide range of measures and tools developed for or used in evaluation 
(Zschock, 1979; Gerard and Donaldson, 1993; Hoffineyer and McCarthy, 1994; McPake 
and Kutzin, 1997; Wagstaff, 2007), Mills (1983) suggested some key criteria for 
assessing, broadly yet meaningfully, the appropriateness and performance of health 
financing systems. These are distribution of financial burden and access to benefits by 
different groups; quantity and quality of services being financed; efficiency of service 
provision; efficiency of administration and achievement of national goals - in measurable 
terms, the latter have been defined in such as universality of coverage, level of health 
attained, measures of financial protection and consumer satisfaction (WHO, 2000). 
a) Sharing of Costs and Benefits 
Equity in financing: This may be defined in terms of "progressivity" i. e. those with the 
ability to pay more should contribute more in practice. Various writers (van Doorslaer 
and Wagstaff, 1993; Hoffineyer and McCarthy, 1994; Wagstaff, 2007; Glied, 2008) 
indicate that NHI systems in IC's and DC's are mildly regressive when compared to 
systems dependent on general taxes. This is due to the establishment of fixed percentage 
payroll deductions in many cases, limits on insurable earnings, tax deductible provisions 
for NHI payments and provisions for "opting out" e. g., in Germany, Holland, Chile. One 
counter-balancing factor is that out of pocket payments are generally quite low for 
services covered under NHI-type systems in ICs limiting the burden placed on low 
income groups to pay for health services. However, top-up insurance for copayments and 
excluded services still require other sources of financing by households (Docteur and 
Oxley, 2003; Mossialos and Thompson, 2004). 
In a different analysis using another measure of equity, Murray et al., (2003) estimated 
that ICs with NHI-type programmes e. g., Germany, Belgium performed relatively well in 
terms of `fairness of financial contribution' (above 0.9 in most cases) compared to 
countries with tax-funded plans such as the UK and Spain. 
In DCs e. g., South Korea (Kwon, 2003 and 2007) and Vietnam (Ensor, 1995; Ron, Carrin 
and van Tien, 1998) high copayments are required for insured services. These are more 
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burdensome on those with lower incomes thus leading to a large measure of regressivity 
in their NHI programmes (Wagstaff, 2007). Because of incomplete pooling in most DCs, 
indicators of fairness of financial contribution are generally quite modest (Murray et. al, 
2003) and in some cases like Argentina and Colombia more than 5% of households have 
to make `catastrophic payments' for health services (Xu et al., 2003). 
Equity in access: In ICs this is generally felt to be one of the successful outcomes of NHI 
(Ham, 1997; WHO, 2000; Docteur and Oxley, 2003; Gottret and Schieber, 2006; 
McIntyre and Mooney, 2007). However, near universal coverage and. equity in access in 
these countries do not always mean equity in utilisation. For example in France, there are 
noticeable disparities in utilisation among different social classes and between those 
living in rural as compared to urban, well-to-do areas (Docteur and Oxley, 2003). 
In DCs there are significant differences in the number of visits to health facilities by the 
insured and those who are not insured and those who are members of less well-endowed 
NHI agencies e. g., South Korea (Yang, 1993), Argentina (Lloyd-Sherlock, 2006), Mexico 
(Lloyd-Sherlock, 2006; PAHO, 2007) and Colombia (Rosa and Alberto, 2004). The 
insured are normally the urban, formal sector workers and their families-thus a definite 
pattern can be identified in terms of their increased access to and utilisation of health 
services at all levels as compared to other social groups (McIntyre, Gilson and 
Mutyambizi, 2005; ILO, 2007; Wagstaff, 2007). 
b) Quantity and Quality of Services 
Mix of services covered: The package of services covered in most ICs is usually quite 
comprehensive (Docteur and Oxley, 2003; Saltman, 2004). 
In DCs, NHI-type programmes have led to considerable development and expansion in 
the range and volume of services provided. However, there has been a clear tendency to 
focus more on hospital-based curative services with preventive services being the 
responsibility of the Ministries of Health e. g., Costa Rica (La Forgia, 1993; Mills, 2007), 
Chile (Homedes and Ugalde, 2005), and South Korea (National Health Insurance 
Corporation, 2005; Kwon, 2007). 
Quality of Services: If patient satisfaction and general health outcomes can be used as 
indicators of quality, ICs with NHI systems can be said to have performed quite well 
scoring 7 and above in the WHO's `responsiveness' index (WHO, 2000) and having more 
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than 60% of the population expressing `satisfaction' in the Eurobarometer survey of 2001 
(Docteur and Oxley, 2003). 
In DCs there are few systematic studies on consumer satisfaction and quality of services. 
Most DCs including several with NHI- type programmes had modest scores according to 
the WHO's responsiveness index (WHO, 2000). 
c) Efficiency of Service Provision 
Cost Containment: Compared to the US where private health insurance is more 
dominant, ICs with NHI-type systems have been more successful in containing cost and 
preventing unnecessary duplication of services (Himmelstein and Woolhandler, 1991; 
Fuchs, 1993, Hoffineyer and McCarthy, 1994; Gottret and Schieber, 2006). One of the 
major reasons for this seems to be the bargaining strength of the agencies in negotiating 
reimbursement levels and in curtailing excessive high technology investment. However, 
compared with countries that have tax-funded systems, cost control is a major concern in 
most countries with NHI-type programmes with health spending as a percentage of GDP 
about 9% and above (WHO, 2000). A range of reforms on the supply and demand sides 
have been or are contemplated to contain costs (Saltman and Figueras, 1997; Preker, 
1998; Mills, 1999; Docteur and Oxley, 2003; Gottret and Schieber, 2006). 
In DCs, cost control has not been one of the strong points of NHI-type systems. In fact, 
cost escalation occasioned by consumer and physician moral hazard seems to have been 
the norm e. g., Korea (Kwon, 2007; Argentina and Mexico (Homedes and Ugalde, 2005; 
Lloyd-Sherlock, 2006). 
Impact of Payment Mechanism: Payment mechanisms are generally similar and not 
unique to countries with NHI-type vs. other health financing systems (OECD, 2006, 
Gottret and Schieber, 2006; Glied, 2008). In most ICs with NHI-type systems, negotiated 
fees and global budgets are used to reimburse providers. In addition, extra-billing is not 
normally permitted. While these arrangements may be said to have contributed in some 
way in slowing down cost escalation (while other factors were pushing up costs), there 
are no noticeable differences whether this has been more successful in countries with 
NHI-type financing vs. tax funding. However, tighter controls over payment systems (and 
less `defensive medicine' practices) have been cited as key factors in cost control 
compared to the US with more private insurance financing (WHO, 2000; Gottret and 
Schieber, 2006; Glied, 2008). 
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In DCs, fee for services especially for hospital and high technology services has led to 
significant cost escalation and excessive investment e. g., South Korea (Kutzin and 
Barnum, 1994; Kwon, 2007), Taiwan (Lu and Hsiao, 2003) Chile and Mexico (Homedes 
and Ugalde, 2005) and Argentina (Lloyd-Sherlock, 2006). 
Use of Gatekeepers and Referral Channels: There is much self-referral and direct 
access to specialist services in most ICs with NHI systems. Formal arrangements to be 
linked to or enlisted with a GP are not the norm-rather there is greater emphasis on free 
choice of physician (Preker, 1998; Barnighausen and Sauerborn, 2002; Saltman, 2004). 
This may have led to a much higher rate of discretionary surgery and other procedures 
compared to the UK and Denmark where there are vibrant gatekeeper systems 
(Hoffineyer and McCarthy, 1994; Wagstaff, 2007). 
\ 
In DCs with NHI-type systems, there is also little reliance on gatekeepers or on a referral 
system (Gottret and Schieber, 2006; Wagstaff, 2007; Mills, 2007). As in ICs this may 
have led to significantly higher rates of surgery and other diagnostic services than in 
countries without NHI systems e. g., South Korea (Kwon, 2007, Wagstaff, 2007). It is 
difficult to say whether and by how much cost containment would have improved in these 
countries if a proper system of gatekeepers and referral was in place. From the evidence 
in the UK, however, one can only conjecture that this could have led to noticeable general 
savings in health expenditure. 
d) Efficiency of Administration 
Cost of Administration: In ICs this has been generally low in most countries i. e. less 
than 10% of the expenditure of the NHI funds/agencies (Hoff neyer and McCarthy, 1994; 
Anderson and Hussey, 2004; Saltman, 2004). However, there are exceptions and in 
Belgium and Germany some of the sickness funds are spending closer to 15% of their 
collections on administration (Saltman, 2004). It is suggested that this was due more to 
the relative size of the fund and location of its membership than to administrative waste. 
In DCs the cost of administration in NHI systems has generally tended to be higher than 
in IC's - some estimates put this closer to 20% (Barnum and Kutzin, 1994). Some of the 
high percentage of administrative expenditure is due to the fact that NHI agencies also 
own and operate health facilities - many of these duplicate the services offered by 
Ministry of Health facilities especially in Latin America (Homedes and Ugalde, 2005; 
PAHO, 2007). 
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Viable Funds and Inter-fund Transfers: In many ICs there is usually no single agency 
serving as the administrator of the NHI system. Rather, there are several competing and 
non-competing sickness funds. In the past, several of these funds were too small and 
uncompetitive (low economies of scale, small membership, high administrative cost) and 
were only kept in existence through interfund transfers at periodic intervals. For example, 
in Germany and Japan there were over 1200 and 400 funds respectively at the beginning 
of the 1990's (Glaser, 1991; Roemer, 1993; Hoffineyer and McCarthy, 1994). By the first 
half of the decade of the 2000's, competition and consolidation had reduced these to less 
than one-half the amount (Gottret and Schieber, 2006). In Holland, reforms in the 1990's 
to achieve more efficiency in the administration of the funds, encouraged direct 
competition with commercial insurers which led to a reduction in the number of funds 
(Docteur and Oxley, 2003; Saltman, Busse and Figueras, 2004). At the same time, there 
were key changes made in interfund risk-sharing adjustment methodologies and 
mechanisms which facilitated these reforms. 
In DCs, some NHI-type systems are also managed by a mix of regional, provincial, 
industry or commercial funds as in Mexico, Chile, Argentina, Colombia and Uruguay 
(Savedoff, 2003; Homedes and Ugalde, 2005). In South Korea there were more than 400 
funds-these have now merged into a single fund (Kwon, 2003; National Health 
Insurance Corporation, 2005). Except for Colombia (Mills, 1999; Rosa and Alberto, 
2004; Savedoff, 2003; PAHO, 2007) interfund transfers are not very common Whether a 
single fund or multiple funds, administrative inefficiencies along with macroeconomic 
difficulties in some years led to financial deficits necessitating subsidies from the State 
(Mesa-Lago, 1989; Homedes and Ugalde, 2005; Lloyd-Sherlock, 2006; Kwon, 2007).. 
e) Achievement of Health Goals 
Health Goals: If the goals outlined by the OECD (1987) are taken as proxies - universal 
coverage, income protection, macroeconomic efficiency, microeconomic efficiency, 
consumer choice and provider autonomy- it can generally be said that NHI-type financing 
has made a significant contribution towards meeting these goals. As discussed above not 
all these goals have been satisfactorily achieved and issues of cost containment, equity in 
access, and microeconomic efficiency in the use of resources continue to test the 
innovativeness and ingenuity of policy-makers and health managers. 
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In DCs these goals still elude many countries with NHI systems. While there has been 
notable achievement in terms of the development of health services, general inequity and 
inefficiency are still the major issues confronting policy-makers. 
Improved Health Status: In both ICs and DCs with and without NHI systems there has 
been significant improvements in health status (using standard health indicators) over the 
last few decades. It is difficult to say what proportion of the improvements in overall 
health status is due to the financing system. One can only suggest that improved access 
and better health security for significant segments of the population may have played a 
key role in attaining and sustaining these improvements (Musgrove, 1996; WHO, 2000 
and 2001). 
Carrin et al. (2004) used econometric analysis of national data to examine the extent to 
which countries with different health financing systems performed in relation to 
achievement of WHO's health goals-level and distribution of health measured in 
DALES; level and distribution of responsiveness; fairness of financing (WHO, 2000). 
They separated countries on the basis of the level of risk pooling (advanced, medium and 
low) and type of financing system such as tax-based, contribution-based through 
compulsory contributions and other systems. In general they found that countries with 
advanced levels of pooling and contribution-based systems such as Germany, France and 
Japan seemed to perform on par with those having tax-based systems such as UK and 
Canada and much better than those where risk pooling arrangements were less advanced 
such as US, Colombia and Argentina. 
xii) Lessons From Experience With NIII-type Systems 
In IC's and DC's the experience with and performance of NHI systems have been quite 
varied. No system has remained, unchanged over its existence and reforms and 
refinements have been quite frequent. From this mixed history of successes and failures, 
certain clear lessons have emerged for countries contemplating the introduction or reform 
of NHI systems. Mills' (1983) 5-point criteria provide a useful basis for integrating these 
conclusions and suggestions. 
a) Sharing the Costs and Benefits. 
NHI improves access to services for many persons but ease of access does not 
mean equity in utilisation. Significant differences are observed in the levels of 
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utilisation by different groups with similar needs (Glaser, 1991; Docteur and 
Oxley, 2003, Wagstaff, 2007). 
" NHI systems continue to operate in favour of the urban, formal sector elite while 
leaving the rural and informal sector workers underserved (Hsaio, 2006; Gottret 
and Schieber, 2006) Better targeting with appropriate health services and facilities 
should be established to improve equity in distribution (WHO, 2000; Preker and 
Carrin, 2004; Mills, 2007; ). 
" State subsidies to NHI systems which have limited coverage of the poor place an 
unfair burden on the poor as taxpayers. In these systems, expansion of coverage to 
the entire population should be progressive and measurable (La Forgia, 1993; 
Preker and Carrin, 2004; Wagstaff, 2007). 
" Opting out of compulsory insurance arrangements runs counter to the principles of 
social solidarity and can rapidly lead to the establishment of a two-tiered health 
system. Persons should be required to remain in the system and purchase 
supplemental private insurance if they so wish (Mills, 1998; Normand and Busse, 
2002; Saltman, 2004; Gottret and Schieber, 2006). 
b) Quantity and Quality of Services 
" Legal entitlement to services must be translated into easy access to adequate, 
high- quality services. Otherwise, popular support for NHI will decline and the 
clamour for opting out and enhanced choice will increase (Roemer, 1993; 
Normand, 2001; Figueras et. al, 2004). 
" NHI systems cannot afford to ignore preventive and primary care services. Every 
effort should be made to have integrated health services to achieve economies of 
scope and synergistic benefits (Kutzin and Barnum, 1994; WHO, 2000; Docteur 
and Oxley, 2003). 
c) Efficiency of Service Provision 
" Supply-side cost containment measures (such as case based and capitation 
payments systems, utilisation reviews, use of gatekeepers, pre-admission reviews) 
are more effective in controlling costs than demand-side measures such as cost 
sharing and utilisation limits (Fuchs, 1993; Docteur and Oxley, 2003). 
"A well-organised referral system is essential for ensuring appropriate levels of 
care and the efficient use of resources (Gottret and Schieber, 2006; Mills, 2007). 
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" Competition in providing services should be based on price and non-price factors. 
Even where NHI agencies own and operate health facilities some competition 
with private providers can be encouraged to lead to a general scaling up of quality 
of services rather than a race to offer high technology services (World Bank, 
1993; Normand and Busse, 2002). 
d) Efficiency of Administration 
" Consolidation of small funds is necessary for economies of scale, adequate risk- 
pooling and overall viability. However this should not be achieved by creating 
excessive bureaucracies which lose the advantages of decentralised and local 
administration (Hoffineyer and McCarthy, 1994; Chernichovsky et al., 2003). 
" Single collector and payer systems are more administratively efficient and have 
more bargaining strength than diverse agencies (Evans, 1986; Himmelstein and 
Woolhandler, 1991; Mills, 1998; Anderson and Hussey, 2004). 
" The State has a major role to play in developing appropriate legislation, 
regulations and incentives and to provide ongoing information to stakeholders so 
that transparency and accountability in operations of NHI agencies can be 
constantly tested (Ron, 1993; Mills, 2007). 
e) Health Goals 
" Health goals and priorities must be clearly established. The objectives of the NHI 
must be consistent with these goals if health managers and NHI administrators are 
to work together and not frustrate each other or the goals of the health system 
(Normand and Weber, 1994; Dror, 2000; Normand, 2001, Kutzin, 2007). 
Several questions arise in relation to designing NHI options from this review of the 
expectations and mixed experiences with NHI-type systems. Abel-Smith (1985) 
highlighted many of these concerns more than two decades ago: 
"the problem for DC s contemplating the introduction of NHI is to design 
systems which avoid all the problems which have manifested themselves in 
Europe.... and on a wider scale in Latin America.... the escalation of costs, 
failure to collect contributions due, the provision of paper rights', bureaucratic obstacles to receiving care, different funds with varying 
rights, wholly separated services for insured persons, the bias to urban 
curative services and the separation of curative from preventive services. 
World experience suggests that services provided under NHI need to be 
closely coordinated with governmental services and the policy governing 
them should be kept under the close supervision of Ministers of Health" (p. 957). 
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2.6 Stakeholder Analysis as a Tool to Assist Policymaking 
In democratic societies where governmental policies and decisions are determined more 
by consultation, debate and bargaining rather than by dictate and command, several 
analysts have underscored the crucial roles of stakeholder (interest) groups in influencing 
the design, timing and implementation of health policy (Reich, 1994; Barker, 1994; Walt 
and Gilson, 1994; Ling, 1999). As such, the final shape and substance of a health policy 
may reflect not so much an optimally rational or technocratic design (characterized by 
systematic consideration of all options and applicability of pre-determined cost-benefit 
rules) but a satisfying solution based on what is politically feasible and acceptable 
(Hogwood and Gunn, 1984; Grindle and Thomas, 1991; Walt, 1994; Figueras et al., 
2000). Drawing on principles and practices from development sciences, policy and 
political analysis, stakeholder analysis has become increasingly popular as a tool to 
examine and manage the influence of key actors on the policy process (Brugha and 
Varvasovskzy, 2000). 
Stakeholders bring different insights, perspectives and passions to the policy debates 
drawing attention to issues and implications which may have been missed or ignored by 
those designing and implementing policy. Grindle and Thomas (1991) identify 
stakeholders as individuals, groups and organizations with special interest in a policy and 
its outcomes while Marmor (2005) defined them as interest groups with material and 
symbolic stakes in policy outcomes. (He estimated that over 8000 lobbyists were 
involved in the debates over the 1993 Clinton health reform proposals). Analysts 
distinguish 3 groups of stakeholders - primary as those ultimately affected negatively or 
positively by a project/policy; secondary as those intermediaries in the implementation 
process; and key stakeholders as those who can significantly influence the design and 
outcome of the project/policy (Barker, 1996; Ham, 1997). Key stakeholders (as 
individuals, groups and organizations) interact directly with policymakers and Walt 
(1994) assigned them a pre-eminent place alongside the other major factors such as the 
context, content and process of health policy decision making (See Figure 2.8 below). 
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CONTENT 
Source: Walt and Gilson, 1994 
PROCESS 
Reich (1994) suggested a 6-stage process in conducting a stakeholder analysis: 
" definition of the goals, mechanisms, benefits and costs of the policy; 
" identification of stakeholders by type (individuals; groups and organizations); 
sector (government, NGO, community, commercial, international); level of power 
or influence (low, medium, high) and their position in relation to the (proposed) 
policy (support, opposed, non-mobilised). A network map (another version of 
`forcefield mapping') can show the number and relative position of stakeholders 
i. e. weak or strong opposition/support or non-moblised (Figure 2.9. ). 
" analysis of sources and strength of opposition and obstacles as well as support of 
the various stakeholders. Walt and Gilson (1994) suggest that the sources of 
power/influence of stakeholders are based on their position in the social hierarchy 
(professional, organizational or political); authority of leadership; control over 
strategic resources (such as money, votes, skills, mobilization strength) and 
possession of specialist knowledge; 
" specific strategies to counter opposition, reinforce support and win the non- 
mobilised; 
" implementation of strategies; 
" monitoring and evaluation of strategies. 
-64- 
Figure 2.8 Factors in Policy Analysis and Policy Making 
CONTEXT 
Figure 2.9 Framework for Network Mapping of Stakeholders 
SUPPORTERS 
Weak 
OPPOSED 
Source: Reich, 1994 
NON-MOBILISED 
Given resource and time constraints, the task of identifying the strategies centers on 
finding the ' optimal tit' or best mix of measures for each category of stakeholders so that 
opportunities are not missed and resources wasted. A framework for `optimal fit' analysis 
is shown in Table 2.4. (Varvasovskzy and Brugha, 2000). It shows that strategies to 
encourage involvement are best for those who support a policy; collaboration for those 
who are uncertain whether to support or oppose; defending the policy to counter those 
who arc opposed and monitoring their actions in relation to those groups which arc not 
significantly affected by the policy. It also shows that it is risky to involve those who 
have mixed positions or who are non-supportive and a waste of resources to involve, 
collaborate with or defend a policy in relation to marginal groups. 
Table 2.4 Strategies for Managing Stakeholders According 
to their Organisational Positions 
Strategics Involve Collaborate Defend Monitor 
Positions 
Supportive Optimal Fit 
Missed Missed Missed 
Opportunities Opportunities Opportunities 
Missed 
Mixed Risk Optimal Fit Missed Opportunities and Opportunities 
Risk 
Non-Supportive Risk Risk Optimal Fit Risk 
Marginal Resource Waste Resource Waste Resource Waste Optimal lit 
Source: Varvasovszky and Brugha (2000) 
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Whether called `involvement of civil society' or `community participation' or 'consensus- 
building', more countries are making use of systematic or periodic consultations with 
stakeholder groups to build ownership, legitimize change and establish alliances for the 
design and implementation of health policies. However, recognition that there are winners 
and losers in any policy (with the latter generally more vocal and perhaps more forceful 
in their ability to frustrate, delay or derail a policy) means that stakeholder analysis can 
serve a valuable practical function in providing data to policy on how to improve the 
design and implementation of policies to achieve satisfactory outcomes (Reich, 1994; 
Gilson et al., 1999). 
Despite its potential benefits, there are certain key limitations in the technique of and 
information provided by stakeholder analysis. It provides a cross-sectional, time limited 
view of the interests, influence and interactions of stakeholders. Given the dynamism of 
the social and health context and the opening up of `windows of opportunity' at various 
points in time, stakeholder analysis often carries less weight than political timing in the 
making of policy decisions (Grindle and Thomas, 1991; Gilson et al., 1999; Brugha and 
Varvasovskzy, 2000). In DC's the role of stakeholder analysis seems more varied given 
the importance of non-formal processes in decision making (Walt and Gilson, 1994); the 
strength of international lending agencies in supplanting local stakeholder influences on 
substantive policies (Homedes and Ugalde, 2005) and small powerful social groups. 
Stakeholder analysis, rigorously conducted, provides helpful data to support policy 
formulation and implementation. However, it needs to be supplemented by other 
techniques and more so by strategic leadership, technical and political, to have a more 
decisive impact on health policy. 
2.7 Summary of Lessons-and Key Issues for Jamaica 
This review of the literature on the international experience with NHI and to a lesser 
extent with stakeholder analysis has examined both the possibilities and the problems. 
Arising from this, there are certain key issues of policy, design and management to 
consider in articulation of a similar programme in Jamaica. These are: 
" clarification of the role and policy objectives of the NHI programme in terms of 
balancing the concerns over revenue generation, equity, efficiency and financial 
sustainability; 
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" ensuring that services in the benefit package are available and that members do 
not end up with "paper rights" but compromised benefits; 
" specification of indicators to measure equity in finance and access, cost escalation 
and efficiency; 
" clarification of the nature of competition and choice in the programme. 
9 determination and analysis of the perceptions, concerns and proposals of key 
stakeholders on an NHI programme. 
The above review has also identified certain outstanding and unresolved issues that need 
to be taken into account in defining the options for Jamaica: 
" The need to examine separately NHI as a means of raising funds and the payment 
mechanisms for providers. There is nothing which locks a NHI system into a 
particular payment mode such as fee-for-service or open-ended budgets. In fact 
global budgets as in Germany for primary care services, tightly controlled fee 
structures for all providers as in Japan, capitation as in Holland, coordination of 
services financing and provision as in Costa Rica, can be cited as good practice 
for any type of financing system. 
" the balance between centralised administration and negotiations and decentralised 
operations is very context-specific and there are no general conclusions which can 
be drawn from the literature on this. Similarly there are no clear answers as to 
whether the NHI programme should be integrally linked to the existing Social 
Security system or stand alone. 
" developments in the labour market are weakening the historic bases on which NHI 
was built in the past. These include the tendency for more contract rather than 
tenured employment, early retirement and self-employment. The risk of 
noncompliance is greater but this has not been adequately addressed in the 
literature. 
Of the 9 key components which form the basis for an NHI programme, 4 will be used as 
the focus for designing the NHI options for Jamaica. These are: 
1. the administrative and regulatory framework; 
2. the package of services; 
3. the nature of the contribution i. e. a payroll tax or fixed contribution; 
4. the level of copayments. 
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a) The Administrative Framework 
There are 3 main issues of concern in specifying the administrative framework: 
i) A Single or Multiple Fund Insurance System: There are advantages and disadvantages 
of each. Glaser (1991), Kutzin (1998) and Anderson and Hussey (2004) suggest that a 
single centralised statutory fund has more negotiating power vis-a-vis service 
providers, can take advantage of economies of scale in its operations such as in claims 
recruitment and marketing and can develop more cost effective arrangements with 
overseas providers of care for particular cases. This seemed to have been the general 
reasoning which led to the merging of several insurance funds into a single payer 
entity in Taiwan (Cheng, 2003) and South Korea (Kwon, 2006 and 2007); On the 
other hand, in a competitive setting with several funds there is more consumer choice, 
more innovative policies and a tendency for more efficiency in the operations of all 
insurers. There is also much selective membership and cost shifting with extensive 
risk adjustment mechanisms in some countries to counter these practices. In a small 
country the benefits of multiple funds may be quite limited given the likely narrow 
membership base of each. 
ii) The Inclusion of Private Insurance Carriers in the System: In most of the countries 
with NHI systems the participating carriers are either statutory or private and non- 
profit. Given the difference in utility functions of a for profit as against a non-profit 
carrier it is debatable whether for profit firms can conduct their operations to reflect 
the social solidarity objectives of the NHI programme. 
iii) The Nature and Location of the Regulatory Mechanism: Quite apart from the need for 
a fairly comprehensive legislative base there is also the need for strong regulatory 
agencies at several levels - to bring the insurers, providers and payers to the 
negotiating table, to research and suggest or actually fix rates and the contents of the 
packages, to arbitrate in disputes. In Japan for example, many of these functions are 
housed in the Ministry of Health and Welfare while in Belgium they are in the 
Ministry of Labour. The issue of regulatory capture also becomes relevant given the 
dominance and social power of the medical associations in all countries (Kwon, 2007). 
b) The Package of Services 
There is disagreement in the literature over the contents of the package of services. From 
a pure insurance perspective there is the contention that only those services which are 
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high cost-low probability (i. e. catastrophic) fit the criterion of insurability. This excludes 
much discretionary and preventive health expenses (Hall, 1994). On the other hand, many 
contend that the focus of NHI on urban-based, hi-tech, curative services is misplaced and 
it should include primary and preventive services (Abel-Smith, 1992; Bobadilla, 1996; 
Schreyogg et al., 2005). Also, the influential World Bank suggestions for greater use of 
health insurance including mandatory insurance in DC's dwell on curative services that 
bring more personal than social benefits (Akin, 1987; World Bank, 1993). 
The distinction between catastrophic and non-catastrophic services was quite evident in 
Holland, for example, where no one could opt out of the plan for covering catastrophic 
services while there was choice in terms of packages for non-catastrophic care (van de 
Ven and van Vliet, 1992). In Jamaica where some overseas care for catastrophic services 
is costly but technically necessary, it cannot be ignored in considerations of NHI options. 
An important aspect of the decision on the package is the availability of State-funded 
services. A proposal which seeks to make an essential package of services available to all, 
through the NHI system, while retaining some services which are fully financed by the 
State and giving insurers the freedom to determine add-on insurance benefits will be 
considerably different from one which seeks to provide comprehensive coverage in NHI. 
c) Percentage Payroll Taxes vs. Flat Rate Deductions 
The majority of countries with NHI-type programmes use payroll taxes to secure 
deductions from members. Where levels of formal sector and especially wage 
employment are quite high and inflation is low there are sound reasons for using payroll 
taxes. On the other hand where the working population is made up of a large percentage 
of self-employed and informal sector workers it may be extremely difficult to assess 
earnings and to collect contributions through payroll deductions. The major implication of 
the failure to collect from all members at the right time and at the right amount will be 
reflected in the compliance variable used in the financial modeling exercise. A low 
compliance level will clearly wreck the NHI plan unless Government steps in with 
subsidies or there are cuts in the package, payment rates and administration. 
Another relevant factor is the relation between the premium and household size. A system 
which uses a percentage deduction from earnings regardless of one's family size may be 
more administratively feasible than one in which flat rate premiums are charged for each 
family member. 
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d) Co-payments 
The use of copayments varies among countries with NHI-type programmes. In European 
countries the rates tend to be quite low while in DC's the rates are much higher (although 
none approaches the levels in South Korea). Copayments can be used selectively to adjust 
contribution rates, deter moral hazard or more positively to channel the utilisation of 
particular services from particular providers. It is used in the financial models as a key 
variable and in the evaluative framework as an indicator of equity. 
The other key elements will be incorporated into the overall design through relevant 
assumptions of their impact on the financial models. These assumptions are as follows: 
" in terms of the conceptual framework, the NHI will be used as a dominant mode of 
financing mechanism but would not completely replace all other sources of funds; 
" it is assumed that any option will target the entire population (universal coverage) as 
members rather than specific groups; 
" given the mix of providers in Jamaica with the State being more dominant in the 
secondary care market and the private sector in the ambulatory care market as well as 
the small size of the country it is assumed that all current providers of services in the 
public and private sectors will constitute the provider network. As such it is not 
necessary for insurers to specify or negotiate with preferred providers in the system. 
" The particular method(s) of reimbursement will have major implications for the 
behaviour of providers and costs. Since the major impact of any reimbursement plan 
will ultimately be reflected in the cost of services, the Study incorporated these effects 
in the sensitivity analysis. For example, an assumption may be made that a fee for 
service payment system will lead to a 10% overall increase in the cost of the package. 
This can be used to trace the impact on contribution levels, and assess whether these 
should be increased or whether some portion can be met from higher copayments or 
even adjustments to the package of services. 
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CHAPTER 3: DESIGN OF STUDY AND METHODOLOGY FOR DATA 
COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS 
3.1 Approach to Key Issues to be Discussed 
Jamaica, after more than 4 decades of policy intent and discussions, has not proceeded 
beyond broad proposals and does not currently have an NHI Programme (NHIP) in place. 
This experience of deferred decisions and non-implementation is fairly similar to that of 
several other DC's since the late 1980's when health financing reforms became a key 
aspect of recommendations for the health sector (World Bank, 1993; Mills, 1998; WHO, 
2000; Carrin et. al, 2004; Wagstaff, 2007). As a consequence, the approach used in this 
study was to conduct an ex ante evaluation of the policy and operational issues of feasible 
NHIP options. These options were defined on the basis of recommendations gleaned from 
the government and key stakeholders as well as from the suggestions in the international 
literature on `best practice' in designing NHI. 
Given the overall goal and specific objectives of the evaluation i. e. to define the factors 
leading to the policy choice of NHI, specify the key operational and financial implications 
of potential NHI options and assess the relative merits of each to determine a preferred 
option, the purpose of this Chapter is to present the design of the study. In doing so, the 
core tasks are to define and discuss the methodological framework and tools utilised in 
data collection, analysis of NHI options and derivation of conclusions. 
Since the design and implications of NHI extend beyond purely health financing 
considerations, the methodological challenges meant covering an information set that 
included aspects of public policy, fiscal behaviour, social protection, stakeholder and 
community participation as well as the core areas of the economics, management and 
financing of health insurance. In addition, since national policy decisions and policy 
making are strongly determined by local context, the study required fairly in-depth 
understanding of the motivations and challenges facing the government and local 
stakeholders in relation to the design of an NHIP amidst other competing concerns. 
Gathering the specific data for various components of the evaluation required a mix of 
research methods. These included literature surveys, primary and secondary data 
collection and analyses, application of quantitative and qualitative tools as well as 
descriptive and forecasting techniques. 
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The discussion of tasks, research methods utilized, issues encountered and strategies 
employed to address these issues will be presented in the following manner: 
¢ outline of the overall conceptual framework used in moving from goals and 
objectives to the major findings and conclusions; 
¢ specification of key research questions and data requirements pertaining to each of 
the study's objectives; 
> elaboration of data collection and analysis methodologies - literature review; 
secondary data; semi-structured elite interviews; participant observation; key 
informants; content analysis, stakeholder analysis, political mapping, financial 
modeling and forecasting; 
¢ derivation and articulation of the role of the `best practice' prototype in 
identifying NHI options for Jamaica; 
> specification of evaluation criteria for appraisal of NHI design options; 
¢ review of data quality and likely influences on the results of the study. 
3.2 Conceptual Framework for Study 
The approach and general sequence of actions and analyses undertaken in the study are 
shown in Figure 3.1. The starting point was the definition of goals and objectives. This 
required decisions on 2 seemingly opposite considerations-firstly, narrowing down the 
initial broad and expansive conceptions of the various aspects of the study into more 
tightly defined statements of what was the central purpose and what was achievable in a 
ex ante research exercise. The second was to broaden the analysis from a strict financial 
modelling and evaluation exercise into a more appropriate health policy study by giving 
due attention to the policy context and role of stakeholders. The resulting goal and 
objectives are shown in Section 1.4. 
This was followed by an analysis of documents to achieve 2 main objectives-to 
understand the theoretical and empirical issues in NHI design and implementation as well 
as to examine the local context influencing the attention to and design of NHI. The first 
objective required a focused literature review of published and unpublished materials on 
the theoretical constructs and international experience with NHI in both ICs and DCs 
(Chapter 2). The second objective led to an in-depth examination of documents 
describing features of and challenges in the local socio-economic, health, health financing 
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and overall policy context. A key aspect of this examination involved an intensive review 
of the most significant of the government's documents on NHI-the Green Paper on 
National Health Insurance (1997). 
Figure 3.1 Conceptual Framework of Study 
GOAL OF STUDY 
OBJECTIVES 
LITERATURE 
REVIEW 
QUALITATIVE DATA: 
"INTERVIEWS 
-PARTICIPANT OBSERVATION 
-KEY INFORMANTS 
"STAKEHOLDER ANALYSIS 
"POLITICAL MAPPING 
-CONTENT ANALYSIS 
ANALYSIS OF 
DOCUMENTS 
NHI APPROACHES, 
FEATURES & PROTOTYPE 
j CONTEXT & 
SITUATIONAL ANALYSIS 
QUANTITATIVE DATA: 
-SECONDARY DATA 
"ESTIMATIONS & 
SIMULATIONS 
"ESTIMATION EQUATIONS 
"SCENARIOS 
SPECIFICATIONS OF 
NHIP OPTIONS 
"FINANCIAL MODELING 
"POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
'EVALUATION CRITERIA 
FINDINGS, DISCUSSION, FURTHER RESEARCH 
Source: Author's representation 
The analysis of documents produced an information base for the definition of NHI 
approaches, features and prototype and consequently, for focusing the field work efforts 
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in the collection of qualitative and quantitative data. In terms of qualitative data, the field 
work was organized around selected issues, selected groups of persons to be interviewed 
and consulted as well as discussions and clarification of issues with key informants. This 
aspect of data collection also involved in-depth participant observation of the interplay of 
technical, administrative and political factors in the responses to and process of designing 
an NHIP. 
The quantitative data collection was organized around the core data set needed for the 
financial modelling. This data set was generally defined after the literature review stage 
and the data gathering included published and unpublished sources. 
Information gathered from the qualitative and quantitative data collection efforts were 
then organized for analysis. In the case of the qualitative data, this meant collating and 
analyzing the responses of stakeholders and key informants along with insights from 
participant observation to identify perceptions, positions, power and recommendations in 
relation to NHI. 
The quantitative data were merged and organized into a set of relations and equations for 
estimating the key magnitudes and outputs of the financial modelling of NHI options. 
These relations and equations were prepared using the theoretical and empirical insights 
gained from literature review. 
The information from the qualitative analyses and quantitative outputs permitted the 
narrowing down of several recommendations into a short manageable list of feasible NHI 
options and components for evaluation. This short-list included the government's NHI 
proposal as well as that of key stakeholders and the prototype developed from the 
literature review of best practices internationally. 
At this point, the financial modelling of the options was undertaken with regard to the 
general inflows and outflows of funds in the baseline, best and worse case scenarios. In 
each case the various estimates were narrowed down to the likely implications for 2 
critical indicators-the pay as you go contribution rate (PAYGR) for workers and the 
contribution expected from government compared to its actual and projected spending. 
The evaluation criteria -developed from the literature review and from collation of 
responses from key stakeholders to a specific question on this--were then applied to 
assess the relative merits of each option. The evaluative criteria included net revenue 
generation, percentage of the population covered (`breadth'); range of services in the 
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benefit package ('depth'), extent of equity in contribution-financing and copayment 
('height'), efficiency in allocation of financing and burden of contribution on government. 
The implications of what emerged as the most feasible option were then explored in terms 
of what they meant for changes in the status quo from the viewpoints of decision makers, 
administrators, other key stakeholders and the overall health system. 
Finally, the overall approach to and outputs of the evaluation were examined in relation to 
knowledge gained, the shortcomings of the study as well as the significance of the 
findings for other countries and implications for further research. 
3.3 Key Research Questions and Data Requirements 
From the specification of the goal and objectives of the study, there followed a definition 
of the key questions and data needs to focus on a manageable yet comprehensive set of 
the critical issues in relation to each objective. From this definition the data requirements 
were specified and the methodologies for data collection and analysis subsequently 
developed and implemented. 
The first objective required delineation of the factors influencing the policy drive for an 
NHI in Jamaica. This meant focusing on key questions such as what were the historical, 
political, institutional, macroeconomic and health specific concerns which pushed the 
government to put NHI on their agenda for action. Included in this list was the question of 
to what extent external agencies such as the ILO, World Bank, IDB and United States 
Agency for International Development (USAID) played a role through their involvement 
and recommendations in social and health policy for Jamaica. The dataset for answering 
these questions required a mix of review of relevant official and institutional documents 
and proposals, interviews with technical staff and policy advisors and analyses of the 
relevant statistical data to determine the likely basis for the attractiveness of NHI. 
In terms of the second objective which called for a definition of the key elements of 
feasible NHI options, the main questions centred on what were the recommendations for 
NHI coming out of best practices internationally and what were the perspectives of key 
local stakeholders on the model of NHI which would be most appropriate for Jamaica. 
These issues required data derived from a focused literature review on the concepts and 
practical experience internationally in respect of NHI-type programmes (presented in 
Chapter 2). It also needed qualitative information from key stakeholders who were 
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usually consulted for advice on health and health financing matters or who would be 
directly involved in the design or implementation of an NHIP. 
The third objective focused on quantification of the financial implications of NHI options 
flowing from international best practice, government and other key stakeholders. The key 
questions involved defining the main components of inflows and outflows in each NHI 
option i. e. sources of revenue and financing on the one hand and the benefit payouts and 
other costs on the other. It also required clarification of assumptions in terms of what was 
measured and what was omitted as well as constructing scenarios to reflect uncertainties 
and changes in the values of key variables. 
The assessment of the relative merits of each option using criteria such as efficiency, net 
revenue generation and equity was defined as the fourth objective. The key questions 
centred on how to define and weight these evaluative criteria in quantitative terms so that, 
in their application, the assessment produced what may be defined as a preferred option. 
The dataset for this evaluation required review of the international literature to determine 
the standard criteria recommended, conceptually and empirically, in similar evaluations. 
It also meant going to stakeholders and policy advisors to ascertain their recommended 
criteria as well as the relative significance they attached to these so that the assessment 
reflected what they considered as appropriate for Jamaica. 
The final objective sought to explore the policy and operational implications of the 
preferred NHI option and the likely impact on stakeholders and on health goals. The key 
questions required attention to what were the expected cost and benefit to different groups 
of stakeholders, what was the administrative capability to implement an NHI and to what 
extent NHI would add value or improve the functioning of the health system. This 
required returning to the pre-NHI context as described or indicated in the local reports 
and studies as well as gleaning information from specific groups of stakeholders on how 
they felt they would be affected by an NHI. In addition, this meant exploring to what 
extent the analysis of NHI in Jamaica held lessons for other countries seeking to establish 
or reform their health financing systems and the new research issues generated by the 
analysis for Jamaica and the international community. 
3.4 Data Collection and Analysis: Analysis of Documents 
The general analysis of documents and secondary data collection sought to provide 
essential data and deepen understanding of the issues and experiences pertaining to 
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designing NHI. The review of documents took the form of systematic secondary data 
analyses, assessing the quality of information and organising information into themes and 
taxonomies as well as looking for different interpretations and inferences than the original 
inquiries. This involved 3 separate but inter-related activities--rigorous review of the 
conceptual and empirical literature (internationally) on health insurance and policy 
analysis; examination of specific published reports on health, health financing, socio- 
economics and policy making in Jamaica; review of the grey literature consisting of 
unpublished reports, papers, letters and other in-house documents recommended or 
provided by key informants or acquired though participation in conferences., 
a) International Literature 
The methods, sources of data and results of the international literature review were fully 
discussed in Chapter 2. 
b) Situation Analysis of Jamaica 
This was the second major component of the analysis of documents. It entailed collection 
and review of a range of information to provide the local contextual data for the study. 
The major reports on Jamaica, published by local and external agencies, covered 
historical and contemporary demographic, economic, social and political developments. 
Local bodies included official agencies responsible for collecting and disseminating data 
on demographic, economic and social statistics such as the STATIN, PIOJ and (the 
central bank) Bank of Jamaica. External agencies included the multilateral financial 
institutions such as the World Bank, IMF and IDB; regional financing institutions like the 
Caribbean Development Bank; international organisations such as the UNDP and 
UNCTAD and private groups such as The Economist and credit rating agencies. 
These reports provided vital statistical and background data for reviewing the sector 
specific reports on the epidemiological, service provision, service utilisation and 
financing aspects of health in Jamaica. Health specific data and analyses were also 
derived from a mix of local and external institutions. Locally, the MOH, PIOJ and 
University of the West Indies (UWI) were the principal sources of materials while 
externally, PAHO, WHO and United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) were the key 
sources. In terms of specific information on the government's proposal for NHI, the 
MOH's 2 critical documents were the main sources-the Green Paper on NHIP (1997) 
and the NHIP Policy Framework Paper (1998). 
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While the bulk of the information in these reports dealt with issues in the public health 
sector, there were several helpful documents and chapters in the above reports which 
provided vital data on the private health sector (for profit and not for profit sub-sectors). 
Additional data on the private health sector came from Annual Reports of some of the 
large insurance companies with health portfolios. 
Published materials, though less formal and less rigorous than the above, included 
election manifestos by the main political parties where health issues and proposals were 
discussed alongside other plans for action in other sectors. They also included news items, 
feature reports, commentaries, letters to the editor in the mainstream daily and weekly 
newspapers generally covering the period from 1996-2001. 
c) Review of Unpublished Works and Grey Literature 
The third contributory source of vital material for the analysis was the grey literature. 
This comprised unpublished works and was derived from 3 main sources. Firstly, issues 
related to NHI, social protection and stakeholder analysis have been the subject of several 
reports prepared by management and other health consultants hired by Ministries of 
Health or international and bilateral organisations. These reports provided valuable data 
not just on Jamaica but also on several other Caribbean and developing countries. 
Because of their `official' nature they generally tended to have limited circulation. 
Secondly, the examination of the grey literature included papers, commentaries, works in 
progress and power point presentations delivered at conferences and seminars. Some of 
these documents were provided by key informants while other documents were secured 
from personal participation in some of these seminars and conferences. 
The third main source of unpublished materials came from direct participation in the 
work of the MOH in Jamaica. These `primary sources' of materials (Allan and Skinner, 
1998) included public speeches and presentations made by Ministers of Health, other 
officers of the Ministry and key stakeholders as well as reports relating to health 
financing and health reform issues in preparation for or subsequent to the MOH's Green 
Paper on NHIP (1997). 
3.5 Data Collection and Analysis: Quantitative Data 
Quantitative data collection relied almost exclusively on secondary sources. For statistical 
data on Jamaica, to be used in the situation analysis and financial modelling of NHI 
options, materials were derived from official publications and websites of the STATIN, 
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PIOJ, Bank of Jamaica and MOH. Valuable data especially on household expenditure, 
poverty levels and health services utilisation and expenditure were also gleaned from 
annual surveys of living conditions (conducted since 1988) conducted jointly by the 
STATIN and PIOJ. 
The datasets (in most cases over the last 3 decades) covered the following categories of 
information: 
" demographic: size, age and sex distribution, growth rate of population 
" macroeconomic and fiscal: size and growth of GDP; real per capita GDP; 
government revenue including magnitude of statutory deductions; government 
expenditure including broad sectoral allocations; debt obligations; inflation; 
" labour force and earnings: size, participation rate and employment status of the 
labour force; average wages; membership in national insurance/social security 
plans and contribution obligations; 
9 social: absolute and relative levels of poverty; income (consumption) inequality 
using the Gini coefficient; 
" epidemiological: mortality and morbidity patterns; 
" health infrastructure: hospital beds; ambulatory clinics; pharmacies; medical and 
other skilled workers; 
" health services utilisation: inpatient and outpatient services; pharmaceuticals; 
diagnostic services; overseas care; 
" health financing and expenditure: sources of finance including taxation, out of 
pocket spending, private insurance claims paid; aid and grants; destination of 
financial flows to the different types of public and private health facilities and 
services. 
For comparative data on other DCs and ICs, sources included official publications and 
websites of the World Bank, IMF; WHO; PAHO; OECD and the ILO. 
In some instances, data from secondary sources did not adequately or exactly address the 
needs of the study. This meant that techniques such as adaptation, re-organisation, 
consolidation, interpolation, extrapolation and general re-working of the data were 
sometimes necessary to ensure a `proper fit' with the requirements of the analysis. 
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3.6 Data Collection and Analysis: Qualitative Data 
Qualitative data collection techniques utilised in the study included semi-structured elite 
interviews with key policy advisors and technical staff in selected Ministries as well as 
key non-public sector stakeholders; participant observation over the period of research 
from 1997-2001 as a member of staff of the MOH and information gathered from 
discussions and communications with key informants. These techniques were applied in a 
dynamic rather than isolated or sequential manner. In some instances specific information 
was sought using a particular technique while in other instances cases information was 
triangulated with viewpoints emanating from all techniques. In addition, information from 
application of the qualitative techniques incorporated and informed simultaneously data 
and perspectives derived from the other methodologies such as the literature review and 
quantitative analyses. 
a) Semi-structured Elite Interviews 
Semi-structured elite interviews have been recommended as a valuable tool to secure high 
quality detailed responses in a manner which encourages response and participation 
(Patton, 1990; Silverman, 1994; Bowling, 1997). The technique allows the interviewer, 
using a checklist of questions as a guide, to probe and prompt as necessary by pursuing 
points to satisfaction on some sensitive or reflective issues. As suggested in the literature, 
the planning of questions, targeting of respondents, interviewing time and strategies and 
transcription of responses are critical aspects of the technique. In addition, the role of the 
interviewer is significant in ensuring relevance of responses, preventing `capture' by the 
interviewee and avoiding bias in managing the interview (Patton, 1990; Bowling, 1997). 
Elite interviews involving selected key stakeholders were used to derive data on 3 major 
aspects of the study-the response to the government's proposals on an NHIP as 
presented in its Green Paper of 1997; the alternative approaches and major components 
which they would recommend for Jamaica and the criteria they would use to assess the 
value of an NHIP to the local health system. A checklist of questions and issues to be 
probed was prepared drawing on information from the literature review and from key 
informants. (The complete list is presented in Chapter 5). 
Experts on stakeholder analysis suggest that selection of key stakeholders should be based 
on a `purposive sampling' approach with predetermined criteria for inclusion. These 
should include individuals and organisations in a position to influence the form, content, 
timing and implementation of a policy through their professional, political, commercial, 
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industrial relations or symbolic power in society (Ham and Hill, 1993; Reich, 1994; 
Walt, 
1998; Brugha and Varvasovskzy, 2000). The selected respondents were drawn from the 
public and private sectors as well as health sector and non-health sector entities. 
The 
majority of these were `self-selected' since, because of their technical competence or 
organisational influence, they were already included as members of 
the Steering 
Committee set up by government in 1998 to review and recommend actions on the 
1997 
Green Paper NHI proposals. The organizations and positions of some specific 
respondents from the MOH are shown in Table 3.1. 
Table 3.1 Key Stakeholders in the NHIP 
Sector Sub-sector Stakeholder 
" Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Health (PS) 
Health: " Director, Health Reform Unit (DHRU) 
Administrative 
" Director, National Health Insurance Implementation Unit (DNHI) 
Health: " Chief Medical Officer (CMO) 
Public Technical " Senior Medical Officer, Secondary and Tertiary Care (SMO/STC) 
Finance " Ministry of Finance (MOF) 
Planning " Planning Institute of Jamaica (DPIOJ) 
Social Security " National Insurance Scheme (DNIS) 
Medical " Medical Association of Jamaica (MAJ) 
Professional 
Nursing " Nursing Association of Jamaica (NAJ) 
Health 
" Jamaica Association of Health Service Executives (JAHSE) Management 
Big Business " Jamaica Employers Federation (JEF) 
Commercial 
Small Business " Small Business Association of Jamaica (SBAJ) 
Profit " Life Insurance Companies Association (LICA) 
Insurance 
Non-profit " Blue Cross of Jamaica (BCJ) 
Labour Unionised " Jamaica Confederation of Trade Unions (JCTU) 
Source: Author's compilation 
Contact was made with key stakeholders-specific incumbents from the MOH and 
representatives (more than 1 in some cases) of organisations in the Steering Committee-- 
directly during the course of interaction at the workplace or by telephone. Respondents 
were told about the purpose of interview/discussion and its contribution to and use in the 
study. Their consent was requested and given verbally. At that time (late 1990's) the issue 
of written and signed consent from every interviewee for non-medical non-interventionist 
research was not deemed as critical and as such there was no insistence on it. Some 
stakeholders requested and were given a copy of the checklisted questions to prepare for 
the interviews. Some also requested anonymity and that there should be no taping of the 
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interviews. This was adopted as the norm for all interviews/discussions. Most interviews 
extended close to 2 hours. A few were short and follow-up discussions directly or by 
telephone were held to clarify some unfinished points. In addition, extensive use was 
made of published statements and responses to the government's NHI proposals by 2 
stakeholders (MAJ, 1997; LICA, 1998). 
Generally, interviews took the form of free-flowing discussions rather than the formal 
`question and answer' approach. Timely references to the check-list helped to maintain 
focus on specific information being sought. Handwritten notes from interviews were 
organised into broad and later narrower categories for content analysis using 
predetermined key words and phrases from the checklist of questions and from the 
literature review. These included `administration'; `universal coverage'; `comprehensive 
package'; `copayment'; "wage-based contribution'; `choice of insurer'; `choice of 
provider'; `equity'; `efficiency'; `subsidies' and `non-negotiable features'. 
b) Participant Observation 
Bowling (1997) describes participant observation as the process in which the investigator 
establishes and sustains a many-sided and relatively long term relationship with a human 
association in its natural (not experimental or laboratory) setting for the purpose of 
developing a scientific understanding of that association. It requires the direct 
involvement of the researcher/observer in the `systematic and unobtrusive observation' of 
the actions, activities and interactions of the observed group. Participation could take the 
form of sitting on committees or working with the team charged with designing, 
developing or implementing policy. Observation could be `structured', `unstructured' or a 
mix of both and include watching, listening, recording and asking guided questions. 
The literature on participant observation suggests that immersion in the activities of the 
group could provide valuable knowledge and insights through `grounded knowledge' 
experiencing interactions from the `inside' and generally does not depend on a person's 
willingness to be interviewed or existence of accurate documents or on memory of 
interviewees. Experts also point out that care should be taken in spending a reasonable 
length of time with the group to make meaningful observations and in recognizing 
`observer bias' through `selectivity' of interactions (since it is impossible to be 
everywhere and talk to everyone) and `hasty interpretations' of actions and statements to 
fit into preconceived models (Patton, 1990; Silverman, 1993; DePoy and Gitlin, 1994). 
. g2. 
The investigator's direct employment with the MOH's Health Reform Unit which had 
responsibility for designing and implementing various health initiatives including NHI 
provided an appropriate opportunity and setting for participant observation. Employment 
preceded PhD studies and, upon commencement, specific approval was sought from the 
head of the MOH (PS) and of the specific department (Director, Health Reform Unit) to 
combine work and research as well as to make use of relevant materials from ongoing 
work-related activities. Consent was given verbally by both heads and key senior officers 
in the Ministry as well as stakeholders in meetings of the NHI Steering Committee were 
made aware of the roles of the researcher. Over the period 1997-2001, tasks were 
assigned which generally permitted enough time and in-depth involvement for the 
application of the critical aspects of participant observation. These included the various 
forms of `structured' and `unstructured' observation such as access to documentation and 
participation in meetings as well as discussions with key stakeholders, communications 
with key informants and general activities of an `insider' in the technical side of the 
policy process. In all these, due attention was given to the matter of confidentiality of 
information and consent/clearance was sought as necessary. 
Throughout the period of observation, the use of recording devices such as video and 
audio tapes was not permitted. This meant exclusive reliance on spontaneous or delayed 
handwritten and computer processed notes. To avoid being overwhelmed by the mass of 
data recorded in several volumes of pages and computer files, a coding system was 
developed for organising, categorizing and cross-referencing materials. This was guided 
by the checklist of questions with key words and phrases matching those used in the 
recording of data from the elite interviews and key informants. Support from a research 
assistant was quite helpful in this cross-referencing task. Content analysis was utilized to 
organize, merge, examine and make inferences from the data emerging from participant 
observation and triangulation techniques were applied to test and validate consistency 
with information from the other qualitative methods. 
c) Use of Key Informants 
During the course of the field work, there were frequent discussions and communications 
with key informants on selected issues. Key informants included 4 main groups of 
persons: 
> middle level officers in the MOH and MOF who were present during discussions 
on NHI at various meetings or dealt with data required for context analysis and 
financial modelling; 
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> retired persons from the public service who were familiar with the history of 
initiatives to strengthen the health sector and to establish NHI in Jamaica; 
¢ lecturers at the nearby University of the West Indies whose research interests and 
public involvement covered areas such as health reform, health financing, public 
policy; social protection and political decision making; 
> selected private consultants, local and foreign, who were contracted to advise or 
prepare reports on health services, health financing and poverty in Jamaica. 
Key informants were consulted to share, clarify, supplement or validate information on 
issues related to the following: 
> data presented in official publications on macroeconomic, poverty and health 
matters and the basis for their projections; 
¢ responses of key stakeholders in their discussions on NHI at various forums, 
comments reported in the media submitted in some cases and in the information 
provided during the elite interviews; 
> detailed rationale for some recommendations in consultant and official reports 
dealing with various aspects of health reform and health financing. 
In many cases, these discussions with key informants led to access to other relevant 
documents. Key informants were very conscious of the confidential nature of some 
documents and reports of meetings and were quick to point out the limits of what were 
quotable and what could only be used as broad statements. 
3.7 Stakeholder Analysis and Political Mapping 
The techniques of stakeholder analysis and political mapping were utilized to determine 
(from data collected through application of the qualitative methods of elite interviews, 
participant observation and key informants described in Section 3.6) 2 separate but inter- 
related aspects of the study - the relative position of key stakeholders on the government's 
overall policy and components of NHI as well as their recommendations for an NHI. 
Following the generally recommended approach to stakeholder analysis and political 
mapping (Reich, 1994; Walt, 1994; Gilson et al., 1999; Brugha and Varvasovkzy, 2000) 
key stakeholders were grouped according to their broad organizational or professional 
affiliation, and their positions in relation to government's proposals on NHI were charted 
in relation to their levels of support or opposition (high, medium and low) or whether they 
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could be construed as `non-mobilised'. Their positions were juxtaposed to the perceived 
level of influence they exerted on health policymaking (high, medium or low) and an 
overall `political map' was prepared to. reflect the significance of the position of 
stakeholder groups for policy decisions and strategic actions by policymakers. 
The second critical aspect of the stakeholder analysis was to delineate from their 
responses what they felt would be the key features of an NHI plan if they were given full 
rein to design such a plan. The responses were diverse and the words used to describe 
desired features were not altogether similar or uniform. However, the general themes and 
concepts were made reasonablyclear after a second line of probing with key words and 
phrases. The data from the qualitative methods, through merging and triangulation, 
permitted the articulation of a recommended alternative by stakeholders to the NHI 
proposals of the government. This alternative was included among NHI options for 
Jamaica and subjected to financial modelling and evaluation alongside the government's 
proposal and the NHI prototype emerging from reviewing international best practice. 
3.8 Derivation of Features of NHI Prototype 
In seeking to define NHI options for Jamaica (as stated in the second objective of the 
study), 2 alternatives emerged from the situation analysis and analysis of data from 
application of qualitative methodologies. These were the government's Green Paper 
(1997) proposals for NHI and the alternative recommended by stakeholders. A third 
alternative was articulated based on the information derived from the literature review on 
conceptual recommendations of experts and practical experiences with NHI programmes 
in ICs and DCs. This has been designated as the NHI prototype. 
As discussed in Chapter 2, the literature review identified key elements in the design of 
NHI-type systems (Ron et al., 1990; Normand and Weber, 1994; WHO, 2000; Carrin et 
al., 2004). These include population coverage, benefits package, administration, mode of 
financing, providers of services, mode of reimbursement and co-payments. There are also 
several configurations within each element so that one could have a wide range of 
theoretically possible NHI options. The emerging best practice for NHI design gleaned 
from the literature review and deemed applicable to Jamaica contains the following: - 
" Population Coverage: Various countries have commenced and continue NHI 
operations with selected population groups such as formal sector workers. 
However, equity in access and health security for all rather than exclusion have 
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been cited as one of the principal benefits of NHI. Consequently, universal 
coverage is identified as one of the core features in the prototype. 
" Package of Benefits: The range of benefits includes primary and ambulatory care, 
acute care (inpatient), catastrophic mostly overseas care and long term care. The 
major recommendation from the best practice is for a comprehensive package of 
services. In this way high cost hospital based services are not ignored in a primary 
care package only or the benefits of low cost primary care with `gatekeeper' 
functions excluded in a package that concentrates on hospital based care. 
" Administration: The literature identifies the pros and cons of single or multiple 
competing pooling agencies to administer the NHI programme. In addition for 
Jamaica, there is the issue of a new statutory agency or the existing social security 
agency as the likely administrator of the programme. On review there seems to be 
a stronger case for a single statutory pooling/purchasing agency through 
upgrading the existing social security agency especially in view of the small 
population size and the likely higher cost of several small competing agencies or 
of a new statutory agency. 
" Mode of Financing: There seems to be general agreement that financing an NHI 
should incorporate a mix of government and employer-employee contributions. In 
terms of the latter, there are arguments for fixed absolute premiums (as used by 
private insurers) as against fixed percentage of wages and income. The principle 
of equity in financing suggests that contribution should be based according to 
ability to pay and this is used to justify the case for a percentage of income-based 
contributions in the NHI prototype for Jamaica. 
" Providers of Services: In countries where the public sector is a major but not 
totally dominant supplier of health services, the private sector plays a critical role 
in filling gaps and in offering alternatives to public services. Given these historical 
roles of the private sector and the need to permit choice in the programme, the 
literature recommends access to public and private providers in the NHI 
programme. 
" Mode of Reimbursement: In the assessment of the implications of the various 
reimbursement methods for cost control, incentives for appropriate behaviour and 
opportunities for abuse, there seems to be agreement on the relative efficiency of 
global budgets as against fee for service or capitation payments for providers. 
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" Copayment: This has a definite impact on the containment of demand as well as 
on the size of the contribution paid by employers, employees and government. On 
the other hand, the literature clearly indicates that high copayments make access 
to care inaccessible to low income persons and so negate the expected benefits of 
prepayment and pooling in an NHI. Based on this rationale, there is provision for 
small copayments, up to 5% of cost of services, in the NHI prototoype. 
3.9 Financial Modelling 
Following guidelines suggested by Dunn et al., 1996; Cichon et al., 1999; Plamondon et 
al., 2002 and GTZ and WHO, 2004)) the financial modelling was conducted in 3 stages: 
> specification of relations among variables in the form of estimation equations to 
reflect the impact on the inflows and outflows of funds in each NHI option; 
> application of the estimation equations to the options to determine contributions 
required by employers-employees (i. e the necessary PAYGR) as well as 
government; 
> sensitivity and scenario analyses of the inputs and outputs of the Financial Model 
to show the impact of uncertainty and changing the values of key assumptions. 
The specification of relations. among variables and estimation of equations followed 
guidelines detailed by Cichon et al., (1999) from a financial viewpoint and Plamondon et 
al., (2002) from an actuarial perspective. The computational aspects of the modelling 
used an Excel spreadsheet format. The datasets going into the modelling were prepared 
based on specific guidelines indicated in Simlns, a health insurance simulation model and 
software package developed by the GTZ and WHO (2004), and Cichon et al., (1999). 
These suggested the main modules and variables to be used (economic and demographic; 
labour force and earnings; health services, utilization and cost of services; administrative 
and other costs; copayment and contributions). 
Supporting information was drawn from Infosure, a software package developed by GTZ 
(2003) for health insurance evaluation drawing on collected data (qualitative, quantitative 
and statistical) from reporting countries such as Bulgaria, Indonesia and El Salvador. 
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a) Key Variables and Estimation Equations for determining Financial Inflows and 
Outflows in the Options 
In quantifying inflows and outflows for each NHI option, the key relations specified and 
calculated were: 
" Revenue of NHI agency/insurance companies; 
" Total Contribution Income; 
" Average Premium; 
" Total Cost of the Benefit Packages; 
" Inflows to the Administrative Agency to include any investment/penalty income; 
" Impact on the Budget (before and after the programme analyses); 
" Utilisation level and costs by different income and age groups. 
Equation 1. Revenue to NHI agency/insurance companies: 
R1 =CY+NY+PY 
R1 = Revenue 
CY = Premium Income 
NY = Investment Income 
PY = Penalty Income 
Equation 2. Contribution Income: 
CY = C. p. r. 
C= Number of Contributors 
p= Average Premium 
r= Compliance Rate 
Equation 3. Number of contributors: 
C=WS+FSE+ISE+PR 
WS = Wage and Salary earners 
FSE = Formal Sector Self-employed 
ISE = Informal Sector Self-employed 
PR = Pensioners, Retirees 
Equation 4. Average Premium: 
p =(U+A+RS+L)/C 
U= Claims / utilisation costs 
A= Administrative costs 
RS = Reserves 
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L= Surplus 
Equation 5. Compliance rate: 
r- IPDx100J 
PT =l Premium Collected 
PD = Premium Due 
Equation 6. Impact on the Budget: 
B*=B1-B2 
B* = Net Budget Allocation to Health 
B1 = Budget Allocation Before NHI 
B2 = Budget Allocation After NHI. 
b) Application of Inflows and Outflows to Options 
Each option was specified in a form that permitted quantification of the key components 
and the likely impact on the inflow and outflow of funds was estimated. 
Financial Inflows: From the viewpoint of the administrative organisation(s) for any 
option at any point in time the main factors determining the level of inflows are: 
" Number of persons in different contribution groups 
" Average Contribution Rate or Premium 
" Wage Levels 
" Income Distribution 
" Maximum Insurable Earnings 
" Expected Rate of Compliance i. e Amount Collected/Amount Collectible 
" Investment and Penalty Income 
" Copayments as an income source which goes to health service providers as against 
the administrators of the NHI option. 
Financial Outflows: The main factors affecting cost and outflows were: 
" Number of Beneficiaries in each age group 
" Cost of the Package 
" Administrative Cost/ Loading Factor 
" Reserve/Contingency Fund. 
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The -2 critical output indicators from the modelling are the necessary PAYGR for 
contributors and the cost to the government. 
c) Key Variables for Undertaking the Sensitivity and Scenario Analyses 
The pattern and predictability of inflows and outflows in each option are likely to be 
affected by several key variables either independently or in tandem. As such, it is 
necessary to specify the mix of variables and assumptions which determined the best, 
worst and most likely baseline scenarios for each option. The key variables to be adjusted 
in the Financial Modelling exercise are: 
> Changes in the rate of growth of GDP: which affect the ability of government to 
mobilize resources to meet its contribution obligations and for sustainability of an 
NHI; 
> Changes in employment levels: which determine the number of contributors; 
earnings base, and share of workers in generating the resources to meet costs; 
> Rate of Compliance: which, as the percentage of contributions paid in relation to 
contributions due, has serious implications for the cash-flow of the administrative 
agency(ies) and their ability to meet obligations to service providers. This is also 
critical in terms of whether higher administrative costs will be incurred to collect 
outstanding amounts or whether the. State will provide relief funds to avoid a 
build-up of bad debts. Compliance level was based on the experiences of agencies 
currently dealing with statutory and other deductions in Jamaica e. g. National 
Insurance Scheme and National Housing Trust. In addition, compliance data were 
compared with internationally bench-marked sources. 
> Level of Indigence and State Subsidy: which affect the contribution burden of 
workers and government. Indigence is an issue of definition and development. A 
strict income related definition may exclude many persons especially the elderly 
with chronic conditions whose health expenditure as a percentage of their income 
may be so high that they fall below the poverty line. High rates of unemployment 
and underemployment could also lead to more persons requiring subsidies from 
the State to pay their NHI contributions. In addition, there may be cases of free- 
riders who under-declare incomes to avoid contributing. The larger the size of the 
indigent population the greater the burden on the State. This could have 
implications for its overall support for the programme. Adjustments were made to 
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financial inflows and outflows to reflect varying levels of indigence (with the 
current poverty line in Jamaica as the base rate) and State subsidy for operations. 
> Moral Hazard (Increased Utilisation): which has direct implications for the cost of 
health services. Health cost, as a composite variable reflecting general inflation as 
well as increases due to population and service delivery changes, could also be 
adversely affected by moral hazard either due to the behaviour of members or 
providers or both. Its variability was modelled to show the likely impact on 
contribution levels and on subsidies needed from the government to ensure 
sustainability of the NHI. 
> Administrative Costs: which is a key measure of efficiency. The size and rate of 
change of this variable is a key indicator of the efficiency of the programme 
especially when compared with the costs of administration in the Ministry of 
Health and in other private health insurance systems. Variation in its base values 
sought to show the impact on overall contribution rate and sustainability. 
3.10 Development of Criteria for Appraisal of Options 
In reviewing the literature to assist in specifying evaluative criteria and indicators, there 
are four main observations which can be made: 
" criteria which have been used have generally been constructed in a way which 
make their application more relevant to ex post as against ex ante evaluations; 
9 criteria have been applied to assess the performance of health systems as against 
health financing mechanisms per se; 
" criteria have been designed and used to provide comparative evaluations of health 
financing mechanisms as against a specific mechanism; 
" criteria used have generally tended to be more descriptive than quantitative. 
Perhaps a major reason for this emphasis on ex post evaluation lies in the practicability of 
evaluation - it is easier to evaluate a plan or system after it has been implemented since 
actual quantitative and qualitative data are more readily available and can brought to bear 
on assessment of performance against stated goals and objectives. In addition, evaluations 
of health financing systems generally extend beyond the primary financing functions to 
include various aspects of the contribution of health financing to overall performance of a 
country's health system. Given the above, Carrin and James (2004) suggested a 
methodological approach that defines and measures performance of health financing 
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systems in relation to Stage 1 activities (e. g. revenue generation, collection, allocation and 
purchasing functions) and Stage 2 functions (e. g. extent to which the financing system 
facilitates or frustrates achievement of health system goals such as healthy years gained, 
distribution of health gains, responsiveness and fairness in financing). 
In deriving a set of ex-ante evaluative criteria, attention was paid to factors broadly 
indicated by stakeholders and the government in Jamaica (such as revenue generation, 
efficiency, equity, choice, public-private collaboration, individual responsibility) as well 
as those emerging from the literature on health financing and on NHI. The specification 
of the factors required narrowing down broad conceptual and design objectives into 
measurable indicators (Zchock, 1979; McPake and Kutzin, 1997; Carrin and James, 2004; 
Schreyoog et al., 2005; Mills, 2007). 
Given the fact that in evaluations, `objectives' define the measurement of linkages 
between `design' and `performance' (Hogwood and Gunn, 1984; Grindle and Thomas, 
1991; WHO, 2000; Gottret and Schieber, 2007) there are close similarities between 
criteria and indicators which can and are used in ex-ante and ex post assessments. 
However, to a large extent, there has been greater reliance on those factors that may be 
considered in `Stage 1" evaluations (Carrin and James, 2004). These include: 
" `Breadth' of coverage or membership in the population; 
" Degree of solidarity or segmentation of risk pools; 
" `Depth' of benefit package; 
" Equity in access and financing (contributions) and `height' of cost coverage; 
" Efficiency in purchasing and administration; 
" Net revenue generation. 
Figure 3.2 outlines the inter-relation of 3 key dimensions of coverage -breadth, depth and 
height. 
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Figure 3.2 Dimensions of'Coverage: Breadth, Depth and Height 
HOW MUCH? 
Cost Coverage 
(Height) 
WHAT? 
mefit Package (Depth) 
i) Breadth of Coverage: 
As a general rule and policy objective, health financing systems which emphasise 
universal coverage (membership) and access are deemed to be better performing than 
those which only offer partial coverage (Normand and Weber, 1994; Kutzin, 2001; 
Schreyoog et at., 2005; Mills, 2007; Gottrct and Schieber, 2007). A plan or option which 
does not provide for universal coverage at the outset or does so on a phased basis often 
leads to exclusion or less health and financial protection of vulnerable groups. In 
measuring this factor, the key indicator is the percentage of the population eligible for 
membership in the plan/option at the outset. 
ii) Solidarity in risk pooling: 
There seems to be general agreement that a single management agency is better at risk 
pooling, raising revenue, purchasing, reducing adverse selection and ensuring solidarity 
and cross subsidy among risk and income groups. The alternative is having multiple 
payers where there is segmentation of risk pools, shifting of high risk to public sector 
agencies and the need for strict regulations pertaining to risk equalisation funds and non- 
denial of health insurance coverage to avoid `cream-skimming'. Risk adjusters can be ex 
ante (age, sex, income, employment status, prior year expenditure, prior utilization) or ex 
post (broadly based on experience of different insurers with surplus or deficits in 
operations). 
-93- 
10 
WHO? Population Coverage (Breadth) 
Source: Adapted from Schreyogg et al. (2005) 
iii) Depth of benefit package: 
The choice of the benefit package is a critical part of the design involving considerations 
of medical need/necessity; adequate care, expedient care, safety, cost, budgetary impact 
analysis, efficacy, effectiveness, cost-effectiveness and stakeholder acceptability. 
As indicated by Mills (2007): 
'In theory the definition of the benefit package is key in making universal 
coverage feasible. No country is able to provide universal coverage for all 
services that technically are available so some type of rationing is 
inevitable. Limiting the Basic Package to a specific set of high priority 
services can mean that it is affordable to provide these services to 
everyone... Countries have tz difficult choice between including... services 
which are highly cost effective but may be relatively cheap to buy and 
those which may be less cost effective but very expensive to purchase for 
those who need them' (p. 11). 
Since the poor and middle classes generally suffer from the same health conditions as the 
rich and are less able to afford high cost necessary services (without further 
impoverishment), it may be more responsive and acceptable to have a broad rather than 
limited benefit package. 
iv) Equity in access and financing: 
Equity is defined in terms of access to services and fairness in the burden of financing. In 
the case of the former, it means that all persons who are plan members or cardholders 
have similar entitlements to services in the benefit package. There are two concerns 
which arise in this context - firstly, for several reasons (such as late decision to join, time 
period to marketing and registration to be completed, non-compliance) it is unlikely that 
everyone will be a member of the plan or a cardholder in the first or even second year of 
implementation. This means that within the plan, equity of access is achievable but for 
non-members there may be some level of differentiation in access to services. 
Secondly, the benefit package in each option contains a particular set of services. For 
services excluded from the package there will also be differentiation in access. In 
evaluating the options, attention will be focused on equity within the plan. Issues of 
equity in the wider society will be discussed in Chapter 8. 
In terms of equity in the burden of financing, there were three key factors which were 
considered: 
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> fixing contributions as a percentage of earnings (rather than as flat absolute 
amounts irrespective of earnings) to enhance progressivity in financing (Wagstaff, 
1993; 2007; McIntyre and Mooney, 2007); 
¢ emphasis on more prepayment than copayment or out of pocket payments since 
the latter, despite their role in rationing and deterring moral hazard, would have 
harsher effects on low income persons. (This is defined as `height' of coverage); 
¢ subsidies to cover the contribution requirements of the poor. 
v) Efficiency in purchasing and administration: 
Efficiency in purchasing and administration may be more readily achieved in single rather 
than multiple pooling agencies (Anderson and Hussey, 2004; Kwon, 2006). The key 
factors to be considered in efficient administrations are the percentage of 
resources/income spent on management as against direct health services and the choice of 
provider payment mechanisms. In respect of the latter, there seems to be general 
agreement that prospective systems are better than those emphasizing retrospective 
payments and consequently, capitation payments and global budgets are preferred to fee 
for service mechanisms. 
vi) Net Revenue Generation: 
This is defined as the amount of new or additional funds available for health services and 
can be expressed in terms of the following: 
NR= (C) - (A + Re) 
Where NR= Net Revenue 
C= Contribution income 
A= Administrative costs; and 
Re= Reserves. 
For a more balanced assessment, there are 2 additional indicators to be included to reflect 
the outcomes of the financial modelling. These are the resulting PAYGR and the 
percentage share of government's contribution to the funding requirements of each option. 
The importance of the former (PAYGR) lies in the extent to which it is viewed as a 
burden, new or modified, by population groups compared to currently imposed statutory 
deductions. In the case of the latter, the importance lies in the extent to which the fiscal 
burden of committed government contribution is increased or decreased in each NHI 
option compared to its current budgetary allocations to the health sector. 
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The overall ranking of NHI options emerges from the scoring method used in relation to 
the indicators and criteria. To reflect the impact of weighting, 2 rounds of scoring will be 
used: 
1) in the unweighted approach, it is assumed that no special significance was 
attached to each criterion and indicator i. e., they were `equally weighted'. For 
this, the scoring was simply based on assessing and ranking each of the 3 
options on whether it could be placed as performing first, second or third in 
relation to each criterion and indicator. The sum of the placements was used to 
determine the overall rank of the option, i. e., the lower the overall score, the 
higher placed the option. Since there were 8 criteria and 12 associated 
indicators used and weighted equally (i. e., each was assigned a unitary value), 
this meant that best likely attainable score was 12. 
2) in the weighted approach, the ranking of criteria by stakeholders (when asked 
a specific question on this) was used. Since net revenue, equity and efficiency 
were viewed by stakeholders as the most important criteria, a similar 
weighting of 3 was applied to each of these with the other criteria receiving a 
weighting of 1. It should be noted that, in the scoring, the weighting was 
applied to the criteria not the indicators since the latter were not specified by 
stakeholders. As in the unweighted method (above), the ranking of options 
according to each criteria i. e., first, second or third was applied so the 
combination of the placement score and weight determined the overall score 
and rank of the options. With weighting of the above 3 criteria (and the same 
12 associated indicators), the best likely attainable score was 24. 
Table 3.2 shows the evaluative framework containing the mix of criteria and indicators. 
These indicators were used to provide a first level evaluation of the data on the NHI 
options derived from the Financial Modelling. Bearing in mind that not all the relevant 
factors and considerations for making a policy choice could be encapsulated in these 
quantitative indicators, the discussion in Chapter 7 explores some of the other policy and 
implementation issues in relation to the options. 
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Table 3.2 Evaluative Framework of Criteria and Ranking of NHI Options 
NIII OPTIONS 
Criteria / Indicators 
Option 1 Option 2 Option 3 
1. Breadth of coverage 
a) % population eligible for membership at outset 
2. Risk pooling 
a) Single risk pool 
3. Depth of benefit package 
a) Comprehensive 
b) Inclusion of catastrophic care 
4. Equity in financing 
a) % earnings vs. flat rate 
b) % copayment-prepayment 
c) Subsidies for poor 
5. Efficiency 
a) % cost of administration 
b) Use of capitation and global budget 
6. Revenue generation 
a) Net revenue 
7. PAYGR 
8. % share of contribution by government 
OVERALL SCORE 
RANK 
Source: Author's representation 
3.11 Comments on Quality of Data 
In terms of the overall quality of the data collected and used in the analysis, there are 
some observations which can be made in respect of the 3 main data sources: the literature 
review; collection of quantitative data and derivation of qualitative data. 
> Literature review: as far as possible every effort was made to conduct a 
comprehensive search for the most relevant and up to date mix of articles, books, 
and reports. The literature review covered the period since 1980. Extensive use 
was made of electronic databases to generate readings. Some of these have 
inadequacies such as coverage of journals, indexing of information and 
misleading keywords (Muir Gray, 1997; Bowling, 1997). In addition, websites 
and internet sources also have limitations in terms of coverage especially of the 
grey literature. On the other hand, familiarity with and direct involvement in 
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Jamaica, meant that coverage of materials-published and unpublished-on the 
local context, health and health financing was quite detailed. 
¢ Quantitative data: extensive use was made of official publications on the 
macroeconomic, social and health context in Jamaica. For information on other 
ICs and DCs, much of the data was derived from official publications of 
international organizations such as the WHO, PAHO, OECD, IMF and World 
Bank. For specifics on Jamaica, efforts were made to triangulate data by 
comparing information across national and international sources. Perhaps the main 
weakness of the Jamaica data is in terms of coverage of materials on health 
services and financing in the private sector. This was dealt with through 
systematic use of annual survey data and information from private insurers. 
> Qualitative data: The 3 pronged strategy of elite interviews, key informants and 
participant observation meant that data gaps in one method were more likely to be 
picked up in the other methods. This was borne out in the dynamic application of 
the methods so that information from one was integrated with the others. In this 
way some of the cited weaknesses in each method were reduced through 
triangulation. This was particularly helpful since participant observation may have 
led to some selective focus or ignoring of some interactions because of familiarity 
or recall bias in recording data. Similarly, key informants may only have offered 
information and documents which they felt were relevant while omitting some 
other valuable sources of information. Elite interviews may have been biased in 
some aspects where some interviewees felt it was more appropriate not to be too 
critical of the announced government policy on NHI. Overall, perceived or 
manifest weaknesses in one method were counter-balanced by varied perspectives 
from others resulting in a more comprehensive and reliable database. 
During the period of participatory research, it should be noted that the MOH as 
employer did not seek to define data content, interpretation or analysis (other than 
the normal insistence on no quotations or references to official confidential 
documents) nor did it seek feedback on the research. General objectivity was also 
maintained and bias minimised in that the bulk of the collation and analysis of 
data took place after the researcher had left employment at the MOH. 
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CHAPTER 4: SITUATION ANALYSIS OF JAMAICA 
4.1 Overview of Key Areas to be Examined 
As a small, lower middle-income developing country, Jamaica has made significant 
progress in improving the health of its population. The extent of health improvements can 
be gauged by comparing some key indicators in 2006 and the 1950's - life expectancy 73 
vs. 58 years; crude birth rate 17 vs. 44 per 1000; crude death rate 5.7 vs. 16 per 1000 and 
infant mortality rate 19.2 vs. 40 per 1000 live births. In addition, compared to other 
developing countries, Jamaica's health indicators appear quite favourable and the country 
has been included among those in the WHO's `mortality stratum B' - low child and low 
adult mortality (WHO, 2004). 
Health progress, however, has also brought new service delivery challenges typical of 
countries in an advanced stage of the epidemiological transition and even sharper 
financial management challenges typical of countries faced with the rising costs of health 
services alongside severely constrained public funding resources. 
Jamaica has a mixed health system with the public sector as a major provider and 
financier of health services (reflecting both its long British colonial heritage and dirigiste 
State policies since independence in 1962) co-existing with a large private sector 
especially in the provision of ambulatory care services (reflecting strong ideological 
influences from its close neighbour, the United States). Protracted economic and fiscal 
problems since the mid-1970's alongside changing demographic and epidemiological 
profiles placed serious pressures on the ability of the health system to sustain 
improvements in the health status of the population. Despite efforts at sectoral 
restructuring, rationalisation and reform by successive governments, issues of inequity in 
access, underfunding of services, cost escalation, inefficient allocation of resources and 
popular expectations of health care driven by North American standards made the health 
system a major source of complaint and frustration (Abel-Smith, 1989; Cumper, 1993; 
Armstrong, 1994; Ministry of Health, 1997; DAH Consulting Inc, 2004). 
This Chapter provides a situation analysis of the Jamaican health system, drawing largely 
from secondary data sources and interviews with stakeholders. It discusses the contextual 
framework for understanding the policy-making environment, challenges, expectations 
and concerns with respect to the articulation of an NHIP. It describes and discusses key 
aspects of the following areas: 
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" general demographic patterns and trends as reflected in the size, age-sex- 
geographical distribution and growth rate of the population; 
" main features of the organisation and delivery of health services with emphasis on 
the relative roles and significance of public and private sectors; 
" health status of the population, burden of disease and the patterns of demand and 
utilization of health services; 
" major macroeconomic developments and trends over the last 3 decades and the 
influence of these on fiscal space, employment, levels of poverty and social safety 
net activities (which are closely linked to overall health status through resources 
for and access to health services); 
" the pattern of financing of health services and policy concerns with respect to the 
relative roles of various health financing mechanisms (taxes, private health 
insurance premiums, out of pocket spending and grants-charitable funds); 
" issues of equity in the health sector especially in relation to health status, health 
seeking behaviour and health expenditure; 
" major goals, components and specific financing concerns of the 1997-2005 Heath 
Reform Programme (HRP); 
" the health policy-making process and the opportunities for key stakeholders to 
influence changes in the system. 
The Chapter concludes by distilling from the situation analysis the main linkages between 
developments and dilemmas in the macroeconomy and health system to identify issues 
for conceptualization and design of an NHIP for Jamaica. 
4.2 The Demographic Context 
Jamaica, with noticeable shifts in the rate of growth and age structure of the population, 
may be described as being in the `intermediate stage of the demographic transition' (PIOJ, 
2006). Appendix 4.1 a provides data on some key aspects of Jamaica's demography. With 
an estimated 2.67 million residents in 2006, Jamaica's population is much lower than 
projections made in the 1960's. Economic progress (albeit uneven), investments in health 
and other welfare-inducing initiatives alongside vigorous and extensive efforts to provide 
family planning services (access to contraceptives and to general antenatal and post-natal 
services) have led to declining average annual growth rates in the population from about 
1.8% in the 1960's to 0.5% in the first half of the current decade (Statistical Institute of 
Jamaica Statistical Digest... various years). 
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The main determinants of population growth - birth, death and fertility rates - continue to 
show a declining trend. By 2006, the crude birth rate had fallen to 17 per 1000; crude 
death rate to 5.7 per 1000 and total fertility rate to 2.5 children per female of child- 
bearing age. Net external movements of the population continue to be negative and exert 
downward pressures on population growth. Permanent emigration, which was a major 
factor in dampening population growth in the 1960's and 1970's, slowed down 
significantly since the 1980's due to tightening of immigration policies in the main 
recipient countries --USA, UK and Canada. On the other hand, immigration (returning 
residents, refugees, deportees) fluctuated but remained at relatively low levels. Overall, 
with falling birth, death and fertility rates it is expected that reduced out-migration 
opportunities and changes in immigration will not have any significant impact on the 
pattern of slow population growth over the medium to long term (PIOJ, 2006). 
As indicated in Appendix 4.1 a, the sex ratio shows the population almost evenly divided 
with 49.3% males and 50.7% females in 2006 The age mix indicates the relative decline 
of the child population (0-14 years) accounting for about 29% of residents in 2006 
(compared to 40% in the 1970's) and the marked rise in the elderly population i. e., 
persons over 65 years, to about 8% of the total population (compared to 5% in the 1970's). 
This proportion of the over 65 population is expected to reach 10% in 2010 and 20% by 
2030 while the decline in the under 14 population is expected to continue at a faster rate. 
Overall, this means that the dependency ratio of 58 in 2006 is projected to fall to the low 
50's in the medium term (PIOJ's Economic and Social Survey, 2006). 
There are 2 major implications for health services and health financing resulting from 
these population trends. Firstly, one can expect a general increase in demand for health 
services and an even faster increase in the demand for particular services such as drugs, 
diagnostics, inpatient services and long-term care relevant to the growing elderly 
population. Secondly, the falling age dependency ratio and the trend for segments of the 
over 65 population to remain employed for longer periods to sustain income levels will 
affect the size and distribution of the burden of financing health services. 
In terms of spatial distribution, migration from rural areas to urban centres has been and is 
a continuing feature of the social environment. In 2006 the rural - urban mix was about 
49% to 51% compared to 65% to 35% in the 1950's. Spatial distribution of population 
has implications for the location of health facilities, equity in access to services, financing 
to maintain the health services delivery network and overall efficiency in the allocation of 
infrastructure and human resources. 
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4.3 Features of the Organisation and Delivery of Health Services 
Similar to other English-speaking Caribbean countries (Caribbean Commission on Health 
and Development, 2005), the health sector in Jamaica is comprised of a mix of public and 
private actors who, following Mills' categorization (2001), compete, complement, 
contract, co-exist and collaborate with each other to provide health services to the public. 
Table 4.1 gives an overview of the relative roles and services/activities - public health, 
ambulatory and inpatient care, pharmaceutical and diagnostic services, research and 
training - with respect to each sector as well as the type of financing mechanism 
associated with these activities. (The dominant actor in terms of provision of services and 
the chief source of financing is shown first). 
Except for public health action and research which have been and still are primarily dealt 
with by the public sector, general curative and palliative services and training are offered 
by public and private facilities. In 2006, the public sector was the dominant provider of 
inpatient care and the private sector of ambulatory services. (The financing mechanisms 
and overall financing of the sector are considered in more detail in Section 4.5). 
a) The Public Sector 
Although some health activities are undertaken by the Ministry of Labour (occupational 
health and safety); Ministry of Local Government (some vector control and public health 
functions); and Ministry of Education (training), the majority of activities in the public 
health sector are undertaken by the Ministry of Health (MOH). 
For personal health care services in 2006, the MOH owns and operates 17 general 
hospitals (18 if the quasi-public University Hospital is included) offering varying levels 
of emergency, curative and rehabilitative services; 6 specialist referral hospitals 
(maternity; child care; cancer treatment; rehabilitation; mental health and respiratory 
disorders) as well as 345 health centres (offering varying levels of preventive and curative 
services). The combined bed capacity in the public sector is about 5000 beds (or 1.9 beds 
per 1000 persons) representing about 95% of the total inpatient beds in Jamaica. 
Pharmaceutical and diagnostic services are available at the hospitals and at some of the 
health centres. In addition, the National Public Health Laboratory serves as the overall 
referral centre for laboratory services. 
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Table 4.1 Pattern of Health Provision and Financing, 2006 
Activities Providers Financing Comments 
1. Public Health 
" Environmental & Public Budget MOH responsibility shared with 
Vector Control Local Government 
" Health Education & Public; Private Budget; Grants & MOH 
& RHAs are prominent; NGOs 
Promotion donations; play important supportive role 
" Regulations, Standards Public; Private Budget; MOH responsibility; 
Professional 
Professional fees councils also have key role 
" Surveillance Public Budget MOH responsibility 
" Occupational Health & Public Budget MOH & 
Ministry of Labour share 
Safety responsibility 
2. Ambulatory Care (primary, specialist and outpatient) 
" Maternal & child Public; Private Budget; OOP; PHI 
Services at public facilities & private 
health clinics 
" Family Planning Public; Private Budget; OOP Services at public 
facilities & private 
clinics 
" Curative Private; Public OOP; Budget; PHI Services at public 
facilities (health 
centres & hospitals) & private clinics 
" Psychiatric Public; Private Budget; OOP Services at public 
facilities & private 
clinics 
" Dental & Optical Private; Public 
OOP; PHI; Budget Services at private clinics & public 
facilities 
3. Inpatient Care 
" Secondary & tertiary Public; Private Budget; OOP; PHI Services at public & private 
hospitals 
care locally 
" Secondary & tertiary Private; OOP; PHI; Services at private 
hospitals in US, 
care abroad Donations; Budget UK and public hospitals 
in Cuba 
4. Pharmaceuticals Private; Public OOP; PHI; Budget Services at private & public 
pharmacies 
5. Diagnostic & Imaging Private; Public OOP; PHI; Budget Services at private & public centres 
Services 
6. Research 
" Health Systems & Public Budget; Grants Ongoing & commissioned studies 
Services 
" Medical & Clinical University; Grants Ongoing & project specific 
Public; Private 
7. Training Public; Private Budget; OOP; Most training is done locally. 
Grants 
Notes: OOP refers to out of pocket payments; PHI to private health insurance 
Source: Compiled by Author 
Until 1997, the management and delivery of health services in the various facilities was 
coordinated and handled from the Head Office in the capital city. However, with the 
promulgation of the National Health Services Act of 1997, the functions of the MOH 
were decentralised with the Head Office being in charge of policy, planning, standards, 
regulations and purchasing services while four Regional Health Authorities (RHA's) were 
made responsible for the management and delivery of health services. In addition, two 
other semi-autonomous bodies were created-the Health Corporation Ltd with 
responsibility for the procurement and supply of essential drugs and medical sundries and 
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the Health Facilities Maintenance Unit for maintenance of equipment and infrastructure 
in the public sector. 
Public health facilities and personnel are spread throughout the country with each of the 
13 parishes (the political/administrative units) having at least 1 general hospital and a mix 
of health centres. However, the cluster of secondary-tertiary facilities around the two 
urban centres--one in the Northwest and the other in the Southeast of the island-- has 
meant that some facilities generally tended to be over-utilised while others in the rural 
areas were under-utilised. This has had several implications for the flow of budgetary 
allocations, availability of services, professional staff and for relations between the Head 
Office and the RHA's. 
b) The Private Sector 
The private sector comprises a mix of individuals and institutions offering a range of 
health services. General practitioners, specialists, dentists and other allied health 
practitioners offer curative and other services either in solo or group practice with the 
former being more common. Generally, these practices are clustered in the urban centres 
and are frequented mostly by the non-poor segments of the population although utilisation 
by the poorer groups is also quite high especially in view of the non-availability of or 
long waiting time for similar services in the public sector. Private companies supply the 
majority of pharmaceutical and diagnostic (laboratory and imaging) services in Jamaica 
and it has become almost the norm for persons who visit public facilities for ambulatory 
care to be given prescriptions or lists of required laboratory tests which can more 
frequently be. filled or conducted in the private sector. 
For inpatient care, there are 7 small urban-based private hospitals with a total bed 
capacity of about 240 or 5% of the total inpatient beds. These hospitals offer a limited 
range of specialties and complicated cases are usually sent to the larger public hospitals. 
Except for maternity cases, occupancy levels are generally less than 40% in the private 
hospitals. Private hospitals have had mixed fortunes over the period 1980 to 2005 and 
some, faced with acute financial difficulties, have had to scale down beds and services 
and approach the Ministry of Finance for special consideration in delaying payments of 
statutory deductions. 
Several non-governmental and faith-based organisations, despite limited budgets and 
facilities, also offer a mix of health education, diagnostic and social support services. For 
example, the Cancer Society, Diabetes and Heart Associations; Jamaica HIV-AIDS 
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Society and Sickle Cell Support Club undertake outreach, education and testing services. 
They also maintain registries of persons with the particular conditions and provide 
counselling to those concerned about or afflicted with the respective conditions. In 
addition to these local groups, there are also some international organizations which 
provide a mix of direct and indirect services (through funding other local agencies). These 
include UNICEF, UNFPA, UNDP, PAHO and Save the Children Fund. 
c) Overseas Care 
Both the public and private sectors have certain limitations in terms of tertiary care and 
are forced to refer patients for specialist overseas care from time to time. Patients are 
normally referred to the nearest facilities in the United States with smaller numbers sent 
to Canada, Cuba and the UK. Financing of these services are covered by a mix of 
budgetary grants (for public patients); private health insurance, charitable funds (from 
non-governmental organizations and public appeals) and own funds by the patients. 
Limitations of funds alongside with incremental development of tertiary and specialist 
services locally led to a significant decline in the number of overseas referrals from the 
public sector since the 1980's. With the demand for funds for overseas `specialist and 
catastrophic' cases exceeding supply, public officials have had to develop formal 
structured mechanisms to ration funds for `partial' or `full' coverage of associated costs. 
On the other hand, private insurers, in response to growing demand from policyholders 
and in contractual agreements with international provider network agencies, have made 
strategic use of authorisations of access to overseas care for `specialist and catastrophic 
cases' in targeting clients, benefit packages and premiums. 
In addition to these complicated cases which are referred abroad, many of the non-poor 
groups in Jamaica make use of overseas care for routine matters partly as a result of 
confidentiality, dissatisfaction with local health services; the close proximity of such 
services in the United States and resources-support from relatives residing in these 
locations. 
d) Private Practice 
In common with many countries which followed the British tradition, senior doctors in 
the public service are usually allowed to have private practice i. e. to work in the public 
and private sectors simultaneously and in some cases to use public facilities for treating 
their private patients. Specialists in the public hospitals as well as general practitioners 
who serve as district medical officers in health centres are granted this privilege which 
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was seen as a means of supplementing their incomes while still keeping them on staff in 
the public sector (World Bank, 1994; discussions with ex-Chief Medical Officer, 2000). 
This policy of dual practice has become a principal source of conflict over the years and 
more so with the advent of the RHA's which have responsibility for more effective 
management and delivery of health services in keeping with targets set out in Service 
Level Agreements with the Head Office. RHAs expressed concerns over the amount of 
time spent by privileged physicians in private practice compared to public duties; the 
spillover effects of their absence on the availability and quality of care and on the 
additional burden on other staff; the demonstration effects on other non-privileged 
physicians and allied health professionals such as pharmacists, laboratory technicians and 
physiotherapists (some of whom undertook private assignments during normal working 
hours) and of patient complaints of under the table payments in public facilities. (Ensor, 
1999 indicated that similar concerns exist in the health systems of some eastern and 
central European countries). 
Private practice emerged as a major area of concern in discussions on the design of NHI 
by those benefiting from having these privileges and groups who felt these privileges 
would diminish promises of securing equity in access in NHI. 
4.4 Health Status, Burden of Disease and the Demand for Health Services 
Inter-temporal and international comparisons suggest that Jamaica has made marked 
progress in improving the health of the population (WHO, 1995 and 2005). Appendix 
4.1b provides data on select indicators of health status and access in Jamaica in 2006. 
With the elimination or control of most infectious communicable diseases (except 
HIV/AIDS and periodic outbreaks of gastro-enteritis and dengue fever), measures such as 
infant and child mortality rates (19.2 and 16.2 per 1000 respectively) and maternal 
mortality rate (106.2 per 100,000) along with population with access to safe water (86%) 
and to sanitary facilities (95%) broadly indicate some of the health improvements 
compared to similar indicators 2 or 3 times worse in the 1950's. Qualitative changes also 
seem to have been realized with the WHO estimating Jamaica's healthy life expectancy to 
be 65.1 years in 2003 (WHO, 2004). 
Analysts have pointed to the interaction of sustained health investments (especially with 
the adoption of primary health care strategies since the early 1970's); economic growth 
and other welfare-enhancing policies in terms of access to safe water, sanitation and 
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nutrition as the key contributory factors to the health gains achieved by the country (Abel- 
Smith, 1989; Cumper, 1991; PAHO, 2002, discussions with CMO, 2000; MOH, 2005). 
Table 4.2 provides data on the broad epidemiological profile focusing on the leading 
causes of visits to health centres and hospitals and of mortality. (It should be noted that 
the data refer to public facilities only although key informants suggest that the pattern is 
similar if data on the private sector were included). In terms of primary care visits most 
persons sought treatment for wounds (dressings); hypertension, respiratory tract 
infections, STD's, skin diseases, and diabetes. At hospitals, pregnancy and related 
conditions, injuries/poisoning, respiratory and cardiovascular diseases and genito-urinary 
disorders were the most common conditions treated in 2005. Among the leading causes of 
mortality in 2004 (latest year based on data compiled by the Registrar-General's 
Department and Ministry of Health) were cerebrovascular conditions, neoplasms, 
diabetes, diseases of the respiratory system and heart disease. Deaths due to HIV-AIDS 
and trauma were also major concerns especially in their impact on the younger, working 
age population and on prospects for social and economic development of the country. 
Table 4.2 Leading Causes of Deaths, Visits, Hospitalisations in Public Facilities, 2005 
Visits to Health Centres Hospitalisation Deaths 
Dressings (for wounds/trauma) Obstetrics Cerebrovascular diseases 
Hypertension Accidents and Injuries Neoplasms 
Respiratory tract diseases Diseases-Respiratory system Diabetes 
Sexually Transmitted Diseases Diseases-Circulatory system Diseases-respiratory system 
Skin diseases Diseases-Digestive system Ischaemic heart disease 
Diabetes Nutrition-Endocrine conditions Trauma: homicides, injuries 
Lacerations and bums Diseases-Genitourinary system HIV-AIDS 
Gastroenteritis Neoplasms Perinatal conditions 
Musculoskeletal disorders Infectious and parasitic diseases Diseases-Genitourinary system 
Leg ulcers Perinatal conditions Neuro-psychiatric diseases 
Source: Author's tabulations based on data reported by The Ministry of Health (2005) 
The latest systematic analysis of the burden of disease in Jamaica was conducted in 1994 
by the Harvard Center for Population and Development Studies for the World Bank 
(World Bank, 1994). Using Disability Adjusted Life Years (DALYs) as the measure, it 
came up with a profile which showed the predominance of chronic non-communicable 
conditions (60%) followed by injuries and accidents (24%) and communicable diseases 
(16%). As shown in Table 4.3 women lost more DALY's due to communicable (21%) 
and non-communicable conditions (70%) than men (12% and 53% respectively). On the 
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other hand, men suffered more as a result of accidents, injuries and violence (35%) than 
women (10%). Overall, the data showed that Jamaica lost 120 DALY's per 1000 persons 
in 1990. This compared favourably with its neighbours in Latin America and the 
Caribbean (where on average 233 DALY's per 1000 persons were lost) and with the 
Established Market Economies as a group (where 117 DALY's per 1000 were lost). 
Table 4.3 Jamaica: Burden of Disease by Sex and Cause (percent by rows) 
Sex and Outcome Communicable Noncommunicable Injuries-Accidents DALYs lost/1000 
MALE 12.3 53.0 34.7 -- 
a) Premature death 16.8 53.1 30.1 -- 
b) Disability 7.4 52.9 39.6 -- 
FEMALE 20.6 69.8 9.6 -- 
a) Premature death 20.1 73.7 6.2 -- 
b) Disability 21.2 65.6 13.2 
ALL JAMAICA 16.0 60.0 24.0 120 
Latin America and 
Caribbean 
42.0 43.0 15.0 233 
Established Market 
Economies 
10.0 78.0 12.0 117 
Source: Compiled by author based on data from World Bank (1993,1994). 
An indication of self-assessed health status, health-seeking behaviour, sources of care and 
incidence of health insurance is provided in Appendix 4.2. Based on estimates from the 
annual Survey of Living Conditions, the data revealed that over the period 1992-2006 
approximately 11.4 % (period average) of respondents reported an illness or injury which 
lasted for about 10.3 days. In terms of seeking care for the reported illness/injury, about 
59.6% visited a health facility or health practitioner with a larger percentage of persons 
choosing to access care at private health facilities (58.4%) than public facilities (35.6%). 
A small percentage of persons (5.9%) visited both public and private facilities. 
For prescription drugs and medication, the majority of persons went to private facilities 
(about 77%) as against public facilities (about 19%). In terms of hospitalisation a larger 
percentage of persons were inpatients of public hospitals (6.6 %) than of private hospitals 
(0.8%). Overall, about 68% of those seeking care first presented themselves at primary 
care facilities (public health centres and clinics of private practitioners) while 26% sought 
initial care from hospital outpatient departments. 
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In terms of health insurance coverage, the percentage of respondents answering positive 
varied from a low of 8.8% in 1994 2006 to a peak of 18.4% in 2006 with a period average 
of about 12%. 
The evidence on health seeking behaviour, utilization and sources of care highlighted 
certain key aspects of the health system in Jamaica. These include: 
> some measure of under-utilisation of services given the gap between the 
percentage of those reporting an illness/injury (11%) and those actually seeking 
care (59%). While lack of action in terms of seeking care may be due to 
perceptions of severity of one's illness and use of home remedies, there were also 
access factors to be borne in mind such as financial considerations, trade-offs 
between seeking health care and spending on other goods/services as well as 
expectations of availability/quality of services. 
> the dominance of the private sector as the preferred provider of primary care 
services and prescription drugs (despite a large network of public health centres). 
The predominance of chronic non-communicable conditions in the population 
(which affects all groups but is higher among the poor) meant that there was a 
high derived demand for periodic check-up visits, diagnostic and pharmaceutical 
services. Data from MOH and Survey of Living Conditions Reports suggested that 
about 80% of visits lead to prescriptions for medication and that prescriptions 
were for more than one drug in the majority of cases. In addition, about 50% of 
visits led to diagnostic tests (laboratory or imaging). 
> the dominance of the public sector in terms of hospital-based services with about 
95% of the bed capacity and the mix of skills to treat with the majority of cases 
needing secondary care. 
> the relatively small percentage of the population with private health insurance 
(average of 12% over the period 1992-2006)-this had implications for equity in 
utilization of services and for considerations of the scope of NHI in extending 
financial protection through its prepayment approach given the high levels of 
utilization of private health providers (Gertler and Sturm, 1997) and of 
retrospective out of pocket payments for these services. 
Specific institutional data on the magnitude of health services utilization were more 
readily available from the public health sector. As shown in Appendix 4.3, the pattern of 
utilization of selected services over the 10-year period 1996-2005 revealed that: 
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> hospital discharges grew from 145,700 cases to 174,200 - an increase of 20%; 
> average length of stay was variable within a range of 4.9 to 6.8 days with a period 
average of about 5.9 days; 
> the number of inpatient days per capita was generally stable at about 0.33 days 
between 1996 and 2000 but rose between 2001-2005 to about 0.44 days-the 
period average was 0.39 days; 
> visits to outpatient and casualty departments increased from 0.38 per capita to 
0.48 in 2003 and 2004 with a period average of 0.44; 
> visits to primary care centres for both curative and preventive (maternal, child and 
reproductive health) services declined from 0.69 per capita to 0.57 - this 
represented a decline of 17% giving a period average of 0.64 visits;. 
> increased utilization of pharmaceutical, radiography and diagnostic services. For 
pharmaceuticals, prescription items per capita almost doubled from 0.37 to 0.68 
giving a period average of 0.55; for radiography services, exams per capita grew 
from 0.07 to 0.09 for a period average of 0.08; and for diagnostic services, exams 
per capita more than doubled from 0.32 to 0.75 giving a period average of 0.54. 
The observed pattern of utilization of health services in the public sector reflected the 
interaction of certain key factors. The increase in the levels of hospitalisation (much 
higher than population growth rates) may have been due to a mix of the following - the 
growing incidence of trauma related cases (violence and accidents) and complications of 
chronic diseases; increased investment in hospital as against health centre services by the 
RHAs and the declining availability of inpatient services in private hospitals (DAH 
Consulting Inc, 2004; Ministry of Health, 2005). 
In the case of pharmaceuticals, laboratory and imaging services, improvements in the 
availability and quality of services in the public sector since decentralization in 1997 
allied with substantially higher prices of similar services in the private sector may have 
been the main contributory factors (DAH Consulting Inc, 2004). 
4.5 Macroeconomic Developments and Health Implications 
After registering average annual growth rates in real terms of about 5.5% in the 1960's 
the Jamaican economy has been undergoing a prolonged period of slow growth since the 
1970's. Real growth rates averaged less than 1% per annum in the 1970's; just about 1% 
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in the 1980's and 1990's and about 1.6% in the years 2001-2006. Over this prolonged 
period from 1970-2006 there have been more years of negative or low growth rates (less 
than 1.0%) than medium to high positive rates despite the strenuous application of 
stabilisation and structural adjustment programmes by the IMF and World Bank 
respectively from 1977-1995 (Boyd, 1988; Witter and Anderson, 1991; World Bank, 
1996; Planning Institute of Jamaica, 2007). When adjustments were made for population 
growth, the data showed that real income per capita increased marginally over the long 
term, 1970-2006. 
Appendix 4.4 presents data on the performance of the economy over the period 1996- 
2006. Except for 2003 (2.3%) and 2006 (2.5%) growth rates have been quite modest with 
notable declines in 1997 and 1998 (-1.1% and -1.2% respectively). Measured in per 
capita terms real GDP in 2006 (J$91,500) was just above the J$89,200 estimated in 1996, 
an increase of 2.3% over the 11-year period. 
Economic performance has been largely influenced by developments in key sectors. 
Despite consistently positive growth in the tourism sector, the other major sectors- 
bauxite and alumina, agriculture (sugar, bananas, coffee and non-traditional crops) and 
manufacturing (light industries, food processing and textiles)-have been characterised 
by generally weak performance. Liberalized local markets (as part of structural 
adjustment measures) since the mid-1980's led to intense competition from imports in the 
commodity and goods market and successes in the tourism and related services sub- 
sectors have not been enough to generate widespread growth in the economy. 
Remittances, since 2000, have replaced tourism as the largest source of foreign exchange 
earnings and it was estimated in the 2005 Survey of Living Conditions (STATIN and 
PIOJ, 2006) that 54% of households received remittances in that year. 
Weak economic growth resulted in severe fiscal constraints. Revenue sources - largely 
from income taxes (25% of personal earnings and 33% corporate); consumption duties 
(15% value added tax which was increased to 17.5% in 2003); trade taxes (mixed range 
of import duties/tariffs from 0%--30% in keeping with membership obligations under the 
World Trade Organisation and Caribbean Single Market and Economy) and special 
consumption taxes on alcohol, tobacco and petroleum products--averaged about 28% of 
GDP over the period. Other statutory deductions took up 15% of earnings and included 
5% each for national insurance/social security; housing and education. While being 
heavily influenced by patterns of economic growth, revenue generation in Jamaica also 
suffered because of severe shortcomings in the efficiency of collection despite high r 
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penalty and interest charges for late payments (Planning Institute of Jamaica, 2007). 
Some estimates indicated that, given the range and magnitude of taxes as well as 
increased technical competence in administration, Jamaica should be collecting at least 
50% more revenue than it did (Tanzi, 2007). Except for international trade taxes, 
collections of most of the other large revenue sources (income, value-added and property 
taxes) were deemed to be deficient. 
On the other hand, expenditures have consistently exceeded revenue (averaging about 
34% of GDP). Successive governments from the 1980's have resorted to heavy 
borrowing both locally and externally to support the ailing economy and its own social 
and economic programmes. In particular the Government has had to rescue a number of 
failing financial institutions from bankruptcy or near bankruptcy - commercial banks, 
insurance companies, trust companies and merchant banks - and to prevent a total 
collapse of the financial sector and the economy in the latter part of the 1990's. The net 
effect was that the total debt (approximately 60% internal and 40% external) grew 
significantly from less than 20% of GDP in 1980 to 148% in 2005. (In 2007, this ratio 
had fallen slightly to 132%). 
In terms of fiscal obligations, debt servicing which was less than 15% of Government's 
expenditure in 1980 rose to about 67% in 2001 and fell slightly to 59% in 2006. 
(Sovereign) Debt servicing has consistently absorbed the largest proportion of the 
government's budget since the mid-1980's leaving a more limited pool of `discretionary 
funds' to be allocated among competing Ministries and priorities. With expenditure 
exceeding revenue in most years and the options for additional tax revenue severely 
curtailed, persistent fiscal deficits came under tight scrutiny from international lending 
and risk-rating agencies (multilateral, bilateral and private). Consequently, the pressures 
to introduce or expand measures to `balance the budget' (such as divestment, revenue 
enhancement measures, debt rescheduling, flexible exchange rates, higher fees and 
charges in public services) featured prominently in policies and debates over the period. 
Inflation, directly and indirectly, affects the cost of health services through (adjustments 
in) compensation agreements for health staff, prices of medical supplies especially drugs 
and equipment (most of which have to be imported), payments for some contracted 
services (such as cleaning, portering, laundry, security, dietary) and utility charges. 
Inflation rates fluctuated over the period from 15.8% in 1996 to 5.8% in 2006. Stringent 
monetary policies (high interest rates and bank liquidity ratios as well as decisive 
interventions by the government in its sale of bonds and Treasury bills as well as by the 
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central bank in building up a pool of foreign exchange reserves to prevent a free fall of 
the exchange rate) during the period largely dampened the price escalation effects of the 
depreciating currency (which stood at J$37 to the US$ in 1996 and declined to J$77 in 
2008). The reappearance of double digit inflation in 2003 after 6 years of modest price 
increases from 1997-2002 was due to excessive price adjustments by businesses made as 
a result of a short-term spike in the exchange rate to about J$70 to the US$ and 
expectations of its continuance. 
The pattern of medical inflation (measured using a package of office visits, prescription 
drugs, hospitalization and surgery costs and medical supplies) generally followed the 
same trends as general inflation with the rates of the former noticeably higher (by about 
10%-15%) than the latter in most years. 
In the labour market, employment levels averaged about 86% of the participating 
workforce over the period. The majority of persons were employed in the services sector 
(65%) as against the goods producing sector (35%) and the main sources of employment 
were government and public agencies (13%); private enterprises (51%) and own 
account/self-employed entities (36%). Unemployment levels remained in double digits 
despite some fluctuation over the period from a peak of 16.5% in 1997 to a relative low of 
10.3% in 2006. One explanation is that the decline may be due more to falling labour 
force participation rates and more years spent in education than to real progress in job 
creation (Planning Institute of Jamaica, 2007). Rates of unemployment tended to be 
higher among females and young persons. However, being unemployed did not 
necessarily mean being `out of work' or income as the informal sector continued to be a 
major source of employment and earnings (Witter and Anderson, 1991; PIOJ, 2007). 
The net effect of weak economic performance and double digit unemployment levels 
should normally be reflected in rising levels of poverty. However the population living 
below the poverty line (measured using consumption not income data and based on 
surveys of spending patterns for a prescribed basket of essential goods and services) has 
generally been falling. In 1996 poverty levels stood at 26.1 %. In 2006 the rate had fallen 
to 14.3%. According to the official data the explanation for this counter-intuitive situation 
could be the large size of the informal sector, the falling rate of inflation, the massive 
influx of remittance funds from relatives living in other countries and the success of 
poverty eradication programs (PIOJ, 2007). One of the major anti-poverty initiatives is 
the Programme for Advancement through Health and Education (PATH). Established in 
2002 with partial funding from the World Bank, the program uses an objective, 
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computerized beneficiary identification system to target the needy and vulnerable 
(children, elderly, disabled, pregnant and lactating women and the destitute). Cash grants 
are given every 2 months on condition that members comply with conditionalities such as 
regular health checks (for all) and attendance at schools (for children). In 2007 it was 
estimated that the program was reaching about 67% of the target population. 
In terms of income distribution (using consumption spending as a proxy for income), the 
Gini coefficient averaged 0.38 for the period and ranged from 0.36 in 1996 to 0.42 in 
1997. (The coefficient varies from 0 when income distribution is equal to 1 when it is 
highly unequal). Levels of unemployment, poverty and income inequality had 
implications for health seeking behaviour, insurance membership and access to services 
as well as the ability to purchase other welfare-inducing goods. 
The above macroeconomic patterns and concerns have been transmitted to the health 
sector in several ways: 
9 Government had to give priority to sovereign debt repayment, severe fiscal 
controls and greater selectivity in budgetary allocations to sectors/ministries - 
these led to much less resources available to the health sector in real and relative 
terms. For the public health sector this resulted in the build-up of unpaid bills, a 
long list of delayed capital expenditure and weaknesses in the ability to recruit and 
retain staff. (The impact of these are discussed in the next Section). 
" The search for alternative revenue generating mechanisms by the public health 
sector led to the re-introduction of revised user fee programmes for health services 
in 1984,1993 and 1997 and 2003 even while successive governments maintained 
an official policy line that no one would be denied access to health services 
because of inability to pay. 
" High unemployment and poverty levels and slow growth of salaries in the private 
sector led to many persons facing difficulties in paying medical bills for private 
health services (hospital care, ambulatory services, drugs and diagnostic services) 
and returning to join the queues for subsidised care in the public sector. Among 
these were many persons who had private health insurance coverage. 
" Largely influenced by income inequalities and deficiencies in the public health 
system, there developed a fairly well-defined three-tier health system where those 
with much resources went abroad for treatment; those with less to the private 
sector and those with little to the public sector. 
9 Macroeconomic forces played a major role in influencing policy and public 
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debates over health financing issues-adequacy of resources for the sector, fiscal 
constraints, how to share costs given the heavier tax burden on formal sector 
workers compared to self-employed and informal sector workers, prepayment vs. 
out of pocket payments and the scope for alternative mechanisms such as NHI. 
4.6 Key Aspects of Health Financing Arrangements 
a) Total Health Expenditure 
Similar to the delivery of health services, health financing is provided through a mix of 
public and private sources. Using a National Health Accounts framework, Table 4.4 
shows estimates of the aggregate and relative shares of health financing in 2006. 
Table 4.4 Aggregate and Relative Shares of Health Expenditure, 2006 
Source Amount (J$bn) Relative Share (%) 
Public health expenditure 20.4 55.9 
" Ministry of Health 17.8 48.8 
" Other Ministries 1.9 5.2 
" National Health Fund 0.6 1.6 
" National Insurance Scheme 0.1 0.3 
Private health expenditure 16.1 44.1 
" Out of pocket 10.6 29.0 
" Private health insurance 4.8 13.2 
" NGO's 0.7 1.9 
TOTAL 36.5 100.0 
Source: Compiled by Author using data from Ministry of Finance Budget documents; Survey of Living 
Conditions and reports from private insurers to Planning Institute of Jamaica. - 
The estimates showed that total health expenditure (THE) amounted to J$36.5bn 
representing approximately 6.0% of GDP in 2006. The public-private split in THE 
showed that 55.9% came from public sources and 44.1% from private sources. Upon 
further disaggregation of the public financing sources, the data showed that resources 
from the Ministry of Finance (largely through taxes and some loan funds) were 
channelled through the Ministry of Health which managed the bulk of public funds for 
health services (87%) with the rest being spent by Ministries of Education (training and 
health education programmes); Labour (occupational health programmes) and Local 
Government (vector control). 
Other sources of public financing came from the National Health Fund (J$0.6bn) which 
was established in 2003 to assist in financing prescription drugs for chronic disease 
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patients and to provide support funds for equipment, supplies and health promotion 
programs. In addition, some financing came from the National Insurance Scheme 
(J$O. lbn) through a health insurance program for its pensioners. 
In terms of private health expenditure, the majority of funds came from out of pocket 
payments (66% or about 29% of THE); private health insurance expenses (30% or 13.2% 
of THE) and the rest from NGOs. 
b) Public Health Expenditure and the MOH 
The majority of financial resources for publicly provided health services (about 90% with 
the rest coming from user fees) were derived from annual budgetary allocations and 
managed by the MOH. Appendix 4.5 shows the pattern of public health expenditure by 
the MOH, recurrent or MOH (R) and capital or MOH (C), over the period FY1980/1 to 
FY2006/7: 
> In nominal terms, MOH's total health budget i. e. MOH (T) increased from 
J$160.6mn in 1980/1 to J$17.8bn in 2006/7. 
> As a percentage of the national budget or total government expenditure (TGE), the 
MOH allocation fell from 6.7% in 1980/1 to 4.8% in 2006/7. The year on year 
pattern is shown in Figure 4.1 with the highest percentage allocation of 8.4% 
received in 1990/1 while the lowest was 3.7% in 2001/2.3 
> In real terms (with 1995 as the base year for deflators), MOH (T) grew from 
J$4.6bn in 1980/1 to J$4.9bn in 2005/6. This represented an overall real growth 
rate of 6.5% over the 25-year period. The highest real allocation over the period 
(J$6. lbn) was received in 2004/5 while the lowest (J$3. Obn) was received in 
1986/7. In comparison, it should be noted that over the same period the overall 
government budget (TGE) grew by 81% in real terms (from J$68.6bn in 1980/1 to 
J$124.4bn in 2005/6); 
> In real per capita terms (adjusting for population changes), real MOH (T) declined 
from J$2144 in 1980/1 to J$1851 in 2005/6 representing an overall decline of 
13.7%. The annual estimates were plotted and are shown in Figure 4.2 with the 
3 Analysis of data over a longer period indicated that in the decade of the 1960's the MOH received about 
11.1% of the budget for health services; 8.4% in the 1970's; 6.9% in the 1980's; 6.0% in the 1990's, and 4.5% in the first few years of 2000's. 
As a percentage of the non-debt obligated or discretionary government budget, the allocation to the MOH fell from 14.2% in 1992/3 to 11.1% in 2006/7. The average allocation over the period 1992/3 to 2006/7 was 11.8% of the non-debt budget. 
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highest real per capita allocation of J$2397 received in 1982/3 while the 
lowest 
was J$1294 in 1986/7. Over the same period, real per capita TGE grew 
by 46%. 
Figure 4.1 Total Ministry of Health Expenditure as 
% of Total Government Expenditure 
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Figure 4.2 Pattern of Real Per Capita Ministry of Health Expenditure (J$) 
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> the recurrent budget for health declined from about 8.9% of government's 
recurrent budget in the 1980's to 7.6% in the early years of the 2000's. The 
relative decline in the capital budget was more dramatic with the share of overall 
capital spending in health falling from 0.9% of government's capital expenditure 
in the 1980's to about 0.2% in the first few years of 2000. 
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> allocation to primary care fluctuated between 15% and 25% with the overall 
average being about 20% (which is less than the target of 25% recommended by 
international organizations such as the WHO). On the other hand, allocations to 
secondary and tertiary care services averaged about 70% over the period. Since 
decentralization and the establishment of RHAs in 1997, allocations have been 
merged into a single budgetary grant making it difficult to readily identify 
separate financing amounts for primary and secondary care. 
¢ as a percentage of the MOH recurrent expenditure, staff costs (salaries, travel and 
subsistence payments) grew from 46% in 1980/1 to 76% in 2005/6. With the 
establishment of the RHAs, staff costs continued to absorb a significant portion of 
the budget of the RHAs amounting to as much as 92% in 2003/4. Despite 
receiving the majority of the health budget, earnings by staff in the public health 
sector were lower than for comparable positions in the private sector. This led to 
major difficulties in recruiting and retaining staff resulting in migration of health 
workers and persistent staff shortages especially for health professionals. 
The MOH and RHAs had to resort to various coping strategies to manage reduced real 
budgetary allocations and shortfalls (given commitments to delivery of a broad package 
of health of services for all). One of these strategies was to build up arrears in terms of 
non-payment of statutory deductions and amounts owed to public utility companies. In 
2003/4 it was estimated that the accumulated `debt overhang' was about J$4bn or about 
35% of the MOH's budgetary allocation. 
The decline in budgetary allocations to health in Jamaica in relative and real terms 
occurred as successive governments responded to the challenges of prolonged fiscal 
difficulties, heavy burden of debt repayments as first call on public resources and the 
need to shift resources to more urgent needs such as national security. To track the 
financial implications of constrained budgetary flows, three simulations were conducted 
to show the likely nominal budget in 2005/6. Firstly, if the MOH share over the period 
remained constant at 6.7% of the total government expenditure (TGE) in 1980/1; 
secondly, if the MOH budget was increased in real per capita terms by 0.5% per annum 
from 1981/ to 2005/6 to take into account factors such as increasing demand due to 
population increase, technology changes and quality improvements; and thirdly, if the 
MOH budget was increased in real per capita terms by 1% per annum over the period to 
take into account the above factors as well as payment of higher compensation amounts to 
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recruit and retain staff. The results of the simulations are presented in Appendix 4.6 and 
depicted in Figure 4.3. 
i) Simulation 1: Fixed Percentage of Government Budget 
Assuming that the MOH health budget i. e. MOH(T) was held constant throughout the 
period at 6.7% of total government expenditure (TGE) in 1980/1 (which was still less 
than the average of 11 % in the decade of the 1960's and 8.4% in the 1970s), the estimated 
nominal budget in 2005/6 should have been J$23.2bn rather than the actual allocated 
amount of J$13.7bn -a gap or shortfall of J$9.5bn or 69%. It should 
be noted that the 
MOH(T) allocation attained or exceeded the assumed `benchmark' of 6.7% only 5 times 
in the 25-year period: 1981/2; 1982/3; 1983/4; 1984/5 and 1990/1. In every other year 
there was a `shortfall' of varying magnitudes. In 1992/3 the `shortfall' was J$ 23.4 
million or 1.4% while in 2001/2 it was J$6.5bn or 80%. 
ii) Simulation 2: Real Per Capita Increase of 0.5% per annum 
Assuming the MOH (T) budget was increased in real terms by 0.5% per capita per annum 
from 1981/2 and the estimated real amounts were reconverted into nominal dollars using 
the annual deflators, the data showed that there would have been negative variances when 
compared to the actual budget received in every year except 1982/3 and 1994/5. The gap 
in the actual budget ranged from J$0.7 million in 1981/2 to J$4.3bn in 2005/6. 
iii) Simulation 3: Real Per Capita Increase of I% per annum 
As in Simulation 2, with a real per capita increase of 1% per annum, the gap in allocation 
ranged from negative J$19 per capita in 1981/2 to J$982 in 1986/7. When converted into 
nominal dollars to estimate what `should have been' the actual budget the shortfall in the 
MOH (T) budget ranged from J$1.6 million in 1981/2 to J$6.7 bn in 2005/6. 
The data from the simulations highlight in quantitative terms what the likely flow of 
resources to the MOH over the period would have been when compared to the fluctuating 
budgetary allocations received from the government. For example, a consistent and 
reliable 6.7% allocation from the government would have resulted in a quite different 
flow of funds compared to the 3.7% of TGE received in 2001/2 and 8.4% in 1990/1. 
Similarly, predictable budgetary increases of 0.5% or 1% in real per capita terms per 
annum would have yielded much more resources for managing health services. 
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Figure 4.3 Simulations of Ministry of Health Expenditure in. lanraica 
Simulation 1: MOH(T) as Fixed % of TGE (1$mn) 
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Simulation 2: MOH(T) with 0.5% Real Per Capita Increase Per Annum (J$mn) 
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-Q-Nominal at Constant 6.7% of TGE 
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c) User fees 
In response to budgetary difficulties as well as to recommendations from certain lending 
agencies that patients should contribute more directly to the costs of care, the largely 
unused user fee schedule for publicly provided health services was revised in 1984 and 
more substantially in 1993,1999 and 2003 to play a more prominent role in funding, 
supplying and accessing services. Revenue generation has been cited as the main driving 
force for fees (Abel Smith, 1989; Shephard, 1995) but key informants in the MOH 
indicated that generating more cost consciousness among patients and health workers (to 
break the `culture of free care') as well as deterrence of unnecessary care were also 
desired objectives. Since 2000, revenue from user fees collected by the RHAs was no 
longer considered as `appropriations in aid' by the Ministry of Finance but as `income' to 
supplement budgetary allocations from the Consolidated Fund for covering the costs of 
delivering health services. 
The structure of fees (for example in the National Health Services Fee Regulations of 
1999) showed uniform fees at hospitals set at significantly higher levels than the uniform 
fees at health centres; different fees for public, private and non-resident patients; and 
specific provisions for insured patients to pay fees in line with the maximum allowed in 
their health plans. In 1999, fees ranged from J$100 (US$1.50) for registration to J$8000 
(US$133) for major surgery at hospitals and from J$20 (US$0.30) for registration to 
J$500 (US$8.30) for delivery of babies at health centres. Fees were not indexed and could 
only be changed by Ministerial and Parliamentary directive. 
Exemptions covered a mix of patient and service groups and were based on direct and 
characteristic targeting. Among those benefiting from exemptions and fee waivers were 
patients at family planning, immunization, antenatal and post-natal care clinics; persons 
on government welfare and social support programmes as well as policemen, firemen and 
school-children. The MOH also had a stated policy that no one should be denied care 
because of declared inability to pay the fees. 
In terms of revenue (See Appendix 4.7), collection increased from J$ 0.2 million in 
1983/4 (or 0.1% of the MOH recurrent budget) to J$1.63bn in 2006/7 (or 9.7% of the 
budget). For the RHAs (which commenced operations in 1997/8), the contribution from 
fees (which were largely collected by them) was much higher reaching a peak of 14.8% in 
2001/2 (See Figure 4.4). 
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Figure 4.4 User Fee Collections in Jamaica as 
% of MO! I and RHA Budgets, 1983/4 -2006/7 
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Collections increased substantially not just because of the higher fees in 1984,1993,1999 
and 2003 but, in the post-1999 period, because of more vigorous, systematic and system- 
wide efforts (in hospitals and health centres) to enhance fee collections (discussions with 
key infonnants in MOH and RHAs). These included: 
0 more cashiers working longer hours in 2 or 3 shifts (compared to I day shift 
previously) in the major hospitals; 
" more assessment officers working with patients to develop payment plans eg 
instalment payments for large hills or to collect what they could; 
0 better arrangements to collect payments From credit cardholders (rather than cash 
only) and from the insured population (with swipe card facilities and ample stocks 
of charge cards for manual claims); 
0 sensitization of the public through posters and other public education activities; 
0 prepayment plans for elective surgery, maternity and other treatments such as 
physiotherapy; 
" improvements in admission, billing, ward monitoring, discharge and collection 
systems; 
" strong advocacy to keep all fees collected by the Rl lAs rather than submit them to 
the Consolidated Fund. (Control over fees collected moved from zero percent in 
the early 1980's to 50% in the late 1980's and to 100% alter 1999). 
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These efforts were partially successful as the data implied that about 60% of bills were 
unpaid (discussions with key informants in MOH and RHAs). Inpatients were more 
culpable than outpatients because of lack of coordination in discharge planning ('it is 
difficult to collect from patients once they have left the hospital') and because patients 
claimed that they had `already paid the doctor'. (The latter may be evidence of approved 
and perhaps unapproved private practice by physicians). RHAs estimated that, despite 
expenditures on administrative changes, net collections greatly exceeded incurred costs. 
In terms of utilization (measured as outputs since utilization is also closely related to 
supply factors and the availability of services): 
" total visits for services at health centres fell by 35% between 1985 and 2002. This 
occurred despite user fees being much lower at health centres than at hospitals; 
" total visits to hospital casualty departments increased about 90% over the same 
period despite higher fees at hospitals; 
" total visits to hospital outpatient departments increased by 6% in the same period; 
" total inpatient days grew from 1.1 million days to 1.2 million days over the same 
period (an increase of 9%). 
The above pattern showing higher levels of utilization (outputs) at hospitals may be due 
to inadequate care offered at health centres, improvements in care at hospitals and higher 
relative prices of services in the private sector. (The latter was reflected in the Survey of 
Living Conditions data which showed increasing use of public facilities since 1996. In 
2002 - in that year only - public facilities replaced private facilities as the main source of 
first-level care in Jamaica. ) 
The policy of user fees had a mixed reception over the period and this ambivalence was 
reflected among policymakers; frontline health staff and analysts. Some called for 
improvements in the billing and collection systems as well as indexation to increase the 
revenue generating potential of user fees (Shepherd, 1995). On the other hand, detractors 
pointed to the negative impact of fees on the poor and of deficient exemption mechanisms 
(Bitran and Associates, 2004). 
The exemption system involved application of policies on scheduled exempt groups and 
services as well as interviewing/assessing those persons who declared problems in paying 
fees to determine what level, if any, waivers should be granted. Despite several 
improvements (more trained officers; sensitization programmes for staff and patients; 
facilities for privacy in the assessment process) the exemption system was still a source of 
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much complaint and deficiencies. These included lack of consistency in assessment of 
patients due to differing levels of diligence among officers; interference by politicians and 
health workers (relatives or disgruntled staff as well as physicians who had private 
practice) in `commanding' officers who should be exempted; and problems in the poor 
getting exemptions because of their lack of knowledge of the system or fear of 
stigmatization or of services being withheld. The data suggested that less than 10% of 
patients received exemptions which seemed quite low given that the public system was 
used proportionately more by the poor and levels of poverty in Jamaica ranged from 44% 
of population in 1991 to 14.8% in 2005. One estimate suggested that there were 
significant Type 1 and Type II errors with 78% of the poor paying for care especially 
ambulatory services and 40% of the rich not paying (Bitran and Associates, 2004). 
d) National Health Fund (NHF) 
Established in 2003, the NHF provides financial subsidies to participating pharmacies 
(public and private) so that access to prescription drugs is enhanced far chronic disease 
patients (suffering from one or more of 15 conditions). Patient membership has grown to 
about 300,000 in 2008 or about 50% of the estimated population with chronic diseases. 
The NHF also provides off-budget funds for capital projects in the public health sector 
and for community health promotion projects. As indicated in Table 4.4, the NHF 
accounted for about 1.6% of total health expenditure in 2006. 
e) Private Health Insurance 
The percentage of the population covered by private health insurance grew from around 
6% in the early 1980's to 18.4% in 2006. (This included policyholders and their 
dependents). Data from the Jamaica Survey of Living Conditions (2006) revealed that 
health insurance coverage is highest (about 30%) among those in the top quintile, persons 
aged 30-59 years and those living in urban areas. The majority of persons were covered 
in group (as against individual) plans which were typically part of overall employee 
benefit packages and renewable once per year. Membership included government 
workers and their dependents as well as pensioners of the National Insurance Scheme 
who were covered in voluntary health plans managed under contract by a private insurer. 
The number and ownership of companies offering health insurance packages changed 
noticeably since the 1980's when there were 6 health carriers. Financial and commercial 
difficulties in the 1990's led to changes in the marketplace with some companies 
dropping and their portfolios taken over by the remaining or new companies. By 2000, 
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there were 5 companies offering health insurance -4 were general and life insurance 
companies and one (Blue Cross of Jamaica) sold health plans only. 
Appendix 4.8 summarises the main benefit items, limits and rules by insurers in 
1997/2000. 
As financing intermediaries, private insurance companies collected about J$5.0 billion in 
premiums in 2006 and paid out J$4.8 billion in claims. Over the period 1996-2006, the 
distribution of claims paid showed that the bulk of payments went to private providers. In 
terms of services bought, the distribution showed the following: prescription drugs (45%); 
office visits to GPs and specialists (20%); hospitalisation room and board and supplies 
(8%); surgery (7%); laboratory and diagnostic services (7%); and other services (13%) 
(LICA Annual Reports). 
Health insurance carriers contended that health plans were not a profitable line of 
business but that it made good sense as part of overall employee benefit packages 
(discussion with key informant from LICA, 1999). They also indicated that the economic 
difficulties facing the country as well as the relatively high cost of trying to attract and 
retain individual members placed clear limits on their ability to expand coverage. These 
characteristics of the industry led to some expansion and innovation along 2 lines-firstly, 
to enhance packages for those already covered especially to include overseas care for top 
executives especially through agreements with international health benefits management 
firms; secondly, to design packages for specific diseases such as cancer and some cardiac 
condition ('critical illness' or `dread disease' policies) which provided lump sum 
payments if the insured is diagnosed with the disease. 
J) Out of Pocket Payments 
Out of pocket payments represent a major component of total health expenditure and 
feature of the health financing system in Jamaica. As indicated in Table 4.1, out of pocket 
payments (comprising copayments in health insurance plans, user fees for public health 
services and other direct payments from the uninsured) are used to purchase ambulatory 
and inpatient services especially in the private sector but increasingly, with higher user 
fees, in the public sector. Data from the Annual Survey of Living Conditions showed that 
household direct health expenditure accounted for about 2.5% of total household 
expenditure over the period 1992-2006 (STATIN and PIOJ). When this percentage was 
applied to total private final consumption estimates in the national accounts, the resulting 
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figure provided an approximation of total out of pocket expenditure on health-in 2006 
this came up to J$10.6bn or about 29% of total health expenditure. 
The high levels of out of pocket payments reflected the inadequate coverage of 
prepayment plans either of the tax-based health services or of private health insurance 
plans. Key informants indicated (discussions with managers of private insurance firms 
and senior health managers in the Ministry of Health) that high out of pocket payments 
were due to certain key factors-voluntary behaviour of persons who choose to self- 
insure and involuntary behaviour of persons who did not fully understand prepayment 
plans or were never approached or were denied coverage by private insurers. 
g) NGOs and Other Charitable Sources 
For certain population groups and categories of health services, funds from NGOs, faith- 
based organizations and other charitable sources, local and foreign, were a crucial part of 
the financial flows to the health sector. The persistence of resource shortfalls in the public 
sector was a major factor encouraging the establishment and expansion of these sources 
of funds. Apart from those local groups linked to specific diseases such as Cancer Society, 
Diabetes Association, Heart Association and Sickle Cell Support Club, RHAs received 
assistance in cash or kind from `friends of the hospitals' and from Food for the Poor (a 
local charity group). 
Overseas financial assistance also played a major role in providing resources for health 
services and in 2007 the Jamaica Overseas Health Office (JOHO) was set up in New 
York to serve as a clearing house and to coordinate and channel health assistance 
(financial, supplies, equipment and technical skills) offered from time to time by civic, 
community and other organizations. 
h) Social Security Spending 
The local social security organization, National Insurance Scheme (NIS), was not a major 
provider of financing nor had much influence over developments in the health sector over 
the period. NIS, with just about 30% of the working population enrolled as contributing 
members, largely confined its activities to providing income replacement payments for 
sickness, maternity, pensions and other related benefits to retired members. 
In 2003, NIS launched a voluntary contributory health insurance plan, NI Gold, for its 
pensioners. The plan covered a broad benefit package and was accessible in public and 
private health facilities. Administration was contracted to a private firm. 
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i) Proposals to Improve Financing Arrangements 
In reviewing the pattern and performance of health financing arrangements over the 
period 1980 to 2006, several issues and concerns can be identified: 
" overall budgetary stringency in the public sector affecting the availability and 
quality of services; 
9 inadequate resources for maintenance and supplies; 
" inadequate compensation packages to attract and retain most categories of senior 
health professionals in the public sector; 
" limited risk pooling arrangements and insurance cover among the population; 
9 large public subsidies to GP's and specialists who are allowed private practice in 
public institutions; 
" inequity in access to and utilisation of services by the poor. 
Over the same period several studies with varying levels of comprehensiveness were 
undertaken by local and external consultants to examine and recommend solutions to 
these health financing concerns (Abel-Smith, 1989; World Bank, 1994). In general, these 
studies recommended the following, either separately or in various combinations: 
" higher user fees for a wider range of services and persons in public facilities; 
" expanded private health insurance coverage using appropriate fiscal incentives 
and different benefit packages for different segments of the population; 
" introducing some form of contribution-based national health insurance; 
" establishing prepaid health plans and health maintenance organisations based on 
managed care principles; 
" using vouchers from the State to assist the poor in enrolling in voluntary or 
compulsory health insurance plans; 
" various measures such as efficiency savings and privatisation to improve the 
availability and quality of services in the public sector; 
" formulation of a basic package of care to be provided in the public sector while 
reducing the State's involvement in secondary and tertiary care. 
Except for user fees, some privatization (through contracting out some support services) 
and national health insurance, official attention largely ignored the other health financing- 
purchasing proposals such as more private insurance, HMO's, vouchers and concentration 
of public funds on a basic package of care. 
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4.7 Issues of Equity in the Health Sector 
Ongoing policy and public concerns emphasised not just general or average health 
improvements but also the distribution of health gains among population groups (Abel- 
Smith, 1989; Cumper, 1991; Manifestos of PNP and JLP, 1997; Ministry of Health, 2001). 
Recognising the influential role of other sources of social and economic inequalities such 
as income, education, housing, access to water and sanitation, official policy has 
consistently given high priority to enhancing equity in health through access to an island- 
wide network of public services at (zero or) low out of pocket costs. However, equity 
concerns persisted in the Jamaican health sector as a result of: 
> the declining availability of staff, supplies and services in public health centres 
which were established throughout the island to ensure geographic equity in 
access to essential primary care services. As such, many poorer patients were 
forced to seek care in the casualty and outpatient departments of public hospitals 
and in the private sector for services which should have been provided at lower 
level public facilities; 
> inadequate monitoring of private practice by public doctors leading to poorer 
patients being kept on long waiting lists while private fee-paying patients jumped 
the queue; 
> increase in user fees at public health facilities without adequate arrangements for 
targeting exemptions for the poor; 
> the relatively high costs of private care requiring out of pocket payments 
especially in view of the low percentage of persons with private health insurance. 
Using a mix of measures in terms of vertical and horizontal equity (Suarez-Berenguela, 
2001) and fairness of financial contribution (WHO, 2000; Murray et al., 2003), Table 4.5 
provides a broad indication of the nature and extent of health inequity by comparing the 
lowest and highest consumption groups (Quintiles 1 and 5 respectively). It should be 
noted that these represent opposite ends of the consumption spectrum and that the values 
for Quintiles 2,3, and 4 were consistently within the range of those for Quintiles 1 and 5. 
Using data from the Annual Reports of Survey of Living Conditions, 1992-2006, on 
self-assessed health status, health seeking behaviour and health spending, it was found 
that relative to Quintile 5, Quintile 1: 
" reported almost as much illness-injury (0.96); 
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9 had protracted illness-injury: condition started before last 4 week reporting period 
(1.18); 
" had more days of impairment (1.40); 
" were less likely to seek care (0.79); 
" used more public facilities for care (3.4), drugs (3.8) and inpatient services 
(1.8). 
Also made significant use of private facilities for similar services (0.49; 0.7 and 
0.23 respectively); 
" were more likely to use hospital outpatient departments (1.8) than primary care 
clinics (0.8) for their ambulatory visit; 
" had little health insurance coverage (0.04); 
" spent more of their non-food budget on health care (1.12). 
Table 4.5 Pattern of Self-Assessed Health Status, Health Seeking Behaviour and 
Health Spending by Lowest and Highest Quintiles, Period Average, 1992-2006 
Indicator 
Quintile 
1 
Quintile 
5 
Ratio 
Q1: Q5 
1. % reporting illness/injury in last 4 weeks 11.2 11.7 0.96 
2. % reporting protracted illness-injury (began before last 4 weeks) 3.3 2.8 1.18 
3. Mean number of days of impairment 6.7 4.8 1.40 
4. % of (1) seeking care 50.6 64.1 0.79 
5. % using public facilities for care 56.9 16.9 3.37 
6. % using private facilities for care 38.0 77.1 0.49 
7. % using public facilities for drugs 34.6 9.2 3.8 
8. % using private facilities for drugs 61.2 87.4 0.70 
9. % of those seeking care at (5) hospitalized in public facility 8.6 4.7 1.83 
10. % of those seeking care at (5) hospitalized in private facility 0.3 1.3 0.23 
11. % of those seeking care who use primary care services 61.7 74.6 0.83 
12. % of those seeking care who use hospital outpatient departments 33.5 19.0 1.76 
13. % of sample population with health insurance 1.33 30.5 0.04 
14. Mean per capita health spending as % non-food spending 5.7 5.1 1.12 
Source: Compiled by author from data in STATIN and PIOJ's Jamaica Annual Reports of Survey of Living 
Conditions, 1992-2006 
Other studies have also drawn attention to equity issues in the health sector. Van 
Doorslaer and Wagstaff (1998) pointed to the pro-rich bias in access to health services 
especially for preventive care visits with a major contributory factor being the extent of 
health insurance coverage by the higher quintile groups. Theodore and La Foucade 
(1998) found that despite reporting as much illness-injury as the rich, health seeking 
behaviour of the poor was heavily constrained by concerns over quality of care in the 
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public sector and by the exclusionary role of private practice in public facilities which 
facilitated queue jumping by the rich. 
Health costs and the pattern of health financing play a crucial role in determining access 
to care. The dependence on out of pocket payments places a greater burden on the poor 
even in the public sector where fees are generally lower than the private sector and where 
the official policy is that no one should be denied care because of inability to pay. In 1999 
a special module of the Annual Survey of Living Conditions reported that about 43% of 
the poor either reduced health spending, cumulated health bills, deferred seeking health 
care, depended on local charities or resorted to home remedies and prayer as strategies to 
cope with health care costs. As a follow-up in 2002, about 20% of respondents in the 
Survey of Living Conditions reported that they did not seek health care despite reporting 
an illness-injury because of financial difficulties. Murray et al., (2003) estimated that 
about 5% of households in Jamaica faced `catastrophic' health payments because their 
health spending exceeded the 40% threshold of their `capacity to pay' (i. e. their non- 
subsistence earnings). 
Generally it would appear that given the high levels of unemployment and poverty, the 
public sector was not as effective as it was designed to be in ensuring access to services 
by the poor or in protecting them from financial distress brought about by health costs. 
4.8 The Health Reform Programme 
The accumulation of evidence from analytical reports prepared by consultant teams and 
MOH officials as well as from complaints by the public and health workers indicated 
quite clearly that despite some major achievements, the health system was not achieving 
its goals and had become a significant source of frustration and disappointment (Ross 
Institute, 1982; Abel-Smith, 1989; Cumper, 1991; Manifestos of PNP and JLP, 1997). 
The main areas of concern included overcentralisation of decision making, allocative 
inefficiencies in terms of the mix of services and facilities, inequity in access to services, 
and financing constraints (Armstrong, 1994; MOH, 2001). 
Alongside these concerns were the changing perceptions of the functions of the State and 
the extent of its involvement in the ownership, financing and micro-management of 
health services (as well as of all other publicly provided services). These issues were not 
unique to Jamaica but seemed to be match similar concerns in other developing countries 
necessitating international action on health reforms in the 1990's especially in respect of 
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`new public management' (World Bank, 1993; Mills, 1998 and 2001; WHO, 2000). This 
mix of internal and external push factors led to the design and implementation of a formal, 
and formally designated, Health Reform Programme which commenced in 1997 and 
ended in 2005. With funding from the InterAmerican Development Bank and local 
sources, the programme was conceived as one involving strategic action to improve the 
management, financing, delivery and quality of services for greater cost-effectiveness and 
sustainability (MOH, 2001). 
It should be noted that 'health reform' was not new to Jamaica. Several project activities 
in the 1970's and 1980's (with external assistance from the World Bank, USAID and the 
IDB) though less comprehensive than the formal 1997 program, sought to 'restructure' or 
'rationalise' or 'improve the functioning' of the sector in general and the public health 
sector in particular (Ministry of Health, 1984; Abel-Smith, 1.989; Cumper, 1993; 
Armstrong, 1994). For example the increased emphasis and investment in primary health 
care in the 1970's involved not just changes in health interventions but also in the 
philosophical principles, legislation, human resource mix, and management framework 
for health services. Restructuring and rationalisation activities in the 1980's led to the 
upgrading and downgrading of some public hospitals, revision of the user fee programme, 
divestment/contracting out of some support services in public hospitals and changes in the 
management structures in the public health system. As such the 1997 reform programme 
was both a continuation of previous initiatives and the implementation of new activities 
(Discussions with ex-CMO Dr. Wint and Director of HRP, Dr. Holding-Cobham, 1997). 
The major goals of the HRP were cited as enhancing equity and accessibility, efficiency, 
quality, financial sustainability, intersectoral collaboration and social participation (MOH, 
2001, DAH Consulting Inc, 2004). To achieve these goals, several major activities 
involving a mix of systemic improvements as well as new initiatives were implemented 
or contemplated. These included the following: 
> Decentralisation of the management and delivery of health services through the 
establishment of 4 statutory agencies - Regional Health Authorities - and re- 
organisation of the Head Office to focus on policy-making, strategic planning, 
standards and regulations and capital investments. 
> Quality Assurance involving the preparation of manuals and protocols for health 
services, development (or revision) of standards and regulations, emphasis on 
clinical governance and client-friendly services. 
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> Establishment of an Emergency Medical System to provide paramedical 
emergency care and transport to health facilities for critically ill or injured persons. 
> Health Promotion initiatives to educate and empower communities and 
individuals in respect of health risks and preventive action as well as to influence 
decision-makers to design healthy public policies. 
> Mental Health Restructuring to emphasise de-institutionalisation of patients and 
provide for care in local communities and acute beds in general hospitals. 
> Drugs for the Elderly Programme to enhance access to prescribed drugs for a 
select list of chronic conditions affecting the population over 60 years through 
subsidies given to public and private pharmacies. This was expanded in 2003 
through the establishment of the National Health Fund (NHF) to cover all persons 
suffering from a wider range of chronic conditions. 
¢ Expansion of user fee programme to generate more funds for public health 
services. 
> Establishment of an NHIP. 
The interface between the goals and components of the Reform Programme and the 
linkages with previous health improvement measures is shown in Table 4.6. Some 
measures such as Decentralisation, Drugs for the Elderly and Quality Assurance were 
multi-faceted and expected to achieve more than one goal. There was no explicit ranking 
of goals and almost inevitably difficulties arose in terms of interpretation of priority and 
speed of implementation of the various measures. 
The Table also highlights the key role expected of an NHIP in confronting weaknesses in 
the health system and achievement of the goals of the overall Reform Programme. This 
had major implications for the design of an NHIP in terms of the varying interpretations 
of stakeholders on whether it could actually achieve all these goals as well as the 
likelihood that an NHIP represented a fundamental change in the pattern of public 
financing of health services. 
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Table 4.6 Health Improvement Goals and Policies /Projects, 1970's - 2005 
Goals 
Policies and Projects Equity- Efficiency- Financial Social and 
Access Quality Sustainability Intersectoral 
Participation 
A. 1970's 
" Primary health care and construction of ** ** ** 
health centres 
Training and deployment of community ** ** ** 
health aides 
" Abolition of user fees 
" Proposal for social insurance ** ** 
" Formation of community health councils ** 
B. 1980's 
" Downgrading of some hospitals ** ** 
" Revision and re-introduction of user fees ** ** 
" Divestment of support services ** ** ** 
" Re-centralisation of some primary care from 
Local Government 
** 
" Upgrading of some hospitals ** ** 
C. 1997 -2005 
" Decentralisation by RHA establishment ** ** ** 
" Reorganisation of Head Office 
" Change in hospital management structure 
" Proposals for NHIP ** ** ** ** 
" Revision of user fees ** ** 
" Quality Assurance ** ** ** 
" Emergency Medical Services ** ** ** 
" Mental Health Restructuring ** ** ** 
" Drugs for Elderly - later merged into NHF ** ** ** 
Source: Compiled by Author from data at the Ministry of Health 
4.9 The Health Policy-Making Process 
In seeking to identify how health policies were developed and decided in Jamaica, two 
key aspects were examined: first, the general policymaking process and second, the local 
institutional framework and levels at which different policy issues were addressed. 
Most writers who have examined or commented on the policy-making process (Hogwood 
and Gunn, 1984; Ham and Hill, 1993; Walt, 1994; Barker, 1996; Gilson et al., 1999) 
identify five main activities or stages: 
" problem identification and agenda setting; 
" policy formulation; 
" policy decision; 
" policy implementation; 
" policy review and modification. 
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There is also general concurrence among these writers that the degree of success or 
failure of a policy depends on the rigour applied in conceptualization, the feasibility of 
the particular design and components of the policy, the amount of resources (including 
political commitment and administrative capacity) devoted to implementation and the 
influence of external factors which can facilitate or frustrate activity. 
Generally, in terms of health policy in Jamaica, these activities or stages are realised in 
the following manner (discussions with Ministers of Health, PS in Ministry of Health, ex- 
CMO and officials in Ministry of Finance, 1997/8): 
> Problem identification and policy ideas got on the health agenda (for 
consideration and action) from several sources such as inputs or feedback from the 
general public, key stakeholders, groups of health professionals, consultant 
research teams and external agencies (regional, multilateral and bilateral). Policy 
ideas were also derived from proposals and promises in political manifestos, 
international agreements or from previous and ongoing policies. 
> Policy formulation took place through research, consultation and discussion 
activities spearheaded by technical teams at the MOH, Ministry of. Finance and 
other public agencies (such as the PIOJ and the Attorney-General's Office where 
legislation was involved). These activities aimed to clarify issues and options as 
well as to recommend actions and resource requirements. 
¢ Policy decision occurred at different levels depending on whether major national 
or sectoral or institutional initiatives were being considered. The `policy 
hierarchy' is discussed further below. 
¢ Policy implementation involved new or existing agencies and programmes, new 
or revised tasks and targets, and changes in the sources and volume of resources. 
Some policies required collaboration with one or more agencies outside the MOH 
or the public sector. 
> Policy review was undertaken through ongoing monitoring activities and reports 
or, depending on the type of policy, at specified times during its lifetime such as 
mid-term or annually or upon completion. This was usually done using internal 
teams and, in many cases, external teams for major policies especially those 
supported by international and bilateral agencies. 
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Following the framework offered by Walt (1994), health policies which involve `high 
politics' in Jamaica (such as health reform, National Health Insurance, decentralisation) 
would necessitate attention by the central Government. This would require the Minister of 
Health to prepare a Cabinet Paper(s) usually with direct inputs from key senior officers in 
the MOH who in turn may have formulated their positions based on technical reports or 
consultative meetings with key stakeholders. Cabinet Paper(s) are presented at the regular 
weekly or sometimes, if warranted, special meetings of the Cabinet. Agreement at this 
level is followed by the preparation of a Bill (if legislation is needed) or a discussion 
paper (Green Paper) for public comments and debate at the first level of the bi-cameral 
legislative system-the House of Parliament (whose membership includes representatives 
of political constituencies won by Government and Opposition parties). From this 
chamber (if there is general agreement) discussion is taken up at the next higher level- 
the Senate (comprised of nominees of the ruling and opposition parties) -especially if 
legislation is proposed. Changes to the draft documents or bills are suggested at the 
Senate and, following agreement, the Governor-General's seal or signature is the final 
stage in the process. 
Not all policies require decision making at the highest level. Many involve `low politics' 
and are determined at the level of the Cabinet or by the relevant Minister of Health and 
Permanent Secretary who have jurisdiction over a defined range of matters. With the 
establishment of RHAs (as part of the Health Reform Programme) as semi-autonomous 
bodies, `operational policies' can be formulated and decisions made by them on several 
issues which were formerly dealt with by the MOH Head Office. Lastly health facilities 
such as hospitals and health centres are permitted to develop `local policies' on a 
narrower range of operational issues. 
4.10 Summary of Findings from Situation Analysis 
This Chapter has reviewed and highlighted the key features of the policy context relevant 
to considering NHI in Jamaica. These include the demographic patterns, structure of 
health services delivery, burden of disease and utilization patterns, macroeconomic 
developments, health financing modalities, the concerns over equity and health, health 
policy-making process and the role of the Health Reform Programme. 
A summary of how these features were likely to influence expectations and the design of 
an appropriate NHI is presented in Table 4.7 below. 
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Table 4.7 Likely Implications of Contextual Factors for Design of NHI Jamaica 
Contextual Factors Implications for NIII Design 
1. Demography 
" relatively small population " likely efficiency of a single vs. competing insurers 
" aging population " greater demand for visits, drugs and hospitalization 
" falling dependency ratio " reduced cost-sharing burden on working population 
2. Organisation of Services 
" Mix of providers " importance of choice for visits, drugs, tests, inpatient care 
" Private practice " this may decline with NHI entitlements to care package 
" Overseas care " inclusion may be costly; exclusion may be opposed 
3. Morbidity and Mortality 
" Dominance of chronic diseases 
and high IMR/MMR 
" package should include mix of curative and preventive services 
" High level of injuries " these are mostly emergency and rehabilitative cases and the 
latter may not fit easily into an NHI package. 
4. Utilisation Patterns 
" Unmet demand " health seeking less than reported illness so increased demand 
likely under an NHI 
" Greater use of hospitals " need for balanced package- primary and secondary care 
5. Macro-economy 
" Slow economic growth " weak sectors may affect willingness to support NHI 
" Fiscal difficulties " debt obligations may affect ability of State to contribute on 
behalf of poor and unemployed. 
" High unemployment, poverty and 
informal activity 
" universal coverage may be difficult to attain at onset of NHI 
6. Health Financing 
" Public financing gap " NHI can play key role 
" Low private insurance " room for low-cost plans; those with plans may oppose another 
deduction for NHI; private insurers may be sub-contracted. 
" User fees " may be replaced with co-payment system 
7. Equity 
" Access to services " unmet demand may be reduced under NHI 
" High out of pocket spending " can be substantially reduced with NHI 
8. Health Reform " can re-build confidence in public health system and lead to 
improved standards and regulations for sector. 
Source: Author's compilation 
The mix of influences outlined above suggested that there were aspects which could 
facilitate as well as challenge the design of what NHI features would be implementable 
without much difficulty, what would require strong or perhaps radical policy decisions, 
and what would have to be delayed until the socio-economic. environment was more 
favourable. From this it would appear that key design issues for an NHI plan would be: 
> Universal coverage with particular attention to certain population groups such as 
the informal sector, self-employed workers and the poor; 
> the components of the package of benefits; 
> the network of health service providers; 
> the remuneration arrangements for providers and role of private insurers; 
> the role of an NHI in relation to the other health financing mechanisms. 
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CHAPTER 5: GOVERNMENT AND STAKEHOLDER PERSPECTIVES AND 
PROPOSALS ON THE DESIGN OF AN NHIP 
5.1 Purpose of Analysis 
After decades of studies, debates and deferred decisions, the Jamaican Government 
prepared a formal set of proposals defining its conception of and intent to implement an 
NHIP. These proposals were stated in its 1997 Green Paper on NHIP and was distributed 
to elicit public discussion, comments and feedback. In addition, a broad-based Steering 
Committee comprising officials from key public and private sector stakeholder groups 
was established to examine the proposals, suggest modifications and recommend specific 
actions for implementation. 
The draft Green Paper proposals received mixed reactions from the public and key 
stakeholders ranging from strong support, no comment, `wait and see', to strong 
opposition. Divided opinions were also evident in the Report of the Steering Committee 
in that its recommendations did not produce a clear-cut path for implementing an NHIP 
by the Government. 
This Chapter presents data on 4 aspects of designing an acceptable NHI plan for Jamaica: 
firstly, on the history and process of the policy choice, of NHI; secondly, on the policy 
framework and components of the draft proposals on NHIP by the Government in its 
1997 Green Paper; thirdly, on the specific views and positions of key stakeholders in 
relation to the Government's proposals for an NHIP; and fourthly, on the principal design 
features of an NHI plan for Jamaica as recommended by these stakeholders. The findings 
are based on an analysis of official documents and statements on the NHIP (and related 
health reform policies), comments from members of the public in letters sent to the 
national newspapers as well as in community meetings on the NHIP and a mix of in- 
depth interviews with key stakeholders and informal discussions with key informants. A 
full description and discussion of the methodologies used in the data collection and 
analysis was provided in Chapter 3. 
The findings and analysis of this Chapter are discussed in the following manner: 
a) how did an NHIP become part of the national (health) policy agenda in Jamaica, 
who were the chief advocates and what were the key agencies involved; 
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b) what were the principal features of the Government-proposed NHIP in 1997 and 
why was it such a major public policy issue; 
c) who were the key stakeholders; what were their interests; what 
were their 
responses and, using a political mapping spectrum (or `forcefield matrix' as 
described by Gilson et al., 1999; Varvasovszky and Brugha, 2000), what was their 
relative position in relation to the NHIP proposals; 
d) what did each stakeholder recommend as the main goals, features and success 
factors assuming he was given the opportunity to custom-design an NHIP for 
Jamaica; and 
e) through merging of the dominant recommendations from stakeholders, what 
constituted their `acceptable' or `satisficing' features of an alternative NHIP for 
Jamaica and to what extent did these features differ from the proposals by the 
Government. 
The recommended NHIP options derived from the above methodological sequence will 
form the basis for the financial and policy modelling presented in Chapter 6 as well as the 
evaluation of options and discussion of results in Chapters 7 and 8. 
5.2 History of NHI on the Policy Agenda 
Intense as against spasmodic national discussions on some version of a contribution- 
based universal health financing system (since the actual words `national health 
insurance' were not always used in the documents/discussions) can be traced to the 
1960's when proposals for a social security/national insurance plan for workers were 
being developed. This was the period just after political independence in 1962 and the 
main political parties espoused policies and programs aimed at hastening the process of 
development and uplifting social welfare of citizens (Manley, 1982). Establishing a 
national insurance/social security system was a major component of the development 
thrust. At that time trade, unions (which dominated the leadership and ideological 
orientations of the main political parties), employer groups and the Ministries of Labour 
and Finance were the principal actors seeking to define the content of the plan. With the 
International Labour Office (ILO) playing a key advisory and technical role (an indicator 
of the concept of `international policy transfer/convergence'-Walt, 1994) and following 
the traditional social insurance focus on the working population (Mesa-Lago, 1989; Ron 
and Tamburi, 1990, Roemer, 1993), the major debate centred on the financing and 
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administrative implications of establishing a comprehensive system which would include 
health insurance as against a more limited scheme focusing on pensions, sickness benefits, 
disability compensation and funeral grants for members. Union representatives, assuming 
the role of spokespersons for all members of the working class and the masses wanted 
comprehensive arrangements to include the non-working population. Employer groups 
insisted on a limited scheme for workers only and excluding health coverage. 
The debate ended in favour of a limited plan and in 1968 the present-day National 
Insurance Scheme (NIS) was established. Proposals for including health insurance 
provisions whether for members of NIS or the non-working population were shelved. 
Based on discussions with the ex-Director of the NIS in Jamaica (West, 1998) and a local 
health consultant (Hinchcliffe, 1997), it seemed that two main factors were responsible 
for the choice of a limited system--firstly, the percentage deduction from wages and 
salaries for a combined NIS and health insurance plan (estimated at about 12%) was 
deemed unacceptable and politically unpalatable. (The current deduction of 5% for NIS 
benefits only has remained unchanged since 1968. The income ceiling has been adjusted 
periodically and is shared equally between employers and employees). Secondly, it was 
felt that with significant upgrades planned for the public health system, health services 
would be adequate to meet the needs of the working and general population. 
In the 1970's the issue arose again as the political party in power had changed (in 1972) 
and the new Government (the People's National Party), infused with the principles of 
"democratic socialism"; "empowerment of the people" and "upliftment of the working 
class" (Manley, 1982), felt that a national health insurance plan should be instituted as 
part of the enhanced development program for the health sector. Led by the Minister of 
Health, research and planning activities resulted in the publication of a Green Paper on a 
National Health System by the MOH (1974) outlining proposals for overall health sector 
development and a contribution-based health financing plan supported by tax funds. 
While the debates on the 1974 Green Paper proposals were underway, the focus of the 
Government shifted and it was felt that adequate housing especially for low-income 
groups and universal education should be greater priorities. In addition, it was felt that the 
health sector was already being strengthened and expanded through heavy investments by 
the Government in primary health care facilities and programmes prior to and later as part 
of its commitment to the Alma Ata Health for All strategy (Ministry of Health Green 
Paper, 1974; Evaluation and Planning Centre, 1987; Abel-Smith, 1989; Cumper, 1993). 
As such, mandatory contributions for housing (managed by a National Housing Trust 
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which was set up in 1976) and education (managed as part of the revenue flow to the 
Government) were instituted, and plans for national health insurance were shelved. In the 
words of a key informant the "MOH did the research but the ideas and dollars ended up 
with housing" A local health consultant was more blunt stating that "we lost in the 
battle 
of priorities and allocation" (discussion with Ms. A. Hinchcliffe, 1997). 
At the beginning of the 1980's government changed hands and the party which ruled in 
the 1960's at the time when the NIS was established (the Jamaica Labour Party) returned 
to power. Deliberations on national health insurance were re-started. By this time 
economic difficulties (which started in the mid-1970's) were severely constraining the 
ability of the Government to support the public health system (as well as other public 
programmes) and with IMF/World Bank-supported economic stabilisation and adjustment 
programmes dominating the policy arena, there was a renewed search for alternative 
health financing mechanisms (Evaluation and Planning Centre, 1987; Boyd, 1988; Ogle 
Committee, 1988; Witter and Anderson, 1991; Cumper 1993; Abel-Smith, 1989). As part 
of the search for alternative financing methods, user fees which were abolished in the 
1970's by the previous government, were re-introduced, increased and expanded to cover 
more categories of services in 1984. In contrast to the party in power in the 1970's which 
treated user fees as inconsistent with its democratic socialism principles and insisted on 
free care for all, the new government felt that user fees would bring in more funds for 
health and enhance individual responsibility for health. Even though the targeted 
collections were quite low (less than 4% of the public health budget would be recovered 
from these fees) the programme was seen as a major step in the inculcation of a fee- 
paying ethos among residents and a first step in the development of a national health 
insurance plan (discussions with Dr. B. Wint, ex-Chief Medical Officer, 1998). 
As directed by the government, several proposals for full-fledged or phased or pilot NHI 
plans were developed by teams of local and external consultants (funded by a mix of local 
funds and grants from the USAID, World Bank and IDB). These were reviewed and 
debated within the Ministry of Health and at the level of Committees and Cabinet (not 
Parliament). Despite the involvement of the Ministries of Health and Finance in 
commissioning these studies and of private insurers as major collaborators in the research 
and discussions, the proposals were either discarded or put on hold (Abel-Smith, 1989; 
Cumper, 1993; World Bank, 1994). Among the factors cited for non-implementation were 
the difficulties of collecting contributions from the large number of workers in the 
informal sector; indecision on whether a new public institution or existing private insurers 
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should be the administrative body; the contents of the benefits package; and concerns 
over public acceptability of a plan at a time when services in the public health sector were 
generally felt to be low quality and inadequate (Abel-Smith, 1989 and discussions with 
ex-Chief Medical Officer, Dr. B. Wint and ex-Head of Health Reform Unit, Dr. Holding- 
Cobham, 1998). 
In 1989, the reins of Government changed hands again and considerations of national 
health insurance re-emerged on the government's agenda. The new Government, the 
People's National Party, (which was also returned to power in subsequent elections in 
1993,1997,2001 and 2004) decided to re-examine existing policies and initiatives in the 
health sector (as in all other sectors) and to implement its agenda for health financing 
change. The new Minister of Health (with an established academic record as a political 
economist) alongside the Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Health (with experience 
in public sector modernisation measures) became the leading advocates for sectoral 
changes and alternative financing in health. Faced with continuing major fiscal 
constraints and budgetary shortfalls in health, the user fee schedule of 1984 was revised 
and increased in 1993 and 1997 in an attempt to mobilise additional funds for the public 
health system. 
In 1995 negotiations commenced for a multi-faceted Health Sector Reform Programme 
supported with financial and technical inputs from the IDB. The Programme was 
launched in 1997 with NHI as one of the key components. (See Chapter 4). Research, 
involving an in-house unit in charge of the Health Reform Programme as well as teams of 
consultants re-commenced on the role and design of an NHIP. This included participation 
in international meetings at which health financing issues and measures were articulated 
as well as a study tour by a team from the MOH (including the Minister of Health) to 
Bermuda which had implemented a mandatory health insurance plan since 1971. (A 
second study tour to Colombia took place in 1998 with a new Minister of Health as part 
of the team). 
These research efforts culminated in the drafting by the MOH and presentation in 
Parliament by the Minister of Health of the Green Paper on NHI in April 1997. The 
Green Paper was debated and passed in Parliament and made available for comments by 
the public. A series of public outreach activities commenced in mid-1997 to discuss the 
NHI proposals through the mass media and directly with communities as well as select 
professional groups. This was followed by the establishment of a Steering Committee in 
early 1998 to review the underlying policy and general design of the plan and advise and 
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make recommendations for achieving the objectives. The Committee, which presented its 
report in late 1998, was aided in its deliberations by the publication of a supplementary 
document by the MOH `Draft NHIP Policy Framework and Design Implications'. 
5.3 Goals, Proposals and Public Significance of The 1997 NHIP Green Paper 
NHI as a policy initiative took on national dimensions (as against technical-bureaucratic 
considerations in committees only) with the publication and debate in Parliament of the 
Green Paper on NHI in 1997. This was a concise 20-page document indicating the major 
philosophical and conceptual features of the Plan as well as the course of action to be 
followed in development of the detailed operational aspects. As defined in the Green 
Paper: 
"the NHIP is a contributory health financing plan aimed at covering all 
residents of Jamaica for a stipulated package of medically necessary 
services. It is designed to assist individuals and families in meeting the 
high costs of health care without suffering financial distress and to 
provide dedicated resources for enhancing the availability and quality of 
health services " (Green Paper, 1997p. 4). 
With the goals and strategies of the Reform Programme as the broad policy and 
operational framework, the Green Paper described the expected role of NHI and its 
linkages with the other health reform activities. Citing "the increasing resource gap 
between the demand for and availability of health resources", "the growing inequity in 
access to health services" and "the constraints on the State in providing more resources 
for health services" as the rationale, the Green Paper stated the following as the principles 
and goals of the proposed NHIP, viz. to: 
i) "provide health security and guaranteed access to health services for all 
residents"; 
ii) "supplement other health financing mechanisms such as general taxes and private 
health insurance"; 
iii) "improve the availability, efficiency and quality of health services"; 
iv) "improve public-private collaboration in the provision and financing of health 
services"; and 
v) "enhance the role of individuals and communities in sharing responsibilities of 
care". 
The following were identified as the key features in the establishment of the NHIP: 
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i) Universal Coverage: all residents of Jamaica regardless of age, income or health 
condition would be eligible for membership; 
ii) Mandatory Insurance: all residents would be required by law to have and 
contribute towards health insurance for at least those services in the "Standard 
Benefit package"; 
iii) Standard Benefit Package (SBP): would comprise inpatient hospital care as 
well as drugs and diagnostic services prescribed during ambulatory visits. Other 
services would be included in later phases; 
iv) Subsidies for the Poor: the Government would take responsibility for paying the 
premium for the Standard Benefit Package on behalf of the poor; 
v) Choice of Provider: insured persons would be able to access health services 
from public as well as private providers; 
vi) Choice of Insurer: persons seeking to buy insurance for the Standard Package 
would be able to choose from among private and public health insurance carriers; 
vii) Competing Public Health Insurance Company (PHIC): a new public health 
insurance company would be set up to compete directly with private carriers and 
would offer the Standard Package as its main product; 
viii) Catastrophic Care Fund (CCF): this fund would be established to provide 
grants to individuals seeking expensive and sophisticated care not covered in the 
Standard Package; 
ix) Regulatory Body: a new regulatory body called the Health Insurance 
Commission (HIC) would be established to oversee the operations and operators 
in the NHIP; 
x) Quality Control by Ministry of Health: one of the functions of the restructured 
Head Office of the Ministry of Health would be to develop and monitor quality 
of care standards in respect of services in the Standard Package (and all other 
health services in Jamaica). 
Details on the administrative system, benefit catalogue, contribution percentage and 
sharing arrangements between employers and employees, contracts with and 
reimbursement of providers and copayments were not specified in the Green Paper since 
these were still being researched. The supplementary document Draft NHIP Policy. 
Framework and Design Implications (1998) provided some more details on key policy 
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and operational issues and the recommended MOH positions on issues such as defining 
eligibility for membership, waiting periods, enrolment, identification of the poor, use of 
the National Drugs Formulary and generics, treatment protocols, review and revision of 
the Standard Package, complaints mechanisms, penalties, sanctions and copayments. 
In terms of getting public responses and feedback on the proposals the MOH embarked 
on a four-pronged consultative approach with the Minister of Health, Permanent 
Secretary and officers of the newly established Health Reform Unit as the principal 
spokespersons and advocates for the Plan. Firstly, copies of the Green Paper were made 
available to key stakeholder groups, the media and other members of the public and 
invitations were extended to send their comments to the MOH by a fixed date. Secondly, 
senior personnel from the MOH presented the proposals and fielded questions in a series 
of interviews with the print and electronic media. This also included specific articles 
submitted to the print media for publication. Thirdly, consultation and discussion sessions 
were held with several groups throughout the country such as hospital and health staff, 
associations of health professionals, trade unions, employer groups, health insurance 
companies, parent-teacher associations and other community groups. Fourthly, a Steering 
Committee comprised of selected stakeholders was set up in 1998 to discuss the proposals 
and to make appropriate recommendations for changes and implementation to the 
Minister of Health. The Committee's membership included representatives from the 
Ministries of Health and Finance as well as organisations of physicians, nurses, 
pharmacists, health service executives, health insurers; trade unions and employer groups. 
The NHIP proposals generated national interest and controversy. As defined by Walt 
(1994), some of the key characteristics of major public and national policy issues are: 
i) they involve `high politics' or decision at the national level; 
ii) their impact will be widespread; 
iii) they will be highly visible and will involve significant changes in the status quo; 
iv) they require major inputs in terms of administration and technology; 
v) they tend to be part of a major programme of change some or many of which may 
be (or have been) unpopular. 
The proposed NHIP exhibited all the characteristics outlined by Walt for a major national 
or public (as against a purely departmental or sectoral) policy. Firstly, as a national 
programme mandating membership by all residents it would require debate and executive 
and legislative "decision-making at the highest levels". It would also involve "high 
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politics" since each of the three leading political parties cited the establishment of some 
version of an NHIP as one of their major innovations with respect to financing health 
services (Manifestos of the ruling People's National Party, 1997, the opposition Jamaica 
Labour Party, 1997 and the National Democratic Movement, 1997). Both the PNP and 
JLP, having alternated the reins of Government since the 1950's, claimed paternity for the 
broad proposal of an NHIP. The newer NDM (established in the early 1990's) castigated. 
both parties for much talk but no action over the years and highlighted an NHIP as one of 
their priorities for the health sector. While there was some consensus on the idea of an 
NHIP, there were critical differences in the policy options, technical features and 
implementation arrangements espoused by each party. 
Secondly, its "impact will be widespread" since all residents would be required to become 
members and to have health coverage for at least the Standard Benefit Package. Also, 
additional contributions (to current income tax and deductions for the National Insurance 
Scheme, National Housing Trust and education) would be required from all members of 
the working population and business firms despite being faced with an environment of 
negative or minimal economic growth, closure of companies, retrenchment and 
rightsizing in the public and private sectors. The benefits (improved access to care in the 
public and private sectors and less out of pocket spending) would also be available to all. 
Thirdly, it would "involve significant changes in the status quo" with the poor and other 
uninsured population groups becoming part of an insurance programme and having 
access to private care as other groups; health service providers having to adjust to new 
relationships with patients as `insured persons' and as `clients' and a new regulatory body 
for health insurance being proposed which would be responsible for monitoring the 
activities of health insurers and health providers and imposing penalties where necessary. 
Fourthly, it would require "major inputs in terms of administration and technology" since 
health insurance activities would be expanded to include the entire population as 
compared to 13% of the population who were covered in 1997. Investments would be 
needed by both private insurers and the proposed new public insurer for infrastructure, 
staff and information systems to deal with enrolment, collection, compliance, claims 
processing, complaints resolution and accountability. 
Fifthly, it was part of larger reform programmes being undertaken in the public sector as a 
whole (the Public Sector Modernisation Project which commenced in 1996) and the 
health sector in particular (the Health Sector Reform Programme in 1997). Both 
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programmes had to deal with much displeasure from particular groups over certain 
activities such as privatisation and contracting in the public sector and decentralisation of 
the management of services in the public health system. 
Given its scope, content, timing and likely impact it was inevitable that interest groups 
and stakeholders in and beyond the health sector would have differing views on the NHIP 
proposals and how best the proposals should be configured to maximise their interests. 
5.4 Political Mapping of Stakeholders 
a) Key Stakeholders, Interests Represented and Interest in the NHIP Proposals 
The criteria for identification and selection of key stakeholders (based on characteristics 
outlined by Reich, 1994 and Walt, 1994) were discussed in Chapter 3. Using Reich's 
(1993) political mapping framework to identify categories by sectors and sub-sectors, 16 
stakeholders--individuals and groups--were considered to have substantial interests in the 
NHIP proposals. As discussed in Chapter 3 (and shown in Table 3.1), these included: 
senior officials in key Ministries (Health, Finance and Planning and Labour and Social 
Security); representatives of health professional groups (physicians; nurses; managers); 
commercial sector (big and small businesses); health insurance industry (profit and non- 
profit companies); and organised labour. 
Table 5.1 indicates the interests represented by stakeholders, the reasons for their interest 
in and concern over the NHIP proposals and the level of their influence (high, medium or 
low) depending on the extent to which they are consulted on selected national 
development policies and in this specific case, health and the NHIP. This is supplemented 
by information in Table 5.2 which summarises key aspects of the responses to the GPP 
proposals by some key stakeholders. 
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The data indicate a wide range of perspectives, expectations and concerns among the 
stakeholder groups and some clear differences even within groups. For example, the 
interests of different functionaries in the MOH revealed quite distinctive perspectives. 
While the Permanent Secretary (PS) and the Directors of the Health Reform Unit 
(DHRU) and the NHIP Implementation Unit (DNHI) had broadly similar interests in and 
agreement on the NHIP proposals, the same was not reflected in respect of the technical 
members such as the Chief Medical Officer (CMO) and the Senior Medical Officer 
(SMO/STC) who were more concerned with the practical impact on the provision of 
specific services (population based services in the case of the CMO and hospital based 
services by the SMO/STC). 
At a broader level, the interests of the MOH members as part of the overall public sector 
were not always in line with those of other officials from the MOF whose concern was 
consistency with `overall fiscal targets' and `avoiding unprogrammed subsidies' from 
Government or the PIOJ's primary emphasis on consistency with macro-plans and 
development commitments in other sectors as well as the likelihood of excess demand. 
The primary concern of the National Insurance Scheme (responsible for managing 
existing social security plans) was the extent to which its expertise and infrastructure 
would be called upon to facilitate the implementation of the NHIP. 
Among the professional groups, the Medical Association of Jamaica, MAJ, (whose 
membership includes a mix of GP's, specialists and junior doctors with a larger 
percentage of GPs than hospital-based doctors) was seen as an authoritative voice to be 
consulted on key health matters. For them, the exclusion of ambulatory visits to private 
doctors for primary care and specialist services from the Standard Benefit Package, 
alongside the inclusion of catastrophic care services were viewed as major weaknesses in 
the NHIP proposals. In addition, they felt the establishment of a public health insurer as 
well as proposed new regulatory and utilisation review provisions would place the 
activities of members under closer scrutiny by public bureaucrats (MAJ, 1997). The 
Nursing Association, already grappling with issues such as low salaries, shortage of 
nurses and overworked `members were concerned over the possibilities of having to 
undertake additional administrative and caring burdens without increased compensation 
and the status of those without insurance coverage. 
Health managers as members of JAHSE were drawn mostly from public and private 
hospitals and were charged with securing the business interests of their facilities. Their 
anxieties were over the arrangements for billing and reimbursement of services; the 
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amount and speed of claims settlement and the size of investment costs in information 
technology to network and interface with the NHIP. 
From the private sector, both the non-profit Blue Cross of Jamaica (BCJ) and the for- 
profit members of LICA were keenly competing for market shares and saw mixed 
possibilities for more business on the one hand but reduced business on the other 
depending on the establishment or otherwise of a competing public health insurance 
company. In addition, they were unhappy over the proposed establishment of a new 
health insurance regulatory agency. 
Employer and small business groups were concerned at the likely impact on their costs as 
contributors since they would be faced with an additional statutory deduction which could 
erode their competitiveness, profitability and even survival in the marketplace. On the 
other hand Trade Unions, while keen on the universal coverage proposals, were anxious 
over the magnitude of the deduction from members' wages and the extent to which their 
current benefits in private health insurance plans would be affected. 
b) Sample of Views and Comments fron: General Public and Minor Stakeholders 
As indicated in Chapter 3 on Methodology there were clear reasons for the selection of 
the above group as key stakeholders. However, since neither of these individuals nor 
groups may be said to be the `average person in the street' or a community-based 
organisation, the issue remained as to whether their interests and views may be deemed as 
representative of the general public. In the absence of an organised body such as a patient 
or citizens health group, local politicians pointed out that in parliamentary democracies 
such as Jamaica where political parties contend for power at prescribed intervals it is the 
Member of Parliament and parties in power and opposition who assume this role as 
"representative of and spokesman for the people". This did not deter groups such as the 
MAJ, the JCTU and even the SBAJ from-portraying themselves as speaking on behalf of 
the public and seeking the interest of the public. 
In the data collection process, the views and positions of the general public as well 
as 'minor' less influential groups such as the Jamaica Association of Public Health 
Inspectors, Jamaica Physiotherapy Society, Jamaica Cancer Society and several non- 
health organisations (e. g., Parent-Teachers Associations) were also monitored and 
recorded. The data came from letters to the mainstream newspapers; call-in radio 
programs as well as from comments and queries in community and other meetings held 
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by teams from the MOH. Excerpts of comments and queries on the NHIP proposals by 
the general public and some of these minor stakeholder groups are presented in Table 5.3. 
Overall, there were mixed reactions to the NHIP proposals from the general public and 
`minor' stakeholders. In organising and structuring the diverse comments and views 
articulated, four broad groups were identified: those who were opposed to the proposals; 
those who expressed conditional support indicating that they did not trust the current 
Government to administer the plan in the public interest; those who were fully supportive; 
and those who preferred to wait and see. 
For the first group (opposed), the planned NHI was seen as another tax or tax in disguise. 
They felt that they were already paying for health services through existing tax 
deductions and that neither the availability nor quality of care in public facilities was 
conducive to implementing the NHI. Some also indicated that they had no desire to be 
part of a plan that took their money to support other citizens who preferred to be 
unemployed while jobs were available or who did not take care of their health but 
expected someone else to pay for their care. In addition, some focused on selected aspects 
of the NHIP proposals such as the exclusion of visits to doctors in the Package as 
providing enough reason for their opposition. Another factor mentioned was the poor 
management of other statutory deductions by public agencies such as the National 
Insurance Scheme and National Housing Trust as well as the Ministry of Finance's 
handling of the Education Tax which was deducted from incomes for education but ended 
up paying government debt - these were posited as indicative of what the NHIP could 
become. 
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To those conditionally supportive, the proposals seemed quite acceptable but the 
Government behind the proposals was not. For them, the Government which had 
campaigned with the slogan "we put people first" during the election period was doing 
just the opposite when in power. Their proposed imposition of contributions for an NHIP 
was cited as another example (alongside increased user fees in 1993 and 1999 for health 
services) of turning its back on pledges of accessible care for all. In addition, its 
continued use of public funds (since 1996) to bail out several failing private financial 
enterprises rather than making these funds available for social development left many 
questioning the motive for the proposed NHIP. To some it was seen as another case of 
Government's dereliction of its responsibility in health. 
On the other hand, there were many others who welcomed the NHIP proposals and saw 
NHI as a mechanism to really ensure health for all without discrimination at the health 
facilities. This was a particularly common view among many persons who either had no 
health insurance coverage, who were refused health insurance from private carriers and 
among the poor. They saw greater access to health services in the private sector and 
assistance in getting overseas care for complicated cases as desirable provisions in the 
NHIP. 
The `wait and see' group preferred to watch from the sidelines how serious was 
Government's commitment to the proposals, which groups were supporting or opposing 
and the early implementation results. This group comprised persons who seemed familiar 
with major policy announcements and promises from (different) governments and who 
did not feel strongly enough about the NHIP proposals. Many in this group wanted to 
wait for the announcement of the percentage deduction and copayment before choosing a 
position. 
(While it was difficult to quantify the size of each group or to measure the passion with 
which their views were expressed, it may be said that there seemed to be more persons in 
the `wait and see' and `conditional support' group than in the other two). 
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At another level, the 2 major opposition parties, despite clear provisions for 
implementation of an NHIP in their manifestos, disagreed with the proposals. The 
spokesperson on health for the Jamaica Labour Party indicated that: 
'the JLP will not support the NHIP ... 
because it is not in the best interest 
of the Jamaican population ... 
[we] support a standard benefit package but 
cannot defend the exclusion of coverage for doctors visits... It is 
inconceivable that the Government having already wasted an inordinate 
amount of time in implementing a plan proposed 12 years ago, has failed 
to incorporate the features in the Plan' (media interview with Ms Shirley 
Williams reported in The Daily Gleaner of 2 May, 1997). 
In addition, the National Democratic Movement spokesperson commented that `the plan 
is deceptive and will only extract more money from the population for the same 
inadequate health care system' (Interview quoted in The Daily Gleaner, 12 July, 1997). 
In many respects the issues and concerns raised by the general public, minor stakeholders 
and opposition parties on design and implementation of the NHIP were fairly similar to 
those from several of the key stakeholders. As such consideration of these concerns have 
been taken up in the analysis of comments from the latter group. 
c) Responses by Key Stakeholders to the Specific Proposals in the NHIP 
In addition to their broad responses and views, key stakeholders were asked in the 
interviews to comment on each of the 10 specific proposals of the NHIP (these are spelt 
out in Section 5.3). Table 5.4 provides a summary of these comments. Broad agreement 
with a proposal is depicted as "Yes" in the Table while general disagreement is shown as 
"No". (Few stakeholders answered `yes' or `no' immediately or solely-most offered 
some explanation. The intensity and explanations of their `yes' and `no' were varied. ). 
In some cases stakeholders agreed with the principle encapsulated by a proposal but 
insisted on qualifying that agreement with a specific statement reflecting their approach to 
its implementation. For example, the PS/MOH agreed with the principle of a public 
health insurance company but felt that rather than trying to do everything on its own it 
should explore the possibilities of sub-contracting certain functions such as collections 
and claims processing if these could be done more economically by other agencies. 
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Also, among those who generally agreed with the proposal for a Catastrophic Care Fund, 
some like the NAJ, JAHSE and the SBAJ preferred a more "limited" Fund i. e., resources 
should be used to fund care for the poor only rather than open to all or for cases which are 
treatable rather than all complicated cases. Again on the Fund, the DHRU and SMO/STC 
felt that while it was essential it should be introduced in a next phase i. e. at some point in 
the future. 
The responses, explanations and preferred positions of stakeholders that accompanied 
their `Yes' or `No' in relation to each of the ten specific proposals are discussed below. 
i) Universal Coverage 
Most stakeholders (88%) agreed on the need for universality in the Plan. However, the 
CMO and the JEF had certain reservations. For the CMO, a universal plan was only 
possible if the Government gave a commitment to timely and total servicing of its 
premium obligations on behalf of its workers and the pool. Failing this, he stated that the 
NHIP should target the working population only while the poor would continue to have 
access to public health services. The JEF shared a similar opinion with respect to the poor 
having access to public health services so that employers did not have an additional 
burden to share premiums which may be set at above-average levels to subsidise the poor. 
ii) Mandatory Plan 
With the exception of the JEF, all other stakeholders (94%) felt that a mandatory plan 
was desirable to avoid what JAHSE described as free-riding, adverse selection and 
cherry-picking and to increase the likelihood of compliance. The JEF indicated that given 
the hostile economic climate many firms would collapse or have to raise prices if they 
were compelled to offer health insurance to all workers. The JEF also stated reservations 
on compliance and collection of contributions from informal sector workers given the 
relatively weak performance of the revenue department and National Insurance Scheme. 
iii) Standard Benefit Package 
More stakeholders (50%) disagreed than agreed (31%) with the proposed components of 
the Package i. e., prescription drugs and diagnostics arising from ambulatory visits as well 
as inpatient hospital care. Their fundamental concern was the exclusion of ambulatory 
services offered by GP's and specialists from the Package - this was seen as unacceptable 
and according to the JEF contrary to primary and preventive health care measures. The 
MAJ felt that such an exclusion made the NHIP "conceptually flawed and inoperable" 
since it sought to focus on the "most expensive parts of the health system" (MAJ, 1997) 
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while still wanting the GP's to operate as gatekeepers. Within the MOH group there were 
clear differences on this proposal with the CMO who wanted ambulatory visits and health 
promotion activities in the Package being at variance with other members. Another 
dimension of the disagreement over the Package came from the insurance group, BCJ and 
LICA, who felt that persons should be free to buy whatever package they desired rather 
than be compelled to purchase a fixed Standard Package. In addition, a third group (19%) 
wanted a phased standard package with the SMO/STC and NIS wanting the starting 
package to contain hospital care and surgery which caused the major financial burden on 
patients; the MOF wanted to start with primary/ambulatory care. Among those who 
supported the Package (31 %) only the NAJ and JAHSE agreed with the logic of the PS, 
DHRU and DNHI (the chief framers of the NHIP) that access to primary and specialist 
care was not the major issue nor financial burden facing patients. 
iv) Subsidies for the Poor 
With the exception of the CMO and the JEF, all other stakeholders (88%) supported the 
proposal for Government premium payments on behalf of the poor. The CMO indicated 
that there was no need for such subsidies since the Government was already paying for 
treating the poor in public health facilities while the JEF was concerned with the 
additional cost burden imposed on employers to meet these costs. The JEF also felt that in 
the absence of a properly functioning system to identify the pool such a proposal would 
lead to widespread abuse since it would encourage many non-poor to declare themselves 
poor. 
v) Choice of Provider 
Recognising the key role of private providers in facilitating expanded access to care, all 
stakeholders with the exception of the SMO/STC agreed to this proposal. The SMO/STC 
wanted a phased approach to the choice of provider starting with public sector health 
facilities since it was felt that the quality of care was too uncertain in the private sector 
especially in the private hospitals. 
vi) Choice of Insurer 
With the exception of the technical members of the MOH group, all other stakeholders 
(88%) supported the proposal for a choice of insurer. According to the CMO and 
SMO/STC, providers would have too much administrative burden in having to handle 
claims procedures from several different insurers. They felt that a single large insurer- 
payer managing the entire Plan would be more desirable. 
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vii) Competing Public Health Insurance Company 
Stakeholders were divided in their positions with respect to this proposal. Some like the 
MAJ, JEF, LICA and BCJ strongly disagreed (25%) and felt that establishing a public 
company was unnecessary and duplicative since several experienced private insurers 
were already in the market and could be given the task of implementing the NHIP. Others 
like the SBAJ, JCTU, JAHSE, NAJ, NIS and DNHI were unimpressed with the poor 
quality of services and exclusionary practices of the private insurers and felt that a new 
public company would operate more in the interest of the public and would not be as 
selective in their membership as the private insurers. Another viewpoint came from the 
PS/MOH, DHRU and the MOF who supported the proposal for a competing public 
company but felt that it should explore the possibilities for sub-contracting some services 
to achieve greater efficiency. A different perspective was presented by the CMO and 
SMO/STC who preferred a single public insurer since it would be less burdensome on 
health providers who would interact with one company and not a multitude of insurers. 
viii) Catastrophic Care Fund 
There was much division in the views of stakeholders on this proposal. Some like the 
PS/MOH, DNHI, NIS and JCTU (25%) felt that such a Fund would provide real benefits 
to the poor who could not afford expensive treatments abroad and who were forced to 
bear their illness or depend on the inconsistency of public donations and the generosity of 
the MOH. Others like the CMO, MAJ, JEF and the insurance group (44%) indicated that 
such a Fund was unaffordable and would be subject to political interference in its 
selection of beneficiaries. Differing views were also expressed by the DHRU and 
SMO/STC who stated their general support for the proposal but felt that it should be 
implemented at a later period when the NHIP was firmly established and had the 
experience to offer other products. 
ix) New Regulatory Body 
Stakeholders were equally divided in their views on this proposal with just over one-half 
supporting the establishment of a new regulatory body, the Health Insurance Commission, 
while the rest felt that the task of regulation could be appropriately handled by the 
existing Office of the Superintendent of Insurance. The insurance group, BCJ and LICA, 
offered another perspective: the entire industry should be self-regulating. 
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x) Quality Control by the Ministry of Health 
With the exception of the MAJ and NAJ all other stakeholders (88%) were in agreement 
with this proposal. According to the MAJ none of the persons determining standards and 
quality at the MOH are practising professionals and are in no position to mandate what 
treatments should be provided. The NAJ's view was that the MOH has a history of 
developing standards in isolation from practitioners and that the MOH is poor when it 
came to enforcement of these standards. 
d) Overall Position of Key Stakeholders in Relation to the NHIP Proposals 
Based on the responses of stakeholders to the 10 NHIP proposals a position map or 
`forcefield matrix' was prepared (See Table 5.5) to show the location of each stakeholder 
in relation to the overall NHIP by using a spectrum/scale ranging from High Support to 
High Opposition. The actual location of a stakeholder on the map also included 
consideration of the extent to which stakeholders deemed their "Yes" and "No" responses 
(shown in Table 5.5) as negotiable or not. As such, the MAJ which held strong "non- 
negotiable" views on several aspects of the NHIP proposals can be placed in the category 
"High Opposition" while the CMO and JEF who also had strong views were categorised 
as "Medium Opposition" because some of these were negotiable. The map. also links the 
position of each stakeholder to the degree of influence exerted in respect of policy- 
making on the NHIP (taken from Table 5.2). Influence is also represented in a spectrum 
ranging from high to low. 
Overall, 11 of the 16 key stakeholders or 69% may be said to be broadly supportive of the 
NHIP proposals (ranging from high to low). Of these, 6 or 37% were highly supportive. 
This group included the PS, DHRU, DNHI, SMO/STC, NIS and JAHSE. Of the 5 (31%) 
who were positioned as broadly opposed, 1 (6%) was highly opposed (the MAJ) and the 
position of the next 4 (25%) - CMO, JEF, BCJ and LICA - was categorised as medium 
opposition. Those opposed also indicated that while they were generally supportive of an 
NHI system they were opposed the particular approach or model presented in the Green 
Paper. 
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Table 5.5 Map of Key Stakeholders' Relative Positions on NHIP Proposals and 
Influence on Policy 
Position on NHIP 
Influence on Support: Non- Opposition: 
Heath Policy High Medium Low Mobilised Low Medium High 
High " PS e 
COÜ 
" PIOJ ---- ---- " CMO " MAJ J 
" DHRU 
Medium " SMO-SC " NAJ ---- --- ---- 
" JEF 
" BCJ " DNHI 
Low " NIS " SBAJ ---- ---- ---- " LICA ---- " JAIISE 
Notes: PS: Permanent Secretary, Ministry of health; UHKU: Director, Health Ketbrm Unit, MUH; SMU- 
SC: Senior Medical Officer, Secondary and Tertiary Care, MOH; DNHIP: Director, NHIP Implementation 
Unit, MOH; NIS: National Insurance Scheme; JAHSE: Jamaica Association of Health Services Executives; 
MOF: Ministry of Finance; JCTU: Jamaica Confederation of Trade Unions; NAJ: Nursing Association of 
Jamaica; SBAJ: Small Business Association of Jamaica; PIOJ: Planning Institute of Jamaica; CMO: Chief 
Medical Officer, MOH; JEF: Jamaica Employers Federation; BCJ: Blue Cross of Jamaica; LICA: Life 
Insurance Companies Association; MAJ: Medical Association of Jamaica. 
Source: Author's compilation 
In terms of levels of influence, only 1 stakeholder (6%) with high influence (the 
PS/MOH) displayed high support. Similarly, only 1 highly influential stakeholder (the 
MAJ) displayed high opposition. Others with high influence ranged from medium (MOF 
and JCTU) and low support (PIOJ) to medium opposition (CMO). Most (numerical) 
support for the NHIP proposals came from the group with medium influence (DHRU, 
SMO-SC, DNHI) and low influence (NIS and JAHSE) while most opposition came form 
those with medium (JEF, BCJ) and low influence (LICA). 
To a large extent the NHIP proposals were interpreted in terms of opportunity (`winners') 
or threat ('losers') or a mix of both by the various stakeholders. In terms of opportunity, 
there were several facets which were considered: 
i) additional financing for cash-strapped health facilities: this was particularly 
welcomed by stakeholders such as the MOH group, the NAJ and JAHSE. The MAJ also 
saw it as an opportunity if the contents of the package were changed to include 
ambulatory visits; 
ii) better access to health services by the poor: this was quite appealing to most 
stakeholders who, acknowledged the deficiencies in the public sector (stock-outs, 
shortages, postponed surgery, waiting times) and the fact that many of the poor were 
forced to seek care in the private sector at high cost. On the other hand, the CMO and JEF 
who felt that access was already being provided in the public sector and that the 
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contribution requirements on the non-poor to secure access to the private sector by the 
poor would be burdensome; 
iii) affordable health insurance for currently uninsured groups: this was of interest to 
the NAJ, DNHI and especially members of the SBAJ and JCTU who cited major 
difficulties experienced by certain groups and individuals in getting and maintaining 
health insurance cover from the private insurance companies at a reasonable premium; 
iv) larger membership, more profits: if configured in the right way i. e., if the proposal 
for a competing public company was withdrawn, this potential was quite appealing to the 
private companies comprising LICA and to BCJ since a mandatory Plan would require 
many more persons to purchase health insurance than the 13% of the population at that 
time (in 1997-1998); 
v) the establishment of a new competing public health insurance company: this was 
of particular interest to the DNHI as well as to the technical officers in the MOH such as 
the CMO and SMO/SC. In the case of the DNHI, he felt that a public company would 
become the largest and most inclusive carrier of health insurance compared to the 
narrowly selective approach in targeting members by commercial insurers. The CMO and 
SMO/SC saw the opportunity for the public insurer to become the single insurer-single 
payer in the health system. 
vi) more effective quality control and standards in the health sector: ' the 
representatives of the MOH, LICA, BCJ, JEF and the JCTU were quite keen on this since 
they recognised that more action was needed to address weaknesses in regulations, 
standards and enforcement in both the public and private sectors. (For the MOH persons 
this was one of the key components of the Health Reform Program). 
In terms of perceived threats there were also several facets considered: 
i) loss of membership and profits: this was a major concern to LICA and BCJ if the 
public health insurance company were established and became a dominant player in the 
market; 
ii) additional costs which could affect competitiveness: these were generally at the 
forefront of considerations by the JEF and SBAJ who felt that additional statutory 
deductions in the prevailing depressed economic climate would be burdensome to most 
businesses and many would collapse. Similar concerns were also expressed by the PIOJ 
and the CMO; 
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iii) fiscal burden on the Government to meet establishment costs and premiums for 
the indigent: these were being scrutinised by the MOF, PIOJ, and JEF who felt that the 
PAYE groups would be burdened once more to cover these costs and that government 
would have to shift resources from other priority programs to facilitate NHIP obligations. 
In a related concern but quite different perspective, the CMO felt that the MOH budget 
would be reduced since the MOF would now be paying for services through contributions 
to NHIP rather than allocations to MOH. 
iv) loss of earnings , autonomy and 
leadership in health: this was particularly crucial 
to the MAJ since earnings could be reduced especially for private GP's and public sector 
specialists with private practice if the NHIP provided adequate resources to 
improve 
services in the public sector. Also, autonomy could be lessened if a dominant public 
health insurance company or all insurers adopted strict approaches to fee-setting, 
prescribing and referral patterns. 
v) readiness of public health facilities to meet additional demand for services: this 
was seen as a major obstacle by most other representatives despite assurances from the 
MOH group that the Health Reform Program was systematically addressing weaknesses 
and increasing the capacity of the public sector. Also the NHIP would shift some of the 
demand for services to the private sector thus lessening the burden on public facilities. 
5.5 NHIP Design Features as Recommended By Key Stakeholders 
a) The Design Issues for Consideration of Alternatives by Stakeholders 
Arising from the responses as summarised in Table 5.4 it was evident that there were 
certain key proposals which led to strong divergent views. These were as follows: 
i) the components of the Standard Benefit Package especially in relation to the 
exclusion of ambulatory visits; 
ii) the choice of insurer i. e. whether there should be competing companies including 
a public company, a single company undertaking all insurance functions, or a 
public company which could sub-contract operations to other agencies; 
iii) the establishment of the Catastrophic Care Fund; 
iv) the establishment of a new regulatory body or utilisation of the existing Office of 
the Superintendent of Insurance (appropriately upgraded); 
v) the possibility of phasing in some of the proposals such as the package of services 
and the Catastrophic Care Fund. 
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In recognition of the spectrum of positions on the Green Paper's NHI proposals and broad 
support for some version of contributory Plan, stakeholders were asked to assume full 
responsibilities of policy-makers and to indicate what they would recommend as the main 
features of an NHI plan for Jamaica. To secure the specific information from this role- 
playing exercise and to guide the discussions within a structured but flexible framework, 
stakeholders were interviewed using a checklist of questions. (A detailed overview of the 
approach to and conduct of this component of the study was presented in Chapter 3). The 
questions required stakeholders to focus their suggestions on the following: 
i) main reason for introducing an NHI; 
ii) alternative financing arrangements which could prove helpful ; 
iii) the country or countries whose NHI plan could be seen as models/examples; 
iv) role of external agencies in influencing and supporting the choice of NHI Plan; 
v) main goals of their proposed NHI plan; 
vi) contribution of the NHI plan to the goals of the health sector; 
vii) most essential features in the proposed NHI plan; 
viii) features of the plan which would be deemed as non-negotiable; 
ix) criteria to be used in evaluating the feasibility of the design; 
x) ranking of the evaluative criteria; 
xi) likely impact of proposed NHI plan on equity in the Jamaican health sector; 
xii) likely impact of the proposed NHI plan on efficiency in the health system; 
xiii) critical success factors for the proposed NHI plan. 
b) Responses and Recommendations of Stakeholders 
The interviews produced a reasonably good database of responses and recommendations. 
However there were some gaps in terms of the adequacy of responses from some 
stakeholders in providing full answers to the questions. These gaps were largely bridged 
through reference to data generated from years of participant observation (1997-2001) in 
tracking and monitoring public statements, comments and articles on NHI matters by 
stakeholders. A summary of the responses and recommendations of stakeholders from 
these 2 data sources is presented in Appendix 5.1. 
i) Reasons for an NHIP 
Reflective of the general concerns over underfunding of health services and how the 
burden of payments should be met, the majority of stakeholders cited "more funds" for 
health services especially in the public sector and "cost sharing" by individuals, 
businesses and government as the main reasons for an NHI. However, there were some 
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concerns expressed and recommendations made by the JEF, SBAJ, LICA, BCJ and the 
JCTU with respect to "reliability" of funds for the health sector, "equity" in raising funds 
and the extent to which the funds would be "dedicated " to the health sector. 
ii) Financing Alternatives 
The most commonly cited alternatives were "higher user fees" (in public facilities), a 
"health levy" (similar to the existing 5% statutory deductions for housing and education) 
and the use of higher "sin taxes" on alcohol and tobacco products. The use of "lottery for 
health" funds; "debt for health swaps" (a reflection of the country's high debt repayment 
burden) and "re-allocation of expenditure" by government also featured among the listed 
alternatives. Some stakeholders such as the MOF, MAJ, JEF and LICA asserted that the 
MOH was not doing a very good job of managing its finances and that "efficiency 
savings" were possible and could add to the resources available to the public sector. 
Many stakeholders insisted that the establishment of an NHIP should not rule out the 
possibilities of utilising some of these financing alternatives. 
iii) Country Models 
NHI systems in Germany, Colombia, Bermuda and Chile were seen by several 
stakeholders as possible models whose experiences would be very helpful to Jamaica. 
Other insurance approaches suggested were those in Canada, Costa Rica and East Asian 
countries. Even though NHI in Trinidad and Tobago was only in the proposal stage, some 
stakeholders had information on what was planned and felt Jamaica could benefit from an 
examination of that proposal. Managed care plans in the United States were cited both for 
positive and negative reasons. For the MAJ these plans were pointed out as clear 
examples of what an NHIP should not do while for the MOF, PIOJ, JEF, LICA and BCJ 
there were several features which could be meaningfully incorporated in Jamaica. 
iv) External Agencies 
Almost all stakeholders indicated that the IDB, World Bank and IMF played (or could 
play) important roles in the implementation of an NHIP. USAID was also mentioned by 
some. Surprisingly, neither the ILO nor the International Social Security Association 
were cited by any of the stakeholders given that the JEF and JCTU were quite familiar 
with the social health insurance policies of these organisations. The influence of the IDB 
and World Bank were viewed in respect of their ongoing involvement in the Health 
Reform Programme (and Public Sector Modernisation Programme) as well as in terms of 
likely sources of start-up capital for financing the investment costs of an NHIP. 
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v) Main Goals 
Health security, improved access, improved availability/quality of services and more 
private-public collaboration were seen as the main goals of an NHIP by the majority of 
stakeholders. The emphasis on health security and improved access seemed to be based 
on the general recognition of the three-tiered health system in Jamaica where those with 
adequate resources could access private care locally (often paid through private insurance 
plans), those with limited resources had to depend on an erratic public health system 
while the very well-off accessed private care abroad. It was stressed by the PS/MOH and 
DHRU that an NHIP should be seen as a "supplementary" financing mechanism as 
against the "dominant" source of health financing as envisaged by the DNHI. 
vi) Assisting the Health Sector 
The responses of stakeholders were quite dispersed in respect of this question. The 
benefits of more resources in terms of reducing stock-outs, waiting times and waiting lists 
were cited by several stakeholders as the major benefit to the health sector especially the 
public health system. Some like the DHRU, MOF and JCTU felt an NHIP would 
encourage more "personal" and "community" responsibility for health while others like 
the MAJ, JEF, SBAJ and BCJ stressed its role in promoting "client-oriented services". 
For the PS/MOH, PIOJ and NIS, the benefit of a "basic package for all" was seen as the 
main contribution to the goals of the health sector. 
vii) Key Features 
Stakeholders generally followed the pattern of their responses to the proposals in the 
Green Paper (as shown in Table 5.4) in outlining their recommended features on an NHIP. 
The majority felt the plan should be compulsory with a mixed package (primary and 
secondary care) which could be bought from competing public and private insurers and 
which was well-regulated. Both LICA and BCJ preferred custom-designed packages 
rather than a nationally-defined package. The MAJ suggested that the National Insurance 
Scheme should be the plan administrator and coverage should be provided by private 
companies contracted by the NIS. On the matter of a catastrophic care fund, the majority 
of stakeholders recommended its exclusion or deferral to a later phase. 
viii) Non-negotiable Aspects 
For most stakeholders a compulsory plan with a mixed package of primary and secondary 
care services, choice of insurer and provider and subsidies for the poor were the main 
features which were seen as non-negotiable. For some like the CMO and PIOJ 
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administrative ceilings (for insurance overheads) were critical factors in the design while 
LICA and JEF insisted on not having a new public company in the health insurance 
marketplace. The NAJ wanted `staff incentives' as a priority in its design and the SBAJ 
cited lower premiums for its members among its priorities. 
ix) Criteria 
The majority of stakeholders indicated that net revenue, efficiency, equity, choice and 
sustainability should be the main criteria to consider in NHIP design. The MAJ insisted 
that "provider autonomy" in decisions over clinical and medical treatments should be a 
key criterion influencing the design while LICA wanted `autonomy' of insurers (i. e., little 
interference in the design of packages, choice of members or premium-setting). 
x) Ranking of Criteria 
Net revenue, equity and efficiency were cited as the top 3 criteria by most stakeholders. 
Among those stakeholders who exerted a high influence on health policy-making, 
efficiency was the first placed criterion by the MOF and PIOJ; net revenue by the 
PS/MOH and CMO; provider autonomy by the MAJ and equity by JCTU. 
xi) Impact on Equity 
There were several differing interpretations of how equity would be achieved in 
recommended designs by stakeholders. Most felt that a "basic package for all", "cost 
sharing" by those with the ability to pay and `improved access" would have the biggest 
impact on equity. To others such as the PS, DHRU, JAHSE and JCTU, subsidies for the 
poor to improve their access to services would be more valuable. The CMO and SMO/SC 
felt that improvements in public health services would benefit all and have a greater 
impact on equity. Among the commercial groups, the JEF wanted more contributions by 
informal sector operators while the SBAJ cited `concessionary premiums by small 
businesses' as' their design factor. The JCTU, on the other hand, felt that employers 
should make larger contributions than workers. The private insurers, LICA and BCJ, 
wanted subsidies to insurers to enrol the poor and the flexibility to custom-design 
packages for different income groups. 
xii) Impact on Efficiency 
Responses were quite clustered on this question with choice and competition among 
providers and insurers, administrative ceilings in respect of costs of insurers and primary 
care in the package as some of the main suggestions by stakeholders. The PS and DHRU 
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indicated that with an NHI given responsibility for personal care services, the MOH could 
focus more on public health matters while the CMO wanted `health promotion' in the 
benefit package to secure efficiency in resource allocation and use. 
xiii) Critical Success Factors 
Stakeholders cited a range of factors as the key determinants of success. Among these, 
there seemed to be general agreement on economic growth, compliance and collection, 
timely and assured Government contributions and limits on abuse through use of 
copayments. Some like the CMO, and the MAJ placed much emphasis on the inclusion of 
primary care and health promotion activities in the package. Additionally, some like the 
NAJ and JCTU stated that accountability was a crucial factor while the DNHI, NIS and 
BCJ wanted to ensure a good IT system was part of the design. . 
In summary, the recommendations of key stakeholders seemed to converge on the 
following: 
" Main Goals: health security; more funds for health, improved availability of and 
access to services; 
" Key Features: universal coverage; compulsory plan; mixed package; subsidies for 
poor; choice of provider; choice of insurer including public company; no 
catastrophic care fund; administrative ceilings; 
" Ranking of Criteria: Net revenue; efficiency; equity; 
" Critical Success Factors: Compliance and collection; economic growth; timely 
gvernment contributions; limits on abuse. 
5.6 Synthesis of NHIP Proposals from the Green Paper and Key Stakeholders 
Table 5.6 provides a comparison of the main proposals derived from the Green Paper and 
the alternatives being recommended by the majority of key stakeholders. From the Table, 
there seems to be a broad concurrence of proposals in the Green Paper and by key 
stakeholders in respect of the following: 
i) Main Goals 
ii) Universal Coverage 
iii) Mandatory plan 
iv) Subsidies for the poor 
v) Choice of provider 
vi) Choice of insurer 
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vii) Quality Control by the MOH 
viii) Administrative ceilings 
ix) Copayments 
Table 5.6 Comparison of Main Proposals on an NHIP from the 
Green Paper and Key Stakeholders 
Feature Green Paper Key Stakeholders 
Main Goals Health security 
Supplementary financing 
Improve service availability 
Health security 
More funds 
Improve service availability 
Universal Coverage Yes Yes 
Mandatory Membership & Yes 
Contribution 
Yes 
Standard Benefit Package Drugs 
Diagnostics 
Inpatient Care 
Ambulatory Visits: GPs, Specialists, OP Care 
Drugs 
Diagnostics 
Inpatient care 
Subsidies For Poor Yes Yes 
Choice of Provider Yes Yes 
Choice of Insurer Yes Yes 
Competing Public Company Yes Mixed views 
Catastrophic Care Fund Yes No 
New Regulatory Body Yes Mixed views 
Quality Control by MOH Yes Yes 
Administrative Ceilings Yes (in Policy Paper) Yes 
Covavments Yes (in Policy Paper) Yes 
Source: Author's compilation 
The main areas of disagreement related to: 
i) the Benefit Package: there were clearly polarised views. The Green Paper was clear on 
a package consisting of prescribed drugs, diagnostics and inpatient care while several 
stakeholders insisted on a mixed package containing the above as well as coverage for 
ambulatory visits (primary and specialist). Suggestions for the contents of the mixed 
package by most stakeholders reflected concerns over the exclusion of primary care 
services, close knowledge of benefit plans offered by private insurers and consideration 
of the extent to which the SBP matched the contents of these plans. Appendix 4.8 shows 
the main services covered, limits and copayments in typical plans offered by local health 
insurers. 
ii) the administration of the Plan with emphasis on the establishment of a competing 
public company: there were 3 clear positions which emerged: firstly, a single public 
insurer administering the Standard Benefit Package in the Green Paper for all residents; 
secondly, a public company that competes with private carriers in selling the Green 
Paper's standard benefit package to the entire population or which sub-contracts private 
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insurers in administering the standard package; and thirdly, leaving the administration 
and sales of the standard package to existing private insurers. The MAJ was the only 
group suggesting that the existing National Insurance Scheme could be the administrator 
that sub-contracts marketing, membership and claims processing services to the private 
insurers. Stakeholders generally recognised that there were major cost differentials as 
well as administrative/regulatory implications for each arrangement. 
iii) the establishment of a catastrophic care fund: the inclusion or exclusion of this 
fund was a major source of contention. As an additional item to what was proposed in the 
standard benefit package such a fund would have implications for costs and contributions 
which were directly related to the range of catastrophic services covered and the sharing 
of the payments. However, stakeholders felt that this could easily be abused, was not a 
priority or could be considered in a later phase. If given the role as policymaker, most 
stakeholders indicated that such a fund would not be established or would be deferred. 
iv) the establishment of a new regulatory body: there were two positions which were 
competing: the Green Paper which stated that a new regulatory body would be set up -the 
Health Insurance Commission--and several stakeholders who indicated that the necessary 
regulatory functions could be carried out by the existing Office of the Superintendent of 
Insurance with an expanded mandate and perhaps some additional costs. 
In terms of a specific NHI design, it seemed that stakeholders and Government were both 
proposing universal coverage, mandatory, largely contribution-based plan but with major 
differences in 2 particular features: 
i) Administrative: Two options i. e., competing insurers including a public company; 
leave it to existing private insurers. Another component of the administrative framework 
involved the decision on either a new regulatory body for health insurance, the Health 
Insurance Commission, or additional responsibilities for the existing regulatory body 
(Office of the Superintendent of Insurance). 
ii) Package: Two options i. e., the standard benefit package of prescribed drugs, 
diagnostics and inpatient care as outlined in the Green Paper along with services in a 
catastrophic care fund; and a mixed benefit package consisting of ambulatory visits, 
prescribed drugs and diagnostics and inpatient care but excluding catastrophic care.. 
The financial implications and analysis of these options in terms of cost, contribution 
requirements and copayments will be dealt with in the next Chapter. 
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5.7 Summary of Findings 
This has chapter sought to examine the emergence of a formally-articulated NHIP on the 
public policy agenda, the reactions of key stakeholders to the government's proposals as 
spelt out in its Green Paper in 1997 and the recommendations of key stakeholders on their 
version of an NHI for Jamaica if given the role of policymaker. The discussion traced the 
early roots of some version of an NHIP to the immediate post-independence period in the 
1960's when social security arrangements were being established and the persistence of 
NHI on the health financing agenda of different governments despite varying ideological 
and pragmatic concerns in the 1970's, 1980's and 1990's. 
It presented data on the rationale for and objectives of the universal coverage-mandatory 
NHIP in 1997 and, using the techniques of stakeholder mapping and forcefield analysis, 
examined the interest in, views and position of key stakeholders on the policy framework 
and specific proposals of the NHIP. It also presented data on comments and perspectives 
of the general public, minor stakeholder groups and the opposition political parties in 
terms of the extent to which they supported, disagreed or held no particular views on the 
NHIP proposals. 
The chapter discussed the use and outcome of a `role-playing' technique which sought to 
secure information on the proposals of key stakeholders for an NHIP as if they were 
policymakers. These proposals were compared with those presented in the Government's 
Green Paper to determine the extent to which there were similarities and differences. The 
major findings showed that: 
> there were similarities in nine key areas: goals, universality, mandatory 
membership and contribution, subsidies for the poor, choice of provider, choice of 
insurer, quality control by the MOH and copayments by patients; 
> there were sharp differences in terms of a comprehensive or limited benefit 
package with ambulatory care being the contentious component; the establishment 
of a public health insurance company to compete with existing private insurers; 
the establishment of a catastrophic care fund for high-cost, complicated cases and 
the establishment of a new regulatory body for the Plan. 
Essentially, as the chapter concluded, the scope of the benefit package and the 
administrative arrangements were the defining distinctive features in perspectives and 
options on an NHIP by government and key stakeholders. 
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CHAPTER 6: FINANCIAL MODELLING OF NHI OPTIONS 
6.1 Key Areas to be Examined 
In their definition, Cichon et al., (1999) state that a financial model: 
"maps the observed financial structure of the system or subsystem and 
projects this structure into the future or simulates the effect of a change in 
a selected parameter or parameters... Financial models in the health 
sector are... a subgroup of the overall set of financial models.... [They] 
provide answers to questions such as 'how much would it cost if... how 
much would we save if... how much would it cost workers, employers and 
taxpayers if we were to introduce a certain type of national health 
insurance scheme... '. These `how much' questions are the nucleus of 
financial modelling. They are normally answered in absolute terms (in 
currency units) and in relative terms (as a percentage of total taxable 
income, of contributions, or of GDP) ". 
Using this definition as a guide, the purpose of this chapter is to define and elaborate the 
main features, assumptions, financial flows and implications of the 3 NHI options i. e the 
government's Green Paper, the alternative emerging from the stakeholder analysis in 
Chapter 5 and the prototype NHI plan. The key aspects of defining such a prototype, 
consisting largely of `best practices' and related features in NHI-type plans which have 
emerged from the literature review, were addressed in Chapter 3. 
As suggested in the literature (Cichon et al., 1999; Plamondon et. al, 2002; GTZ and 
WHO, 2004), the general approach adopted in the financial modeling is to specify as far 
as possible the features, relationships, policy variables, assumptions and expected results 
or outcome indicators of each option and the prototype in a quantitative form. In building 
and deriving estimates from the model, certain datasets or modules are critical - 
demographic and macroeconomic; labour force and earnings; and utilisation and cost of 
health services. In the analysis there are five key aspects which will be presented: 
1) the main features of the options with emphasis on those areas where there is 
common ground and those which reflect clear differences; 
2) schematic frameworks to depict the flow of funds and services in each option; 
3) specification of the variables and assumptions to be used in the financial modeling 
and mathematical mapping of the relations and equations linking these variables; 
4) calculations of the inflows and outflows in the prototype and the two options over 
the medium term (2002 to 2010); 
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5) scenario analyses of baseline assumptions and estimates of financial flows, pay as 
you go rate (PAYGR) and government's contributions to consider the 
combination of key factors which could lead to the `best case' and `worst case' 
as well as sensitivity analyses to consider the likely impact of specific variables. 
6.2 Main Features of NHIP Options 
Table 6.1 summarises the main features of the prototype (referred to as PT) and the two 
NHI options discussed in Chapter 5 i. e., the Green Paper proposal referred to as GPP and 
the proposed alternative by some key stakeholders referred to as SAP. In comparison, 
there are some common features among the options and some which make them distinct. 
Table 6.1 Key Features in NHI Options to be Evaluated 
Features Prototype (PT) Green Paper (GPP) Alternative (SAP) 
Common 
Population Coverage Universal Universal Universal 
Legal status Mandatory Mandatory Mandatory 
Subsidies for the poor Government Government Government 
Health service Public and private Public and private Public and private 
providers 
Quality control Ministry of Health Ministry of Health Ministry of Health 
Administrative costs Fixed ceilings Fixed ceilings Fixed ceilings 
Copayments Percentage of costs Percentage of costs Percentage of costs 
Different 
Benefit package Broad Package: Limited Package: Broad Package: 
Medical and Hospital Prescribed drugs Medical and Hospital 
Prescribed tests and 
Imaging services 
Inpatient hospital care 
Catastrophic care Some coverage Some coverage Not covered 
overseas 
Administration/ Single public company Competing public and Competing private 
Choice of insurer private companies companies 
Regulatory agency Upgrade existing New agency Self-regulatory or 
agency Upgrade existing agency 
Reimbursement of Global budgets Fee for service at average UCR-based fee for 
service providers (assigned to providers) cost in public facilities service (assigned to 
(assigned to providers) providers) 
Contribution Percentage of Standard fixed amount Standard fixed amount wages/earnings (indexed) (indexed) 
Source: Author's compilation 
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a) Common Features 
" Universal Coverage:. On the `breadth' dimension, each option proposed to be 
inclusive rather than restrictive in terms of membership and to offer the same package 
of benefits to each member. This reflects a shared concern with `equity in access' in 
that at the time of treatment there is (or should be) no distinction between members 
who made direct contributions and those whose contributions were paid by 
government. 
" Mandatory plans: Each option proposed legislated plans to make it compulsory for all 
residents to become members and to have health insurance coverage for at least those 
items specified in the benefit package. This ruled out the possibility of some groups 
such as the top income earners or workers in selected industries opting out of the NHI 
system. (However, this did not prohibit persons from having `duplicate' insurance 
coverage). As such, the health risk profile and utilisation patterns considered in the 
options reflect the national experience rather than that of selected segments of the 
population. The element of compulsion also extended to service providers in that no 
provider could turn away or refuse to treat a member of the plan. 
" Premiums for the poor: To secure universality and to ensure that the mandate for total 
population membership was met, each option proposed that the State cover 
premiums/contributions of the poor. This obligation would be met through subsidies 
to the insurer(s) rather than to providers of care so that the poor received membership 
cards entitling them to the same package of benefits as other contributing members. 
The issues relating to identification of the poor, whether the subsidy should be 
`partial' or `total' and the implications of these are explored in the subsequent 
sections dealing with funding and policy aspects. 
Access to and choice of service providers: In view of the mixed character of the 
Jamaican health care system, where the public and private sectors complement each 
other for some services and compete for patients in others, each option proposed that 
members should have access to service providers in both sectors. Another key aspect 
was that such access and choice would be open to the poor so that they were not 
restricted to using services in the public sector only. 
" Quality control: In terms of quality of care offered by providers each option proposed 
that the Ministry of Health rather than the insurer(s) or a new agency be asked to set 
norms and standards and to adjudicate on these when required. 
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" Administrative costs: Reflecting concerns to contain cost despite clear differences in 
their administrative arrangements, each option proposed to set ceilings with respect to 
the administration of the plan thus ensuring that the majority of contributions were 
directed at paying for health services rather than for `management'. While specific 
targets were not indicated, estimates have been made in the modelling exercise as to 
what these magnitudes may be, based on suggested administrative structures 
(discussed below in the section on differences dealing with `Administration and 
choice of insurer'). 
" Copayments: Copayments (based on a percentage of costs rather than flat amounts) 
weree proposed in each option primarily to deter `frivolous' use and to provide 
immediate resources to providers. While no specific targets were stipulated, the 
modelling exercise assumed certain magnitudes bearing in mind the indications given 
in interviews with stakeholders and the general international trend towards some form 
of cost-sharing at the point of service (Saltman, et al., 2004; Carrin, 2004). 
b) Differences 
" Benefit package: The delineation of the benefit package shows clear differences 
among the options. While the PT and SAP offered all medical (i. e. ambulatory care 
services) and hospital benefits, the GPP proposed a more restricted package covering 
inpatient hospital care, prescribed drugs and diagnostic services arising from 
ambulatory visits. The GPP specifically excluded consultations and non-prescription 
costs of ambulatory care visits whether in primary care or outpatient settings. 
However, the GPP and PT included a limited amount of overseas care (discussed 
below in `Catastrophic care') while the SAP excluded such care. In each option it was 
proposed that the benefit package would contain standard provisions and available to 
all. This did not prevent anyone from seeking additional (supplementary and 
complementary) private insurance coverage for services outside the standard packages 
or to cover copayments or even duplicate coverage for services in the packages. 
" Catastrophic care: In Jamaica catastrophic care normally refers to expensive and 
sophisticated treatments not available locally for which patients are sent overseas for 
care (to the US, UK or Canada or Cuba). As suggested by stakeholders, this was 
excluded from the SAP package. However, coverage for some of these services was 
included in the GPP and PT packages. 
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" Administration and choice of insurer: This is one of the most distinguishing features 
of the options. The PT proposed that the plan should be managed by the existing 
Social Security agency appropriately upgraded as a fully-fledged public company (as 
against its present status as a department in the Ministry of Labour). This would mean 
that a single public insurer (with an established infrastructure) would be responsible 
for the plan and as such members would not have the option of selecting their own 
insurer. The GPP provided members with a choice of insurer from among the existing 
private health insurance carriers and a new public company to be established. 
According to the Green Paper a public company was necessary to provide coverage 
for its benefit package only and to ensure inclusion of those persons who are normally 
refused insurance cover or are charged very high premiums by private carriers (such 
as the retired, elderly, unemployed and those with certain pre-existing health 
conditions). On the other hand the SAP proposed that members should choose an 
insurer from among the existing private carriers and that there was no need for a new 
competing public company or for a single non-competing public insurer. 
" Regulatory agency: Both the PT and SAP indicated that expanding the functions of 
the existing Office of the Superintendent of Insurance (OSI) would adequately cover 
the task of regulation and supervision in the plans. The SAP also proposed that self- 
regulation by the group of private carriers could be considered. On the other hand, the 
GPP placed much emphasis on the establishment of a new Health Insurance 
Commission to perform the specific tasks of supervision and adjudication in respect 
of the NHI plan. 
" Reimbursement of providers: While there was consensus on assignment of payments 
to providers (rather than to members) there were quite distinct proposals among the 
options for reimbursement of providers. The PT sought global targets/budgets for the 
various services and fixed reimbursements (on a cost per case basis for ambulatory 
care and budgets for hospitals) with reference to these targets. The GPP proposed to 
reimburse public and private providers on a fee for service basis with close reference 
to the average cost of similar services in the public sector. In the SAP the proposal 
was also for reimbursements on a fee for service basis but based on private insurance 
practice of `usual, customary and reasonable' (UCR) rates charged by providers. 
" Contributions/Premiums: Each option had different proposals for determining the 
basis for contributions reflecting concerns over equity (payment according to one's 
ability) and administrative feasibility (calculation of earnings and collectibility of 
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contributions especially with respect to the large self-employed population). The PT 
proposed a fixed percentage of earnings (proportionality) while the GPP and SAP 
proposed community-rated fixed amount contributions (irrespective of earnings) 
indexed to the cost of services (as in private health insurance). A critical factor in 
relation to contributions is compliance i. e., the extent to which due contributions are 
paid on a timely and complete basis. The likely impact of varying compliance levels 
on financial flows and overall viability of NHI is considered in the modeling. 
6.3 Schema of the Flow of Funds and Services 
Donaldson and Gerard (1992) and WHO (2000) suggest that NHI-type systems are 
generally based on a `triangular' structure of relationships in dealing with the critical 
components of a health financing system i. e.: 
" who pays/contributes; 
" who benefits; 
" what is the modality and mechanism for contributions; 
" who collects the funds and manages the system; 
" what benefits/services are received; 
" who provides the services; 
" how are service providers reimbursed. 
The following frameworks (Figures 6.1-6.3) outline how these components are envisaged 
in the NHI options using the triangular relations among members/beneficiaries, health 
service providers and insurer(s) in mapping the flow of payments and services. They 
reflect those aspects of the options which are broadly similar such as coverage of 
contributors and other beneficiaries (dependents); choice of health services providers; use 
of copayments and reimbursement arrangements. However the varying size of the boxes 
and thickness of the directional arrows indicate some of the areas where there are clear 
differences in the options. These are shown in Table 6.2 where the key differences and 
likely magnitudes of these are mapped in relation to the number of likely beneficiaries; 
the depth of the benefit package; the expected contribution per member; co-payment 
obligations; number of insurers, number of providers and percentage of claims value paid 
by the insurer(s). For example, copayments are expected to be higher in the SAP 
following the existing pattern among local private insurers to set rates at about 20% while 
lower rates are expected in the GPP and PT. 
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Table 6 .2 
Comparison of key Factors Affecting Financial Flows in NHI Options 
FACTORS PT GPP SAP 
i) Number of likely beneficiaries (linked to depth of benefit package) *** * ** 
ii) Size (depth) of benefit package *** * ** 
iii) Contribution per person *** * ** 
iv) Copayment obligation * ** *** 
v) Number of insurers * *** ** 
vi) Number of service providers 
vii) Percent of claim paid by insurer (linked to size of copayment) 
Notes: the number of asterisks reflects the likely quantum of the factor. 
Source: Author's compilation 
Figure 6.1 outlines the flows assumed in the PT. Members (including contributors and 
non-contributors) have access to health services in a broad benefit package that includes 
hospital care (inpatient and outpatient), ambulatory care, prescribed drugs and diagnostic 
services and some catastrophic (overseas) care. This is to be paid through a mandatory 
deduction fixed as a percentage of the income of the working population and Government 
subsidies for the poor. The contribution arrow indicates that the average amount of the 
contribution is expected to be greater than in the other Options. 
The health insurance plan is only available from a single public insurer. Beneficiaries 
have access to services in the package offered by local public and private providers who 
receive periodic payments based on annually negotiated global budgets as well as through 
some copayments. There are also provisions for some services by overseas facilities. 
Beneficiaries are expected to make small copayments (compared to other options). 
Figure 6.2 depicts the flows in the GPP. Members have access to a narrower benefit 
package comprising inpatient care, prescribed drugs and diagnostic services and limited 
overseas (catastrophic) care. This is to be paid for through a fixed premium, the same for 
all persons regardless of income, and Government subsidies for the poor. Insurance for 
the package of services could be bought from competing private and public companies. 
The services in the package could be accessed from public and private providers and 
there are provisions for some overseas care. Providers will be paid on a fee for service 
basis. Copayments are expected to be higher than in the PT but lower than that in the SAP. 
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Figure 6.1 Flows of Services and Funds in Prototype (PT) 
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The flows in the SAP are shown in Figure 6.3. Members have access to a benefit package 
that includes hospital care (inpatient and outpatient), ambulatory care, prescribed drugs 
and diagnostic services. This is to be paid for through a fixed premium for all members. 
The benefit package could be bought from any competing private insurer at a fixed price 
premium (as in the case of the GPP). Services in the package will be available from 
public and private providers who will be paid by insurers on a fee for service basis (based 
on UCR fee schedules). Copayinents are expected to be the highest among the 3 Options. 
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6.4 Specification of Variables and Assumptions 
Using 2002 as the baseline year the financial modelling makes projections of key 
variables based on particular assumptions on what are the likely inflows and outflows of 
funds in the PT, GPP and SAP options over the medium term (up to 2010). The variables, 
combined into datasets, that are required for the modelling and the results of the 
estimations are organised into six main modules or categories: economic and 
demographic; labour force and earnings; health services utilisation and cost of services; 
cost of benefit packages including administration; contribution revenue and other income; 
and estimation of the necessary `pay as you go' (PAYG) contribution rate to equate 
expenditure and revenue as well as the contribution share of government. The key 
variables in each module are defined below. 
a) Some General Assumptions 
Assumptions play a pivotal role in the financial modelling of NHI or other health 
insurance programs (Cichon et al., 1999; Plamondon et al., 2002; GTZ and WHO, 2004). 
The critical general assumptions applied in the modelling exercise are as follows: 
i) Coverage: Based on the recommendations and best practice emerging from the 
literature and the general consensus of stakeholders, the NHIP options should seek to 
ensure universal coverage. It is assumed that universal coverage in the context of Jamaica 
with prominent patterns of in-migration (given the importance of the tourism sector) and 
out-migration (given the notable outflow of persons seeking jobs abroad) refers to the 
population of `residents' as against `citizens'. The implication of this distinction is that 
short-term visitors as well as Jamaican citizens working and living abroad are not 
included in the estimates. The legal requirements for `residency' are reflected in the 
decennial census and inter-census estimates of population by the national statistical 
institute (STATIN) and data from their publications are used in the financial modelling. 
In practice, and as evident from most countries with mandatory health insurance plans, 
universal coverage may not be achievable in the first year of operation and in fact may 
require several years. In some countries, certain groups are targeted for inclusion in 
various phases of growth and development and this had several implications for cost, 
administration and contribution rates. In the current modelling. exercise, universal 
coverage is assumed from Year I to show the financial and policy implications of a fully 
functional NHIP. By extension, with universal coverage and mandatory participation, it is 
further assumed that there is no opting-out provision for particular groups. 
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ii) Access and use of public-private providers: In view of the mixed nature of the 
health provider market and reflective of stakeholders' concern for choice, competition 
and efficiency, services (as defined in the different packages) will be accessible in public 
and private health facilities. As indicated in Table 4.1 the public sector is more dominant 
in the provision of hospital-based services while private providers dominate the market in 
the provision of ambulatory care, prescribed drugs and diagnostic services. 
Although there are clear differences in average costs and overall expenditure, for the 
purpose of the financial modelling, it is assumed that the current patterns of choice and 
utilisation of services in the public and private sectors will continue in the medium term. 
It is also assumed in the modelling that access to and the cost of overseas care, which is 
covered in some private health plans and which is quite common for residents with higher 
incomes in Jamaica, will be limited to catastrophic cases referred for treatment abroad. 
It is further assumed that issues of provider licensing and registration will have been dealt 
with by local health regulatory agencies and that the NHIP will establish contractual 
relations with the network of public and private providers. 
iii) Indigent population: The modelling assumes this group can be appropriately defined, 
measured and identified by other state agencies (rather than by the NHIP agencies as an 
additional task with associated costs). As residents, it is also assumed that they would be 
eligible for membership in the NHIP and access to the full benefits of the package. It is 
further assumed that their contributions will be paid in full by the Government. 
iv) Reimbursement: Evidence from various countries and health plans indicate that the 
mode of reimbursement (such as fee for service based on UCR charges, global budget and 
capitation as well as whether patients or providers are assigned reimbursements) has 
implications for cost of services and administration as well as behaviour of providers and 
members. The modelling does not attempt to provide explicit data on the implications of 
varying the modes of reimbursement but treats this as an integral component of the cost 
of administration and as part of moral hazard examined in the sensitivity analysis. 
v) Services to be covered: Using data provided by stakeholders, the broad categories of 
services considered in the modelling are: 
" inpatient hospital care; 
" outpatient and casualty visits (including emergency) to hospitals; 
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9 ambulatory visits to public health centres, general practitioners (GP's) and 
specialists; 
" prescribed drugs; 
" prescribed laboratory and other diagnostic services; 
9 limited overseas care for catastrophic conditions. 
Further refinements and specifications of services to be covered within each category 
such as establishing lists of included and excluded services, limits on access and 
utilisation (e. g. value and volume restrictions per individual or family or case or lifetime) 
and quality provisions are not explicitly dealt with in the modelling. However, it is 
assumed that considerations of these factors are ultimately manifested in the cost of 
services. Changes in the cost of services are dealt with in the sensitivity analysis as 
factors which could reduce or increase the cost of the package(s). 
It is further assumed that all persons would have access to the same package of services. 
The policy and practical implications of different packages for different groups of persons 
as well as for coverage of services not included in the package(s) are considered in 
Chapter 8. 
vi) Demand for Health Services: Ideally, projections of demand should consider a range 
of inter-related factors. These may include: 
" the size and growth of the population; 
" the age and sex distribution; 
" the morbidity and epidemiological profile of the population; 
" the current levels of utilisation and the extent to which these are affected by issues 
such as supply (of hospital beds, physicians, specialists and the mix of services 
available in Jamaica), location of facilities, income levels, the incidence of health 
insurance, educational attainments, quality and price; 
" the health goals and objectives of the country such as emphasis on preventive as 
against hospital-based interventions; 
" the impact of technological innovations. 
It is outside the scope of this research to develop a specific health services demand model 
which effectively includes all of these factors. As such, the projections in the modelling 
consider current utilisation patterns and the changes expected as a result of population 
growth and aging as well as the likely impact of a universal health plan which would 
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provide full access to-services for all groups and especially for some which seemed to be 
"under-utilising" services. 
The model assumes that the pattern of demand is ultimately and fully reflected in the cost 
of services (i. e. supply constraints do not significantly distort the pattern of demand). The 
sensitivity analysis explores the implications of larger or smaller increases in projected 
demand which may be due to the impact of factors other than key demographic variables. 
vii) Income ceiling: Income ceilings affect the contribution rate as well as the absolute 
size of the contribution by members of the NHIP. In several countries where the 
contribution rate is specified as a fixed percentage, contributors make payments which are 
proportionate to their income i. e those with higher incomes pay more than those with 
lower incomes. An income ceiling is often used to provide some measure of relief to high 
income earners who may be burdened with excessively large absolute payments. 
Establishing such ceilings requires detailed data on the distribution of income and on 
actuarial analyses. In the absence of this data, the financial modelling did not attempt to 
establish ceilings. It assumes that there are no ceilings. It is also assumed that `income' is 
limited to `wages and salaries' which could be readily estimated from the national 
accounts data as a percentage of GDP. 
viii) Other health sector spending outside the NHIP benefit package(s): This includes 
the cost of administration of MOH's Head Office, capital spending and its other non- 
health expenditure such as social programmes. It is assumed that these items will 
continue to be funded from general taxes i. e. through allocations to MOH From MOF. In 
the case of capital spending, the consequent recurrent costs are contained in and 
considered as part of the health services budget. 
In the private sector there are no explicit provisions for considering capital investment. It 
is assumed that amortisation and interest charges for such investments are reflected in the 
routine costs of health services provided and are fully incorporated in their charges for 
services. 
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b) The Data Modules 
i) Economic and Demographic: The modelling requires and utilises data on several key 
macroeconomic and demographic variables. These relate specifically to: 
" GDP and GDP growth rate 
" general and medical inflation 
" the size and rate of growth of the population 
" the age distribution of the population 
" the (social) dependency ratio i. e. number of persons less than 14 years and over 65 
in relation to those 15-64 years old 
" average size of households 
" number of persons living below the poverty line 
Table 6.3 lists the key variables as well as provides data on the baseline magnitudes, 
estimates and projections. Current and projected measures of these variables are generally 
derived from existing data in official publications. Some projections are made based on 
calculations undertaken within the model and these are clearly indicated. 
ii) Labour Force and Earnings: The main variables considered in the modelling are: 
" the size of the population 15 years and over; 
" the potential labour force (PLF); 
" the labour force participation rate (LFPR); 
" the actual labour force (ALF), employed labour force (ELF) and unemployed 
labour force (ULF); 
" distribution of the ELF in terms of broad employment categories: government or 
public sector; private wage and salaried groups; own account or self-employed; 
" wages and salaries as a percentage of GDP and the total earnings or income base 
(for estimating the contribution rate/amount); 
" average real earnings per capita and the rate of growth of earnings; 
" the economic dependency ratio: the number of persons being supported by each 
worker or the total non-working population in relation to those who are working. 
The baseline magnitudes and projections in respect of these variables are shown in Table 
6.4. Official data on the current and projected magnitudes of these variables already exist 
and are used in the modelling of NHIP options. In some cases additional projections are 
required in the modelling and these are clearly indicated. 
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Table 6.3 Baseline Magnitudes and Projections of 
Economic and Demographic Variables, 2002-2010 
Inputs/Variables Baseline Assumptions/Projections 
Data (2002) 
1. Real GDP (J$bn) 382.2 Official data used. Actual data used for 2002-2004. 
Projections for 2005-2010 assume real growth of 1.5% p. a. 
2. 'Real GDP growth rate 1.1 Official data used. Actual data used for 2002-2004. 
(%) Projections for 2005-2010 assume real growth of 1.5% p. a. 
3. Index of change in real 100 Cumulative changes are calculated with 2002 as base year. 
GDP 
4. Real GDP per capita 145.9 Official data used. Actual data used for 2002-2004. 
(J$'000) Projections for 2005-2010 assume growth rate of 1.0% p. a. 
5. Real GDP per capita 0.7 Official data used. Actual data used for 2002-2004. 
growth rate (%) Projections for 2005-2010 assume growth rate of 1.0% p. a. 
6. Index of change in real 100 Cumulative changes are calculated with 2002 as base year 
GDP per capita 
7. General Inflation using 7.1 Official data used. Actual data used for 2002-2004. 
consumer price index (%) Projections for 2005-2010 assume increase by 8.0% p. a. 
8. Medical Inflation (%) 8.6 Official data used. Actual data used for 2002-2004. 
Projections for 2005-10 assume medical inflation exceeds 
general inflation by 1.5% p. a. 
9. Difference between 1.5 Actual data used for 2002-2004. Projections for 2005-10 
medical and general assume a continuing difference of 1.5%. 
inflation (%) 
10. Population (mn) 2.62 Official data used. Actual data used for 2002-2004. 
Projections for 2005-10 assume growth rate of 0.5% p. a. 
11. Growth rate (%) 0.4 Official data used. Actual data used for 2002-04. Projections 
for 2005-10 assume growth rate of 0.5% p. a. 
12. Index of change in 100 Cumulative changes calculated with 2002 as base year. 
population size 
13. Growth rate of elderly 0.5 Official data used. Actual data used for 2002-04. Projections 
population X65 years (%) for 2005-10 assume growth rate of 0.6% p. a. 
14. Index of change in 100 Cumulative changes calculated with 2002 as base year. 
size of elderly population 
15. Dependency ratio i. e. 0.63 Official data used, Actual data used for 2002-2004. 
number of persons under Projections for 2005-10 assume stable ratio of 0.61. 
14 and over 65 as % of 
those 15-64 years . 
16. Average size of 3.6 Official survey data used. Actual data used for 2002-04. 
household (persons) Projections for 2005-06 assume 3.5 persons per household 
and 3.4 persons from 2007-10. 
17. Average number of 728 Official survey data used. Actual data used for 2002-04. 
households ('000) Projections for 2005-10 based on calculations of population 
and average size of households. 
18. % persons living 19.7 Official survey data used. Actual data used for 2002-04. below poverty line Projections for 2005-10 assume 20% of persons live below 
poverty line. 
19. Number of persons 516 Calculations and projections from official survey data. below poverty line ('000) 
Source: Author's compilation 
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Table 6.4 Baseline Magnitudes and Projections of 
Labour Force and Earnings Variables, 2002-2010 
Inputs/Variables Baseline Assumptions/Projections 
Data (2002) 
1. % population 15 years 69.5 Official data used. Actual data used for 2002-04. Projections 
and over from 2005-10 assume 70% of persons are 15 years and over. 
This data is used to calculate the absolute size of the adult 
population. 
2. % institutionalised 2.3% Official data used. Actual data used for 2002-04. Projections 
population from 2005-10 assume the same rate over the period. 
3. Potential Labour Force 1.78 Official data used. Actual data used for 2002-04. Projections 
- PLF (mn) from 2005-10 are calculated 
from data on the adult and 
institutionalised population. 
4. Labour Force 64.0 Official data used. Actual data used for 2002-04. Projections 
Participation Rate - LFPR are 65% in 2005 and 66% from 2006-10. 
(%) 
5. Actual Labour Force - 1.14 Official data used. Actual data used for 2002-04. Projections 
ALF (mn) from 2005-10 are based on population growth rates and the 
LFPR. 
6. % Employed 84 Official data used. Actual data used for 2002-04. Projections 
from 2005-10 assume 86% employment rate. 
7. Employed Labour 0.96 Official data used. Actual data used for 2002-04. Projections 
Force - ELF (mn) from 2005-10 apply the projected employment rate (86%) to 
the projected ALF. 
8. Unemployed Labour 0.18 Official data used. Actual data used for 2002-04. Projections 
Force - ULF (mn) from 2005-10 apply the projected unemployment rate (14%) 
to the projected ALF. 
9. Distribution of ELF by a) G: 13% Official data used. Actual data used for 2002-04. Projections 
employer-government b) P: 51% from 2005-10 assume a distribution of 11%; 55% and 34% 
(G); private (P); own c) OA: 36% respectively. 
account (OA) 
10. Wages-earnings as % 65 Official data. Actual data used for 2002-04. Projections from 
GDP 2005-10 assume wages account for 68% of GDP. 
This data is used to estimate the total real wage base. 
11. Average real earnings $258,800 Official data used. Actual data used for 2002-04. Projections 
per worker per annum J($) from 2005-10 relate changes in the real wage base to 
changes in the ELF. 
12. Labour productivity $398,100 Official data used. Actual data used for 2002-04. Projections 
J($) from 2005-10 relate changes in real GDP to changes in ELF. 
13. Economic 1.7 Calculated for 2002-04 and projections from 2005-10 utilise 
Dependency Ratio: data on size of the ELF and the non-working population. 
number of persons 
supported per worker 
Source: Author's compilation 
iii) Health Services Utilisation and Expenditure: The key variables in this module are 
the patterns of utilisation of health services and of costs. The projections cover the likely 
growth in demand for and consequent costs of services in the package(s) i. e. inpatient and 
outpatient hospital care, ambulatory non-hospital visits, prescribed drugs and 
laboratory/diagnostic services; and catastrophic care. Table 6.5 shows baseline 
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magnitudes and projections in 11 sub-models showing demand for and costs of these 
services in the private and public sector. 
Table 6.5 Baseline Magnitudes and Projections of 
Health Utilisation and Expenditure, 2002-2010 
InputsNariables Baseline Assumptions/Projections 
Data (2002) 
1. Inpatient Hospital 5.8 Calculations from official data and projections of public and 
Care (J$bn) private inpatient costs (i. e. Sub-models la and lb). 
Sub-model la: Public 
" Utilisation 1,198,000 or Official data: The period average for 1992-2003 was 0.35 
(inpatient days) -0.46 days days per capita. However, in 2001-2003 the average was 
per capita 0.43 days. Projections from 2004 use the average of last 3 
years and a small adjustment for the impact of the growing 
elderly population. 
" Cost (J$bn) 4.7 Estimated: Cost per inpatient day times number of days. 
Projections make a 1.5% adjustment to reflect the impact of 
the difference between medical and general inflation. 
Sub-model lb: Private 
" Utilisation Specific data Broad estimates from the Annual Survey of Living 
(inpatient days) not available Conditions (ASLC) suggest that private inpatient days 
account for about 10% of total inpatient days. 
" Cost (J$bn) 1.1 Estimates from National Health Accounts (NHA) data, 
ASLC and private insurance. 
2. Outpatient hospital 2.7 Calculations from official data and projections of public and 
Costs (J$bn) private outpatient costs (i. e. Sub-models 2a and 2b). 
Sub-model 2a: Public 
" Utilisation (casualty 1,183,000 or Official data: The average for the period 1992-2003 was 
and outpatient visits) - 0.45 visits about 0.4 visits per capita. In 2001-03 the average was 0.45 
per capita visits. Projections from 2004-10 assume a slight rise to 0.47 
visits to reflect likely increased demand from the growing 
elderly population. 
" Cost (J$bn) 2.2 Estimated: Cost per visit times number of visits. Projections 
make a 1.5% adjustment to reflect the impact of the 
difference between medical and general inflation. 
Sub-model 2b: Private 
" Utilisation (casualty Specific data Broad estimates from the ASLC suggest that private 
and outpatient visits) not available outpatient visits account for - 10% of total inpatient days. 
" Cost (J$bn) 0.5 Estimates from NHA data, ASLC and private insurance. 
3. Ambulatory care visits: 5.6 Calculations from official data and projections of public and 
primary & specialist private ambulatory visits costs (i. e. Sub-models 3a and 3b). 
(J$bn) 
Sub-model 3a: Public 
" Utilisation (visits) 1,502,000 or Official data--The average for the period 1992-2003 was 
0.57 visits about 0.55 visits per capita. In 2001-03 the average was 0.57 
per capita visits. Projections from 2004-10 assume a slight rise to 0.6 
visits to reflect likely increased demand from the growing 
" Cost (J$bn) 1.4 Estimated: cost per visit times number of visits. Projections 
make a 1.5% adjustment to reflect the impact of the 
difference between medical and general inflation. 
Sub-model 3b: Private 
" Utilisation (visits) Specific data Broad estimates from the ASLC suggest that private 
not available ambulatory visits are 3-4 times the number of public visits. 
" Cost (J$bn) 4.2 Estimates from NHA data, ASLC and private insurance. 
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Inputs/Variables Baseline Assumptions/Projections 
Data (2002) 
4. Prescribed drugs 5.1 Calculations from official data and projections of public and 
(J$bn) private prescription drug costs (i. e. Sub-models 4a and 4b). 
Sub-model 4a: Public 
" Utilisation 1,896,000 or Official data: The average for the period 1992-2003 was 
(prescriptions filled) - 0.72 per about 0.6 prescriptions per capita. In 2001-03 the average 
capita was 0.7. Projections from 2004-10 assume a slight rise to 
0.75 prescriptions to reflect likely increased demand from 
the growing elderly population. 
" Cost (J$bn) 1.3 Estimated: Cost per prescription times number of 
prescriptions. Projections make a 1.5% adjustment to reflect 
the impact of the difference between medical and general 
inflation. 
Sub-model 4b: Private 
" Utilisation Specific data Broad estimates from the ASLC suggest that private 
(prescriptions filled) not available prescriptions filled are 3-4 times that in the public sector. 
" Cost (J$bn) 3.8 Estimates from NHA data, ASLC and private insurance. 
5. Prescribed diagnostic 1.8 Calculations from official data and projections of public and 
services (J$bn) private diagnostic services utilisation (i. e. Sub-models 5a 
and 5b). 
Sub-model 5a: Public 
" Utilisation (imaging 1,829,000 or Official data: The average for the period 1992-2003 was 
scans and laboratory -0.7 about 0.65 scans/laboratory tests per capita. In 2001-03 the 
tests) scans/tests average was 0.7. Projections from 2004-10 assume a slight 
per capita rise to 0.75 prescriptions to reflect likely increased demand 
from the growing elderly population. 
" Cost (J$bn) 0.7 Estimated: Cost per scan/test times number of scans/tests. 
Projections make a 1.5% adjustment to reflect the impact of 
the difference between medical and general inflation. 
Sub-model 4b: Private 
" Utilisation (imaging Specific data Broad estimates from the ASLC suggest that private scans- 
scans and laboratory not available tests are 1.5 to 2 times that in the public sector. 
tests) 
" Cost (J$bn) 1.1 Estimates from NIA data, ASLC and private insurance. 
6. Sub-model 6: 0.2 Estimates and projections from MOH data and private health 
Catastrophic Care insurance. 
Overseas (J$bn) 
7. Total cost/expenditure 21.2 Sum of costs In 1-6 above 
(J$bn) 
Source: Author's estimations 
iv) Outflows-Cost of Benefit Package and Administration: In addition to the direct 
costs incurred in covering the benefit package there are two other major expenditure 
items-administration and reserves. Administration covers the cost of administering the 
plan (staff, premises, equipment, etc) by insurers as well as by the regulatory agency. In 
addition, it is prudent to build up a pool of reserves (to ensure that sufficient funds are 
available to cover utilisation costs in case of contingencies such as delays in receiving 
contributions or unexpectedly high and short-term unemployment levels). Given the 
experience with compliance in Jamaica (estimated by the respective agencies at 40%-50% 
for income and corporate tax; 75% for General Consumption Tax; 80% for National 
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Housing Trust deductions and 68% for National Insurance contributions) it is assumed 
that reserves will be needed to cover about 2-3 months of utilisation costs. 
In the modelling, reserves are treated as part of the cost of administration and are built up 
over a period of time. In the case of the PT, the cost of administration is assumed to 
represent about 7.5% of the cost of benefits while in the GPP and SAP it is assumed as 
15%. The difference in the costs of administration is largely related to expectations of 
lower costs and economies of scale of a single insurer-payer managing the PT's 
operations as against competing insurers striving for membership and market shares in 
the GPP and SAP. This is a general finding by analysts and researchers on health 
insurance systems in DCs and ICs (Evans, 1986; Docteur and Oxley, 2003; Anderson and 
Hussey, 2004; Kwon, 2006). In Jamaica, competing insurers would mean greater roles for 
private insurance carriers whose operational and marketing costs alongside profitability 
expectations would most likely lead to greater upward pressures on administrative costs. 
Table 6.6 shows the calculated baseline expenditures and the basis for projecting these 
expenditures in respect of the costs of benefits, administration and reserves. 
Table 6.6 Baseline Magnitudes and Projections of 
Administration and Total Cost of NHIP Options, 2002-2010 
InputsNariables Baseline Data Assumptions/Projections 
(2002) 
1. Cost of benefit package PT: 21.2 Data from the 11 sub-models in Table 6.5 are used to 
($bn) GPP: 12.9 derive the cost of the benefit package for each option. 
SAP: 21.0 
2. Administration (% / $bn) PT: 7.5% / 1.59 The percentage represented by administrative costs 
GPP: 15% / 1.94 remains steady over the period for each option. 
SAP: 15% / 3.15 
3. Total cost of plan ($bn) PT: 22.79 This is the sum of the cost of the benefit package and 
GPP: 14.84 of administration/reserves. Changes over time reflect 
SAP: 24.15 changes in the above components. 
4. Average cost-payment per PT: 8,699 This varies over time according to movements in total 
member per annum ($) GPP: 5,664 cost and the size of the population. 
SAP: 9,218 
Source: Author's estimations. 
v) Inflows-Income and Other Revenue: As shown in Table 6.7, inflows represent 
payments and contributions needed for meeting the cost of each option. The key variables 
in this module are: 
" the expected wage/earnings base of the contributing population. This is 
determined by the magnitude of total insurable wages/earnings and level of 
compliance by contributors in meeting their due financial obligations; 
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" the extent of government payments for the indigent population; 
9 the amount of revenue targeted from contributors using payroll and other 
deductions as a percentage of earnings or as flat rate. The implications of sharing 
the deduction between employers and employees are discussed in Chapter 7; 
" amount targeted from copayments which are paid directly to providers. 
Table 6.7 Baseline Magnitudes and Projections of 
Income and Revenue for NHIP Options, 2002-2010 
Inputs/Variables Baseline Data Assumptions/Projections 
(2002) 
1. Total Insurable earnings 248.4 Official data. Same data as estimated in the module on 
or real wage base ($bn) labour Force and earnings. 
2. Compliance rate (%) 70 Official data. Estimate is based on compliance data 
from income tax and national insurance/social 
security departments. Their experience is used to 
estimate and project compliance at about 70% of due 
contributions. 
3. Expected income base 173.9 Official data. Changes in the expected income base 
($bn) over the period reflect changes in insurable earnings 
adjusted for compliance. 
4. Gov't payments for PT: 4.49 Official data. Estimates reflect changes in the per 
indigent population ($bn) GPP: 2.92 capita cost of services and administration in each 
SAP: 4.76 option (identified in the module on Total Cost). 
5. Copayments (% and $bn) PT: 5% / 1.14 
GPP: 10% / 1.48 
SAP: 15% / 3.62 
Baseline data and projections are assumed at 5%, 10% 
and 15% respectively over the period 2002-10. 
6. Required contributions PT: 17.17 This represents the contributions required after 
from Employed Labour GPP: 10.44 deducting government payments for indigent and 
Force-ELF ($bn) SAP: 15.77 copayments from the total cost-income needed for 
each option. Changes over the period reflect changes 
in these 3 variables. 
7. Total income ($bn) PT: 22.79 Same as the estimated cost of each option. 
GPP: 14.84 
SAP: 24.15 
Source: Author's estimations. 
6.5 Mapping of Mathematical Relations and Equations 
Based on the framework suggested by Cichon et al., (1999) the `critical indicator' linking 
the variables in the financial modelling of social health insurance schemes is the 
necessary pay as you go contribution rate (PAYGR) i. e. what percentage of the earnings 
of contributors will be deducted so that projected inflows (income) and outflows 
(expenditure) in the plan are equalised. This break-even rate seeks to ensure at best a 
balanced portfolio or at worst temporary cash flow deficits that are not large and 
persistent thus necessitating higher contribution rates or reduced benefits. This is one of 
-191- 
the key reasons for including an additional expenditure item in the form of reserves which 
can be drawn down during periods when actual income is less than expected. The reverse 
situation may be desirable, i. e., when surpluses accrue, but where profit making is not the 
fundamental objective of the plan contributors may press for a reduction in the 
contribution rate or an increase in benefits. 
In equation form: 
PAYGR (t) = 
[TE(t) - OY(t)] 
TAB (t) 
where, PAYGR = required pay as you go rate 
TE = total expenditure 
OY = other income i. e. copayments and Government's contribution for the poor. (In 
some cases other sources of income to the insurer may include investment and penalties 
for non-compliance. These are not considered in the modelling). 
TAB = total assessment base or sum of the earnings of the employed population, and 
t= refers to the year. 
On the inflows side, the main components will be: 
a) Contributions received from the working population: the amount received will be 
related to the size of the working (employed) population and the average level of 
earnings (which will establish the size of the assessment base) and the contribution 
rate. Adjustments will have to be made for compliance levels. 
CY(t)=TAB (t) * PAYGR(t) 
Where CY = total contribution income. 
b) Contribution from Government on behalf of the indigent: the amount will depend on 
the size of the indigent population and the percentage of the benefit cost incurred by 
the group that Government is prepared to pay (the alternative being to share this cost 
with the working population). 
IY(t) = IPOP(t) * PEP 
t 
Where IY = Government's subsidies for the indigent 
IPOP = size of the indigent population, and 
TE/POP = average cost of the plan to the beneficiary population. 
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c) Copayments: these are paid directly by patients and can be varied to achieve 
particular objectives such as to control cost and utilisation or to encourage 
consumption of certain services. They may be defined relative to all cost (i. e benefits 
and administration) or cost of benefits only. In the modelling, they are used as a 
source of income to help defray all cost. This means that a copayment rate of 5% of 
all cost would translate into a slightly higher rate if computed against cost of service 
benefits only. Since copayments can be fixed in absolute or percentage terms one of 
its consequences is to lower the contribution rate. 
CPY(t)= [TBE(t)+AE(t)] *p 
Where CPY= income from copayments 
TBE = total cost of the benefit package 
AE= cost of administration; 
And p =copayment rate. 
On the outflows or expenditure side, the main components will be: 
a) The cost of benefits: this figure will depend on items/services covered, the rates of 
utilisation by the beneficiary population and the average cost per item/service. 
TBE(t)= BE1(t) + BE2(t) +BE3(t) +....... BEn(t) 
Where BE1... n= cost of care services in categories 1... n eg. inpatient care, ambulatory 
care, drugs, diagnostic services 
b) The cost of administration: this covers recurrent and capital costs of the insurers as 
well as the regulatory agency. This is usually represented as a percentage of the cost 
of the benefit package. 
AE(t)=TBE(t)* a 
Where a= percentage of benefit cost allotted to administration. 
c) The cost of the reserves pool: the size of the pool depends on expectations with 
respect to cash flow and dealing with contingencies. A reserve pool covering 2-3 
months of expected expenditure is targeted to be built up over the medium term. For 
the modelling exercise, reserves are included as part of administrative cost. 
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6.6 Results of Modelling of Inflows and Outflows 
The sixth module, the results module, presents data on two of the critical outcome 
indicators of the modelling exercise i. e. the PAYG Rate representing the magnitude of the 
deduction from earnings, and the percentage of total cost to be borne by the government. 
Using the features of each option (PT, GPP and SAP) outlined in Table 6.1 as the point of 
departure, the simulation exercise estimated the expected changes in five key sets of 
variables (identified in 6.4 above i. e. economic and demographic, labour force and 
earnings, health utilisation and expenditure, administration and reserves, and income) 
over the period 2002-2010 (with 2002 serving as the base year). The detailed results of 
the financial modelling are contained at Appendix 6.1. 
A summary of the results focussing on expected total expenditure, the PAYG Rate and 
the percentage of total cost to be funded by the government in each option is presented in 
Table 6.8. 
Table 6.8 Summary of Simulation Estimates of NHI Options, 2002-2010 
Variables 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2010 
A. Prototype (PT) 
Total Cost ($bn) 22.79 23.33 23.87 24.40 24.83 25.26 26.88 
PAYG Rate (%) 9.9 9.9 9.5 9.5 9.5 9.6 9.7 
Government share in Total Cost (%) 29.5 29.1 28.2 28.2 28.3 28.2 28.3 
B. Green Paper (GPP) 
Total Cost ($bn) 14.84 15.07 15.41 15.76 16.10 16.33 17.37 
PAYG Rate (%) 6.0 6.0 5.7 5.7 5.8 5.8 5.9 
Government share in Total Cost (%) 28.8 28.3 27.7 27.7 27.7 27.7 27.7 
C. Stakeholders'Alternative (SAP) 
Total Cost ($bn) 24.15 24.73 25.3 25.88 26.34 26.90 28.49 
PAYG Rate (%) 9.1 9.2 8.7 8.7 8.8 8.8 8.9 
Government share in Total Cost (%) 28.2 27.7 27.2 27.2 27.2 27.1 27.2 
Source: Author's estimations. 
In terms of expected total cost: 
> the SAP shows the highest expected cost because, except for catastrophic care 
overseas, it offers a near comprehensive package of benefits. However, it has 
higher administrative costs (15%) because of its reliance on multiple private 
insurers and on fee for service claims processing and remuneration systems. The 
PT has the most comprehensive benefit package but has a lower administrative 
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cost (7.5%) reflecting the economies of scale of a single insurer-payer and a more 
tightly controlled global budgeting remuneration system. The GPP has the lowest 
cost because, even though it has an administrative cost of 15% reflecting the 
implications of multiple insurers-payers and fee for service remuneration systems, 
it offers a relatively limited benefit package. 
In terms of the PAYG Rate: 
¢ the PT has the highest PAYGR (averaging about 9.6%) because of its 
comprehensive benefit package and its relatively low level of copayments (5% of 
costs) which means that the majority of revenue needed to cover costs will be 
derived from payroll deductions (for formal sector workers) and other earnings- 
related deductions (for own account workers). The SAP's PAYGR averages about 
8.8% because of its near comprehensive benefit package and its relatively high 
level of copayments (15%) which serves to reduce the revenue requirement for 
earnings-related deductions. The PAYGR for the GPP averages about 5.8% 
largely because of its relatively limited benefit package. 
> It should be noted that the PAYGR is also affected by the magnitude of the 
payments made by the government on behalf of the indigent population. Since this 
percentage is not affected by the scope of the benefit package in each option, it 
does not play a critical role in the ranking of options according to PAYGR 
requirements. 
In terms of the percentage of funding to be borne by government: 
> since the size of the indigent population (whose costs including copayments will 
be met by government) is the same for each option, the key variables determining 
the percentage of total cost borne by the government are differences in the size of 
the benefit package and magnitude of copayments payable by government 
workers (about 11% of workforce). In the PT, the government's share of cost is 
estimated to be highest (average about 28.3%) because of its comprehensive 
package and relatively limited copayments (5%). In the GPP (average 27.7%) and 
PT (average 27.2%) the share of government funding is lower than in the PT 
largely due to differences in copayment rates (10% and 15% respectively). 
Government's share may be reduced depending on agreement with workers on 
sharing the contribution requirements. 
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It should be noted that the variability observed in the PAYGR and Government share of 
costs during the earlier period of the modelling, 2002-2004, is due largely to the effects of 
changes in the actual values of certain macro-variables - real GDP changes which 
affected the insurable wage/earnings base and expected earnings base after adjusting for 
compliance levels; changes in the estimates of the percentage of persons living below the 
poverty line; and in the distribution of the workforce. The implications of the PAYGR 
and government share of costs for current health spending patterns and affordability are 
discussed in Chapter 7. 
6.7 Scenario and Sensitivity Analyses 
To examine the implications of changes in the magnitudes of certain key variables on the 
robustness of the results, 2 types of analyses were conducted: 
(1) Scenario Analysis to consider the likely impact on the results indicators of 
changes in several key variables simultaneously. This was done through definition 
and examination of a `best case' and `worst case' scenario; and 
(2) Sensitivity Analysis to consider separately the likely impact on the results 
indicators of changes in specific variables. 
The key variables considered in the Scenario and Sensitivity Analyses are as follows: 
i) Changes in real GDP: This measures broadly the capacity of the economy to sustain 
an NHIP (or any health system) and it plays a major role in determining the magnitudes 
of a number of related variables used in the modelling, exercise. These include the levels 
of employment; the wage-earnings base; the real earnings per worker per annum; the 
economic dependency ratio and the percentage of persons living below the poverty line. 
The analysis examines the likely effects of real GDP growth rates of 2.5% and 0.5% as 
compared to the baseline estimate in the projections of 1.5%. 
ii) Employed Labour Force: This determines the number of workers whose wages- 
earnings will be directly affected as they share the costs of each NHIP. The size of the 
employed labour force determines the magnitude of the insurable wage-earnings base, the 
average wage-earnings per worker and the percentage of persons living in poverty. In the 
modelling, the scenario analysis considers the likely effects of an increase in the 
employed labour force to 90% and a decrease to 80% as compared to the results observed 
from using the baseline projection of 86%. 
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iii) Total wages-earnings as a percentage of GDP: This determines the insurable wage 
base and directly influences the magnitude of the contribution to be borne by each worker. 
The analysis considers the implications changes in the wage-earnings base to 70% of 
GDP in the `best case' and 62% in the `worst case' when compared to the effects of the 
baseline projection of 68% 
iv) Compliance Rate: At best, this requires that all contributions are paid in full at the 
prescribed intervals. Despite the threat of legal and financial penalties, non-compliance 
has been a major area of concern for the respective agencies collecting statutory 
deductions in Jamaica i. e. income and General Consumption Tax, contributions to the 
National Insurance Scheme and the National Housing Trust. The Tax authorities estimate 
that the level of compliance for personal and corporate income tax is about 40% to 50% 
with major problems encountered in collections from the self-employed and with 
receiving timely returns from employers who are responsible for deducting and 
transmitting payments on behalf of employees. For General Consumption Tax, the 
estimated level of compliance is about 75%. In the case of the NIS, the majority of 
contributors are employees/employers in the formal sector and the estimated level of 
compliance is about 68%. The NHT. has a better record of compliance with the level 
reaching about 80%. 
The NHIP is not expected to be immune from the general problems with compliance 
especially with respect to collections from the self-employed (and to a lesser extent with 
timely returns from employers and even the Government). The baseline model assumes 
an overall compliance rate of 70%. The financial viability of the NHIP will be tested 
using two different levels of compliance -an increase to 80% in the `best case' scenario 
and a decrease to 65% in the `worst case'. 
v) Moral Hazard: This includes a range of influences on the pattern and magnitude of 
likely demand and cost of services such as utilisation changes with universal access to 
health services, the behavior of providers, the mode of reimbursement and changes in the 
supply of services. The simulation exercise tracks the likely impact on the PAYGR and 
government share of costs in each option of a 10% increase in utilisation and costs due to 
moral hazard. 
vi) Administrative Cost: The baseline data assumes steady state administrative cost of 
7.5% in the PT and 15% in the GPP and SAP. This is generally higher than what obtains 
in most Developed Countries (Cichon et al., 1999; Saltman et al., 2004). It is also lower 
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than the 20%-30% which private health insurers in Jamaica indicate that they are carrying. 
One of the key issues in Jamaica is the relative cost of reaching and collecting 
contributions from the large informal sector and even within the formal sector the large 
group of own account workers (about 34% of the employed labour force). Another key 
issue is the cost of the claims process since the majority of health providers are not on- 
line (in terms of computerised information systems). 
There are also cost implications of having a choice of insurers as against a single insurer 
and of establishing a new regulatory institution as against utilising the existing Office of 
the Superintendent of Insurance (with extended jurisdiction). 
The likely impact of these factors is considered as part of the administrative costs in each 
option. The analysis examines the implications for the results indicators of decreases in 
administrative costs to 5% for the PT; 10% for the GPP and SAP as well as increases to 
10% and 20% respectively. 
vii) Level of Indigence: Changes in the rates of employment and unemployment have 
direct implications for the level of indigence and the magnitude of contributions required 
from government to secure the membership and benefits of the poor in each NHIP option. 
The baseline projections assume an indigency rate of 20% of the population. In the 
analysis, this is varied to 15% in the `best case' scenario and 24% in the `worst case' 
scenario to examine the likely impact on the results indicators. 
viii) Copayments: These can be used for several purposes such as sharing the costs of 
services, deterring unnecessary demand, reducing the contribution rate and ensuring a 
certain amount of readily available funds to the providers. The impact of variations in the 
percentage copayments will be reflected in variations in the PAYGR and government 
share of costs. The baseline projections assume copayments of 5% in the PT; 10% in the 
GPP and 15% in the SAP. These are varied to examine the likely effects of an increase in 
copayments to 10% in the PT; 15% in the GPP and 20% in the SAP. 
Except for changes in copayments, the Scenario Analysis combined all the other key 
variables into 2 clusters reflective of the `best case' and `worst case' for each NHIP 
option. The combinations and results when compared to the baseline values are shown in 
Table 6.9. 
The results indicators show that in the `best case', the total cost is expected to decline and 
PAYGR is likely to be reduced to 8.2%; 4.9% and 7.5% for the PT, GPP and SAP 
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respectively compared to the 9.6%; 5.8% and 8.8% in the baseline scenario. On the other 
hand, these indicators would be negatively affected by the changes assumed in the `worst 
case scenario' and, with a general increase in total cost, would rise to 12.4%; 7.6% and 
11.5% respectively. 
In terms of the government's share of total costs, the analysis shows that in the `best case' 
scenario, this share may be reduced to 23.8% in the PT; 23.2% in the GPP and 22.7% in 
the SAP while in the `worst case' the share would be increased to 31.8%; 31.3% and 
30.7% respectively. 
Table 6.9 Variables Used and results in Scenario Analysis 
VARIABLES BASELINE BEST CASE WORST CASE 
Real GDP growth per annum 1.5 2.5 0.5 
(%) 
Employed Labour Force as % 86 90 80 
Actual Labour Force 
Total wages-earnings as % 68 70 62 
GDP 
Compliance rate (%) 70 80 65 
Moral hazard effect: utilisation Utilisation grows in line Utilisation and cost Utilisation and cost 
and cost of package population adjusted for same as baseline increase by 10% 
growth of elderly population 
Administrative cost as % PT: 7.5% PT: 5% PT: 10% 
benefit GPP: 15% GPP: 10% GPP: 20% 
SAP: 15% SAP: 10% SAP: 20% 
% Persons living below 20 15 24 
poverty line 
RESULTS 
PAYG Rate (%) PT: 9.6 PT: 8.2 PT: 12.4 
GPP: 5.8 GPP: 4.9 GPP: 7.6 
SAP: 8.8 SAP: 7.5 SAP: 11.5 
Government Share of Total PT: 28.3 PT: 23.8 PT: 31.8 
Cost (%) GPP: 27.7 GPP: 23.2 GPP: 31.3 
SAP: 27.2 SAP: 22.7 SAP: 30.7 
Source: Author's estimations 
The Sensitivity Analysis seeks to narrow down the range of influences on the results 
indicators to consider the impact of selected individual variables-the compliance rate; 
the level of indigence; moral hazard and cost of the benefit packages and the level of 
copayments. The impact of these changes is shown in Table 6.10. 
Generally, the results indicators are quite sensitive to changes in the selected variables. 
Using a rough `elasticity' measure to estimate the percentage change in the results 
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indicators in relation to the percentage change in the select variables, it appears that the 
compliance rate is perhaps the most critical variable in terms of its impact on the PAYGR, 
and the indigence rate on government's share of cost. 
Table 6.10 Sensitivity Analysis: Implications of Changes in Select Variables 
Variables Indicators PT GPP SAP Comments 
PAYGR (%) 9.6 5.8 8.8 Baseline estimates from Table 6.3 
Baseline 
Gov't cost share (%) 28.3 27.7 27.2 Baseline estimates from Table 6.3 
Reduction: higher compliance levels 
PAYGR (%) 7.9 4.8 7.3 are reflected in higher expected 
1. Compliance: income-earnings base and reduced 
increase from PAYGR in all options. Elasticity= 1.2 
70% to 80% Unchanged: since only the expected 
Gov't cost share (%) 28.3 27.7 27.2 earnings base will be affected not the 
distribution of cost shares. 
Reduction of the PAYGR comes about 
PAYGR (%) 9.0 5.4 8.3 because a larger share of the cost of 
2. Indigent insuring the population falls on the 
population: government. Elasticity=0.3 
increase from Increase: Government will be faced 20% to 24% 
Gov't cost share (%) 31.8 31.3 30.7 with a 
larger burden of cost with an 
increased level of indigency. 
Elasticity=0.65 
Increase: higher levels of utilisation 
3. Moral hazard: PAYGR (%) 10.5 6.3 9.7 and cost will lead to an increase in the 
utilisation and PAYGR. Elasticity=0.9 
cost increase by 
° Unchanged: the costs borne by 10% Gov't cost share (%) 28.3 27.7 27.2 government also shift by 10% so that 
its overall share is the same. 
Decrease: higher copayments / out of 
4. Copayments: PAYGR (%) 8.9 5.3 8.1 pocket payments reduce the burden on 
increase from payroll deductions so the PAYGR 
5%, 10% and declines. Elasticity=0.1 to 0.3 
15% to 10%, 
15% and 
10%, 
Decrease: as above, the higher the 
level of copayments the lower will be resp. for PT, Gov't cost share (%) 27.7 27.1 26.6 the burden on government in sharing GPP, SAP 
the total cost of each option. 
Elasticity=<0.1 
Source: Author's estimations 
6.8 Summary of Findings 
This Chapter dealt with the financial modelling aspects of the study and sought to specify 
and quantify the likely financial implications of the proposed NHI options over the period 
2002-2010. It defined the main features of each option, identified and discussed the key 
assumptions and specified the data modules for derivation of the component and total 
costs. From these estimates, the financing needs for each option were derived through a 
-200- 
combination of necessary pay as you go rate (PAYGR) relating to contributions from the 
working population and allocations from government to cover the contribution 
requirements of designated groups in the population. 
Differences in the components of the benefit package, administrative arrangements 
(single vs. multiple insurers-payers) and levels of copayments heavily influenced the 
magnitude of expected cost in each option. This was borne out in the detailed estimates 
following a process of specification of key variables, assumptions and estimation 
equations and articulation of these through the six main data modules over the period: 
" economic and demographic; 
" labour force and earnings; 
" health services utilisation and expenditure; 
" cost of benefits and administration; 
" contribution revenue and other income; 
" necessary PAYGR and contribution share of government. 
Overall, it was estimated that, in the baseline scenario, financing the PT would require a 
PAYGR of about 9.6%; the GPP 5.8% and the SAP 8.9%. In each option it was expected 
that the PAYGR would have to be supported by allocations from government averaging 
about 28% of total cost (with some variability among options depending on the rate of 
copayments and the actual magnitude paid by government workers). Government's share 
of total cost may be less depending on agreement with workers on dividing the 
contribution requirements. 
Scenario ('best' and `worst' cases) and sensitivity analyses were also conducted to 
consider the likely impact of changes in the magnitudes of key variables such as growth 
of GDP; levels of employment; rate of compliance in paying contributions; moral hazard 
in utilisation; administrative costs; levels of poverty and levels of copayments. Generally, 
the results showed that (using an `elasticity' measure) the most critical variable affecting 
the PAYGR was the compliance rate while the level of poverty had the largest impact on 
the share of government's contribution obligations. 
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CHAPTER 7: EVALUATION OF FINDINGS FROM FINANCIAL MODELLING 
7.1 Purpose of Analysis 
The approach to, baseline assumptions, analyses and results of the financial modelling 
presented in Chapter 6 provided vital data on the components, cost and contribution 
requirements of the NHI options. Additionally, the scenario and sensitivity analyses 
explored further the likely impact of key variables and the robustness of the findings. 
However, while this is a necessary initial step i. e. estimation and specification of the main 
quantitative aspects of the design of NHI, it is not sufficient for policy decision-making. 
More rigorous analysis is required to `go behind the numbers' and assess the financial 
estimates against key policy objectives as well as the overall feasibility and acceptability 
of the options (Grindle and Thomas, 1991; Ham and Hill, 1993; Walt, 1994; Cichon et al., 
1999; Gilson et al., 1999). 
This Chapter focuses on evaluating the broader policy aspects of the findings of the 
financial modelling. The purpose is to derive what may be termed the `most preferred 
option' for Jamaica through an assessment of the likely implications of each option 
against a select list of design criteria reflecting key policy concerns on health financing 
systems and on NHI. In this respect, the choice of evaluation criteria is critical since the 
options are being assessed in an ex ante manner. As discussed in Chapter 3, the actual 
criteria that were chosen related to best practices emerging from the international 
literature review that were considered to be appropriate for Jamaica given its health 
financing concerns, the expressed positions of stakeholders as well as the goals and 
objectives in the Government's GPP. 
The evaluation and discussion of the findings in this Chapter are organised as follows: 
> Firstly, it will examine the likely implications for households, business (including 
health insurance carriers), government and the health system (in particular public 
and private health service providers) arising from each option; 
> Secondly, it will review the dimensions of the key criteria, the weighting approach 
and scoring method that were used. It will then apply the criteria to each option 
and assess shortcomings or merits in a comparative framework with a view to 
developing some form of ranking of options - this will then be aggregated to 
derive a preferred option; 
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> Thirdly, it will discuss some of the key supportive developments and institutional 
arrangements, some of which may involve additional expenditure, which must be 
implemented for each option to work well; 
¢ Fourthly, it will briefly discuss the methodology and outcome of the evaluation 
with particular attention to the preferred option in the light of the theory and 
international evidence on national health insurance systems. 
7.2 Likely Implications of NHI Options 
Each NHI option has major implications for direct payers and contributors-the 
government, employers and workers and households. For each group, despite mixed 
reactions of support or opposition or wait-and-see, issues of affordability loomed large 
especially in a context of constrained national and household resources. In addition, there 
will be implications for public and private providers to relate to a new purchasing 
agency(ies) armed with significant bargaining power. Some of the key issues for each 
specific group are discussed below. 
a) Implications for Government 
In a context where the total health spending of the Government was about J$21 billion in 
2006 or 5% of total government expenditure, there are three key inter-related concerns 
which would arise from implementing any NHI option. The first relates to affordability at 
the macro (national economy) level; the second to the control mechanisms to manage 
expenditure given that a major lever in the hands of government i. e. the budget allocation 
to health would be largely out of its hands; and the third the loss of policy control over 
user fees in public facilities. 
At the macro level the NHI was being considered at a time when the overall economic 
difficulties were persisting and when, despite more than 6% of the GDP being spent on 
health services in 2006, a number of health needs were not being met and the health 
sector was `underfunded'. With an NHI it was expected that there would be an initial 
upward shift in overall resources to the health sector. In a fiscally constrained 
environment, this may be interpreted (and actually was by some especially in the MOF) 
as making the health sector more costly and a net transfer of resources from other sectors. 
On the other hand, it could be seen (and actually was by some others especially in the 
MOH and associations of health professionals) as more earmarked financing for health 
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thus enabling the provision of more and better services to the population. The direct cost 
to the Government would be: 
> to provide adequate funds for paying its share of the contribution requirements of 
its workers (estimated at 11%-13% of the employed labour force in the modeling); 
> to provide adequate funds for full payment of the contributions of the indigent 
(estimated at 20% of the population in the modeling); 
> to provide funds to cover those services in the public health system which are 
excluded from the NHI benefit package (such as MOH Head Office expenses, 
public health/environmental health activities; regulations; research and training as 
well as ambulatory care in public facilities in the case of the GPP); 
> to provide funds or guarantees for the start-up capital-this could be in the form 
of loans that could be repaid from NHI funds over time. 
In terms of affordability to government, the data from the financial modeling suggest that 
government's cost share in the near-comprehensive packages of the PT and SAP options 
and in the narrower package of the GPP option would be about 28%. Expenditure by 
government to cover non-NHI services would be considerably reduced so that its total 
outlay on all health services may be about 35%-40%. This is significantly less than its 
current expenditure in the health sector which, based on national health accounts data in 
Table 4.4 of Chapter 4, indicated that government was responsible for about 56% of 
national health expenditure in 2006. It also gives support to some who view an NHI as a 
means to reduce government's expenditure in health. This means that the implication of 
affordability and finding new money for NHI may be of greater concern to direct 
contributors (workers and businesses) than to the budget officials in the Ministry of 
Finance. For the latter group, the concerns over affordability would have shifted to the 
likelihood of increased inflation if businesses transferred the majority of contribution 
costs to consumers and of decreased employment if businesses are unable or unwilling to 
meet (share in) the contribution costs on behalf of workers. 
The second major implication is in relation to cost control. NHI takes a large measure of 
financial control in health out of the hands of government. It `locks in' government to 
committed, timely and predictable spending through contributions on behalf of its 
workers and the indigent - this is quite unlike traditional budgetary allocations to health 
which are more firmly within its control and could be increased or decreased as resources 
and priorities dictated. Financial and cost control would now become the function of 
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insurer(s) and contracted health providers whose interests and priorities would (logically) 
not always match those of government. Guidelines would be needed from Government to 
ensure the establishment and implementation of cost-control measures while leaving 
adequate flexibility and discretion to the insurer(s) to manage the business of NHI. Cost- 
control measures could take several forms such as limits on the contents of the package, 
adoption of rational drug use principles, preference for global budgets and capitation as 
the modes of reimbursement for providers, intensive utilisation reviews, a system of 
penalties on errant insurers and varying the level of copayments. 
The third implication relates to loss of policy control over the design, dimensions and 
implementation of user fees in public health facilities. For consistency, this would need to 
be more directly aligned to the copayment provisions and arrangements in each option so 
that public and private providers operate with broadly similar rules. Compared to user fee 
collections of about 10% of MOH budget and 11% of RHAs budget in 2006/7, the 
assumptions and estimates of copayments suggest that collections would most likely be 
less the 2006/7 percentages in the GPP and PT and more in the case of the SAP. 
b) Implications for Employers and the Business Community 
While the financial modeling estimated total contributions from the employed labour 
force, it did not make any specific assumptions on the sharing of compulsory deductions 
for NHI between employers and employees. However, following the provisions for 
current statutory deductions in the NIS (shared 50: 50) and NHT and Education Tax 
(shared 40: 60 between employees and employers), it is expected that employers (after 
negotiations) may have to meet around 50% or more of the contribution requirement. (In 
the case of own account operators, this is expected to be 100%). Business theory suggests 
that sharing of NHI deductions by employers will increase cost of labour and final 
product, reduce. competitiveness, decrease sales and net income and lead to a decline in 
profitability. So, in addition to legal commitments to share contributions on behalf of 
workers, businesses may have to do so with diminished profits in the short term. Given 
the existing burden of statutory deductions for corporate tax and other social levies 
amounting to about 44% of earnings (discussed in Chapter 4), any new shared deduction 
for NHI purposes would be of major concern to employers. 
This scenario however is more fluid and varied since the magnitude of changes in 
profitability would depend on the position of firms in the marketplace, their ability to pass 
on costs to consumers, the reaction of employees in terms of productivity levels as well as 
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the ability of and decisions by several business firms in substituting higher cost current 
private health insurance packages for workers with lower cost NHI packages. For some 
small businesses with low profit margins and flexible workforce arrangements, 
compulsory shared deductions may lead to reduction in employment, even lower 
profitability and even closure. On the other hand, for many without private health plans 
for their workers, mandatory NHI could serve to replace the unplanned but ever-present 
financial demands placed on them by several employees for `salary advances' to assist in 
meeting health bills. 
As discussed in Chapter 5, for existing private insurers, each NHI option may be 
construed as an opportunity or threat depending on the role (or not) assigned to them. At 
best, business opportunities could be seen as expanding significantly in the case of the 
GPP and SAP which provide for choice of insurers. At worst, their business could be 
curtailed significantly under the PT which provides for a single insurer leaving them to 
offer largely `wrap-around' supplementary or complementary benefit packages to their 
clientele (and full duplicate and/or `deluxe' packages according to the preferences of 
some of their high-income subscribers). 
c) Implications for Workers and Households 
There would be mixed implications in each option for workers and households in terms of 
the quantum and sharing of contributions and of copayments. For some the contribution 
(through PAYGR which varied from about 5.8% in the GPP to 9.6% in the PT), whether 
shared or not, could be seen as a burden if they already had private health insurance and 
did not wish to curtail or terminate their coverage or if they did not think they needed 
health insurance because care was available at zero or low cost in the public sector. More 
particularly, workers in the formal sector already confronted with several deductions from 
their earnings (for income tax and education, housing, national insurance deductions) 
would be anxious to know whether there were any implications of this additional 
contribution on the employment considerations of their employers. 
On the other hand, NHI would be readily accepted by workers and their dependents who 
sought but were denied health insurance by private insurers as well as by those with 
private insurance premium rates that were higher than the amounts required in the 
PAYGR. (In 2000, it was estimated that the average premium for a basic medical plan 
was about 12% of average wage and of a major medical plan about 15%). For some 
others also, the principal attraction of an NHI would be that, with insurance cover, there 
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would be more choice of health provider especially in terms of seeking care in the private 
sector rather than being restricted to publicly provided services only. 
On copayments, the implications for households would vary. Some with private insurance 
plans, would compare likely copayments in each option with similar payments in their 
plans; others would compare copayments to the levels of out of pocket payments for 
health services-this amounted to about 2.5% of average household expenditure 
(STATIN and PIOJ Survey of Living Conditions). On the other hand, for some benefiting 
from user fee exemptions in the public health sector, copayments provisions may lead to 
loss of their exempt status. 
d) Implications for Health Service Providers 
Each NHI option would bring noticeable changes in the marketplace with public and 
private service providers having to compete more directly for patients and funds. In this 
`money follows the patient' system, public providers would be newcomers since the 
majority of their funds have traditionally been derived from government allocations rather 
than payment for services from patients. Their experience with user fees suggest that they 
would need to make major changes in their administrative systems, business methods and 
`culture' (eg. admissions, billing, transmitting claims) if they are to operate successfully 
in an NHI environment. These changes are critical given the propensity of insured 
patients to seek more private services 
7.3 Review and Results of Application of Evaluative Criteria 
Each NHI option has been specified in a manner that addresses the core questions faced 
by a health financing system. As indicated in Table 3.2 (Chapter 3), these core issues 
have been used to specify the design and assumptions related to each option. In addition, 
they have been used to develop the list of evaluative criteria and indicators drawing on 
`best practices' emerging from the literature, from the views of stakeholders in Jamaica 
when posed with the particular question on what criteria they would use to evaluate the 
feasibility of an NHI plan (reported in Section 6.5 of Chapter 6) and from the results of 
the financial modelling. Table 7.1 summarises the mix of criteria and indicators to be 
used in the evaluation. 
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Table 7.1 Summary of Evaluative Criteria and Indicators 
CRITERIA INDICATORS 
1. Breadth of coverage a) % population eligible for membership at outset 
2. Risk pooling a) Single risk pool 
3. Depth of benefit package a) Comprehensive non-catastrophic benefits 
b) Inclusion of catastrophic care 
4. Equity in financing a) % earnings vs. flat rate contribution 
b) % copayment vs. prepayment 
c) Subsidies by government for the poor 
5. Efficiency a) % cost of administration 
b) Use of capitation and global budget to pay providers 
6. Revenue generation a) Net revenue 
7. PAYGR a) % deduction from earnings 
8. Contribution share by government a) % total cost borne by government 
Source: Author's compilation 
The overall ranking of NHI options emerges from the scoring method that is used in 
relation to the indicators and criteria. The evaluation was conducted using unweighted 
and weighted values with the former using equal weights for each criterion and the latter 
using weights for three criteria reflecting the importance assigned to them by key 
stakeholders. "Two rounds of scoring were used: 
i) in the unweighted approach, each criterion was `equally weighted' and the scoring 
was based on assessing and ranking each of the three options on whether it could 
be placed as performing first, second or third in relation to each criterion and 
indicator. The sum of the placements was used to determine the overall rank of the 
option. With 8 criteria and 12 associated indicators, this meant that best likely 
attainable score was 12. 
ii) in the weighted approach, net revenue, equity and efficiency were viewed by 
stakeholders as the most important criteria and given a similar weighting of 3. The 
other criteria receiving a weighting of 1. As in the unweighted method (above), 
the ranking of options according to each criteria i. e. first, second or third was 
applied so the combination of the placement score and weight determined the 
overall score and rank of the options. With weighting of the above three criteria 
(and the same 12 associated indicators), the best likely attainable score was 24. 
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The results of the ranking are shown in Tables 7.2 (unweighted) and 7.3 (weighted). In 
relation to Table 7.2 and unweighted values: 
a) Breadth of coverage: each option receives a score of 1 since each proposes 
universal eligibility and coverage; 
b) Risk pooling: the PT scores better than the GPP and SAP (both of which involve 
multiple pools) because it places the eligible population in a single pool (more 
solidarity, no segmentation or adverse selection or cherry picking); 
c) Depth of package: the PT scores better because of its comprehensive coverage and 
inclusion of catastrophic benefits. The GPP scores better than the SAP because of 
its inclusion of catastrophic coverage but scores less than the SAP because of its 
limited benefit package. 
d) Equity in financing: the PT scores better than the other 2 options because it 
proposes contributions as a percentage of earnings hence `proportionality' as 
against the GPP and PT which propose flat rate payments irrespective of earnings. 
Also copayments in the PT are lower (5%) showing its greater emphasis on pre- 
payment rather than point of sale payment. Because subsidies for the poor are 
common in all 3 options, the score was similar. 
e) Efficiency: the PT scores better due to its lower administrative costs (7.5%) and 
use of capitation and global budgets as payment mechanisms. Despite having the 
same level of administrative costs and fee for service reimbursements, the GPP 
scores slightly better than the PT because its payments systems propose to use 
rates derived from costing publicly provided services rather than the PT which 
relies on usual customary and reasonable rates in the private sector. 
f) Net revenue: the PT will need to generate more revenue than the other two. But, 
its administrative cost is expected to be lower so the net revenue figure is larger. 
g). PAYGR: this was derived from the financial modelling. In terms of magnitude, 
more (9.6%) will be expected from contributors for the PT than for the GPP (5.85) 
or SAP (8.8%). 
h) Share of government contribution: in terms of magnitude, the PT scored less than 
the other 2 because the share of government is estimated to be the highest (28.3%) 
largely due to the lower levels of copayments by members. 
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Overall, using unweighted values, the PT received the lowest score (16) hence was 
ranked the highest followed by the GPP (22) and SAP (23). 
Table 7.2 Results of Application of Evaluative Criteria and Ranking of NHI Options 
(Unweighted Values) 
ia / Indicators it C 
NHI OPTIONS 
er r 
GPP SAP PT 
1. Breadth of coverage 1 1 1 
a) % population eligible for membership at outset Universal: 1 Universal: 1 Universal: 1 
2. Risk pooling 2 2 1 
a) Single risk pool Segmented: 2 Segmented: 2 Single: 1 
3. Depth of benefit package 4 4 2 
a) Comprehensive Limited: 3 Broad: 2 Comprehensive: 1 
b) Inclusion of catastrophic care Yes: 1 No: 2 Yes: 1 
4. Equity in financing 5 6 3 
a) % earnings vs. flat rate Flat rate: 2 Flat rate: 2 % earnings: 1 
b) % copayment-prepayment 10%: 2 15%: 3 5%: 1 
c) Subsidies for poor Yes: I Yes: 1 Yes: 1 
5. Efficiency 4 5 2 
a) % cost of administration 15%: 2 15%: 2 7.5%: 1 
b) Use of capitation and global budget FFS at public 
rates: 2 
FFS at UCR 
rates: 3 
Capitation and 
global budget: 1 
6. Revenue generation 3 2 1 
a) Net revenue 85%: 3 85%: 2 92.5%: 1 
7. PAYGR 5.8%: 1 8.8%: 2 9.6%: 3 
8. % share of contribution by government 27.7%: 2 27.2%: 1 28.3%: 3 
OVERALL SCORE 22 23 16 
RANK 2nd 3rd 1st 
source: Autnors estimations 
In relation to Table 7.3 and weighted values: 
a) the scores derived from applying the following criteria remained unchanged 
because their weighting did not change - breadth of coverage, risk pooling, depth 
of benefit package, PAYGR and contribution share of government. 
b) for equity, efficiency and net revenue generation, the scores diverged significantly 
because of the weighting applied. However, the PT still received the best scores 
on each of these criteria because of its design features. 
Overall, the application of weights to reflect stakeholder views did not affect the overall 
ranking of the options. The PT with an overall score of 28 still emerged as the best option 
followed by the GPP (46) and SAP (49). 
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Table 7.3 Results of Application of Evaluative Criteria and Ranking of NHI Options 
(Weighted Values) 
NHI OPTIONS 
Criteria / Indicators 
GPP SAP PT 
1. Breadth of coverage (1) 1=1 (1) 1=1 (1) 1 =1 
a) % population eligible for membership at outset 1 1 1 
2. Risk pooling (1) 2=2 (1) 2=2 (1) 1 =1 
a) Single risk pool 2 2 1 
3. Depth of benefit package (1) 4 =4 (1) 4=4 (1) 2=2 
a) Comprehensive 3 2 1 
b) Inclusion of catastrophic care 1 2 1 
4. Equity in financing (3) 5 =15 (3) 6 =18 (3) =9 
a) % earnings vs. flat rate 2 2 1 
b) % copayment-prepayment 2 3 1 
c) Subsidies for poor 1 1 1 
5. Efficiency (3) 4 =12 (3) 5 =15 (3) 2=6 
a) % cost of administration 2 2 1 
b) Use of capitation and global budget 2 3 1 
6. Revenue generation (3) 3=9 (3) 2=6 (3) 1= 3 
a) Net revenue 3 2 1 
7. PAYGR 1=1 2=2 3 =3 
8. % share of contribution by government 2=2 1=1 3=3 
OVERALL SCORE 46 49 28 
RANK 2nd 3rd Ist 
Source: Author's estimations 
7.4 Supportive Developments and Institutional Arrangements 
In addition to feasibility questions that may be answered by the financial modeling, the 
three NHI options would require supportive complementary actions by other agencies and 
institutions as well as specific new arrangements for their functioning. Some of these 
emerged from the views expressed by stakeholders and others have been identified from 
the literature review (Ron, 1994; Roemer, 1993; Normand and Weber, 1994; Eichler, 
1999). Given the specific context in Jamaica in relation to institutions and systems, there 
are five key areas requiring concerted action: identification and registration of the poor; 
joint programs for improvements in collection and compliance in relation to statutory 
obligations; enhancement of the regulatory framework for health services and quality 
control by the Ministry of Health; visible improvements in the availability and quality of 
services in the public sector; and development of an appropriate information technology 
systems for managing NHI. 
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a) Identification and registration of poor: Each NHI option has proposals for 
including the poor as members with the government meeting their share of 
contributions. However, the tasks of identification, registration, monitoring and 
maintaining updated lists of persons below-the poverty line are expected to be 
handled by the existing institutions using their methods, systems and personnel. 
As discussed in Chapter 4, the Ministry of Labour and Social Security largely 
through its PATH activities is the primary public agency with responsibility for 
identification and registration of the poor. However, it has been estimated that 
only about two-thirds of those who were deemed to be poor according to national 
surveys by STATIN and PIOJ, were registered by the PATH authorities (PIOJ, 
2007). In addition, it was estimated that many persons deemed to be the `working 
poor' (whose earnings placed them below the poverty line) were not being 
counted because of their employment status. The major gaps in the institutional 
capacity, methods and systems would need to be frontally tackled to ensure 
inclusion of the poor and for enhancing the feasibility of implementation of the 
NHI options. 
b) Improved collection and compliance systems: According to estimates shown in 
Chapter 4, efficiency in collection of current statutory deductions by public 
agencies was just over 60%. Even private health insurance companies, despite 
their strong commercial interests and focus mainly on formal sector workers, have 
shown significant shortfalls in their collection of premiums (discussions with 
Supervisor of Insurance, 2001). In such an environment, especially with a high 
proportion of informal sector activities, the insurer(s) in the NHI options, in 
collaboration with other statutory collection bodies such as Inland Revenue 
Department, General Consumption Tax Office and National Insurance Scheme, 
would have to implement major nationwide programmes of capacity strengthening, 
public education and penalties to enhance collection and compliance. 
c) Regulatory framework and quality control by MOH: Reliance on the systems and 
capabilities of the MOH for standards and regulations in relation to health 
professionals, health facilities and health services provided in the public and 
private sectors is a common featureof all NHI options. The actual performance of 
the Ministry has been quite weak in this regard (KPMG Consulting, 1998; DAH 
Consulting Inc, 2004). The demand for improved quality driven by more effective 
regulations in both sectors is expected to intensify as contributors and patients 
make a direct link between mandatory payments and health services. In this 
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respect, significant investment and changes will be required in the MOH's 
regulatory capacity for meeting the legitimate expectations of members in NHI. 
d) Availability and quality of publicly provided health services: One of the primary 
reasons cited by stakeholders for an NHI was the financial constraint facing the 
public health system and its negative effects in terms on the availability and 
quality of services. Despite some successes of the Health Reform Programme 
(DAH Consulting Inc, 2004), the general perception from stakeholders was that 
major improvements were still needed in publicly delivered health services to 
ensure personnel and services were available when needed by patients. The 
emphasis placed on choice of health providers in each NHI option and the 
implications of efficient purchasing by the insurer(s) would require public health 
facilities to compete with their private counterparts for patients in a system where 
`money follows the patient'. Evidence of their lack of preparedness to respond and 
compete may be drawn from the operations of the National Health Fund where 
private pharmacies account for more than 90% of the claims and payments for 
drugs purchased by members (Lalta and Barrett, 2004; Annual Reports of 
National Health Fund, 2005-2007). 
e) Information Technology Systems: For a national programme involving about 2.7 
million persons, each NHI option will require significant investment in IT systems 
and technologies to effectively manage the business of health insurance. This 
investment will involve much more than scaling up or adding extra facilities to 
those in private health insurance companies since key issues of national 
connectivity, economies of scale and confidentiality of information would need to 
be addressed collectively rather than separately by each insurer. Areas requiring 
joint decisions include unique membership identification cards, systems for claims 
adjudication, processing and payments as well as for reviews of treatment, 
prescribing and utilization. 
7.5 Discussion of Methodology and Outcome of Evaluation 
The methodology of using ranked positions to calibrate and score performance was 
applied primarily because of its simplicity and efficiency in application and because of 
the difficulties of trying to assign values in a continuum such as a Likert scale as to what 
constitutes `good' `fair' or `poor" performance. In addition, in an ex ante evaluation, the 
features and components are established by design with clear assumptions and specified 
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parameters. This meant that the task is more one of comparing designs rather than the 
uncontrolled variabilities associated with actual performance in implementation. 
Given the above, the PT emerged as the preferred option since the benefit package was 
broader (thus taking on board one of the major concerns of stakeholders), the 
arrangements for pooling (in a single agency) emphasised solidarity and cross-subsidy as 
well as limited administrative costs, its contribution rate was proportional rather than 
regressive and percentage co-payments were smaller. On the other hand, the size of its 
benefit package was larger-this required a greater financial effort from contributors and 
government. 
Overall, the GPP (with its smaller copayment, benefit package and related PAYGR) 
ranked second but this was based on scores that were only slightly higher than for the 
SAP. As such, it may be fair to say that attractive features such as the broader benefit 
package in the SAP were counterbalanced by less equity in financing and efficiency in 
paying service providers. 
The PT, by design, as the preferred option may be seen as closer to the international best 
practice model than the other options in most aspects (benefit package covering most core 
and selected catastrophic health needs providing financial protection; contributions based 
on ability to pay; limited copayments). The one key area where it may be contentious is in 
terms of its administrative framework using a single agency. However, international 
theory and practice seems to be quite divergent and ambiguous on this since some value 
choice and competition among agencies e. g. Germany, Netherlands, Colombia while 
others prefer consolidation e. g. Taiwan, South Korea, Costa Rica. In the case of Jamaica, 
its small population size may be said to be a critical limiting factor to efficient risk 
pooling among competing insurers. As such, efficiency of pooling and economies of scale 
in administration are more likely in a single agency. 
The emergence of a preferred option through design and financial modelling applications 
is a necessary but not sufficient basis for decision making and implementation success. 
There are other macroeconomic, social and political considerations that enter the decision 
framework (Ham and Hill, 1993; Walt, 1994; Barker, 1994; Gilson et al., 1999; Mills, 
2007) and these are discussed in Chapter 8. 
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CHAPTER 8: DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS 
8.1 Purpose of Analysis 
This study sought to examine the motivations and attempt by Jamaica, a small lower 
middle income DC, to make a major shift in the mode of financing health services for the 
population from a largely tax-funded system to one largely dominated by compulsory 
contributions (officially described as 'NHI' in the government's GPP in 1997). Since, at 
the time of writing, the policy shift had been shelved, the study combined aspects of both 
historical analysis into the proposals for NHI by the government and the responses to 
these with simulations of other NHI options to determine, ex ante, what might be a 
desirable and feasible NHI design for the country. 
As outlined in the conceptual framework (Section 3.2), -the identification of a preferred 
NHI option for Jamaica in Chapter 7 followed a sequence of analysis that included review 
of international literature and local documents; context analysis; collection, collation and 
analyses of qualitative and quantitative data to define three NHI options; estimates of 
inflows and outflows in NHI options through financial modelling and assessment and 
ranking of options through application of evaluative criteria. The three NHI options 
examined were the government's GPP, the alternative proposed by some key stakeholders, 
the SAP, and a prototype, called the PT, which emerged from synthesis of what may 
broadly be called international `best practice' in NHI. 
This Chapter reviews and discusses the approach, assumptions and the general and 
specific findings of the research. The purpose is to examine the overall validity and 
usefulness of the methodologies employed, and, using information gleaned from the 
international literature on factors which can facilitate or frustrate the choice and 
implementation of NHI, to assess the results in terms of the viability and acceptability of 
the preferred option. Since this is an ex ante policy-oriented study, the Chapter explores 
some of the key issues and conditionalities in Jamaica that seemed to have derailed the 
shift to NHI since 1997 and which would most likely influence the transformation of 
what appears as a financially viable NHI option (identified in Chapter 7 as the PT) into an 
implementable decision. 
It should be borne in mind that, as an ex-ante analysis, there are several aspects of the 
review and discussion of NHI options and their implementability which may be 
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considered more as conceptual and as comparisons of design against contemporary 
financing mechanisms. 
The discussion of the findings is organised around the following sub-themes: 
> the methodological framework, scope and limitations of the study as well as the 
likely influence of recent developments in Jamaica since the fieldwork was 
completed in 2001/2; 
> the range of preconditions and facilitatory factors discussed in the international 
literature which seem to have influenced the decision to shelve NHI proposals in 
Jamaica in 1997 and their likely implications for future decisions on implementing 
NHI designs such as the PT; 
> the influential role of key stakeholders on NHI in democratic policy-making 
environments like Jamaica and strategies to secure or strengthen the support of 
these stakeholders; 
> comparison of the context, challenges of design and NHI options for Jamaica with 
the broader findings and postulates on health financing systems and the actual 
experiences of ICs and DCs. 
8.2 Appraisal of Methodology and Recent Developments in Jamaica 
The methodology, as discussed in Chapter 3, involved a sequence of actions and analyses 
commencing with specification of goals and objectives and climaxing with identification 
of a preferred NHI option through application of a defined evaluative framework. Critical 
components of methodology included: 
> examination of the theoretical and empirical issues on health financing and NHI 
through a search and review of internationally published and grey literature; 
> understanding the specific contextual issues and challenges in Jamaica through 
review of the relevant historical and contemporary documents on the society, 
economy, health sector and the NHI policy initiative; 
> generation of qualitative data on health financing concerns and NHI through 
interviews with key stakeholders, key informants and participant observation; 
> generation of quantitative data through scanning and extraction of materials from 
secondary sources; 
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¢ application of stakeholder and content analysis of qualitative data along with the 
tools of estimations and simulations of quantitative data to specify NHI options; 
> specification and estimation of inflows and outflows in each option through 
financial modelling of baseline and alternative scenarios as well as sensitivity 
analysis. 
In terms of the literature review, the study necessitated both a broadening of the focus to 
include materials on policy analysis and decision making as well as narrowing the search 
to materials directly relevant to NHI. Published databases such as Healthstar, Global 
Health and LILACS as well as websites of international organizations and library sources 
proved to be valuable in this search. As an ex ante study, the search also required seeking 
out grey literature from mostly unpublished project and consultant reports since the 
majority of the published materials in books and journals tended to focus on ex post 
analyses. This did not pose major challenges since direct contact with consultants and 
some officials in international organizations sponsoring these studies generated a 
reasonable volume of materials. Country data included Vietnam, Cyprus, Trinidad and 
Tobago, The Bahamas, Kenya, Mauritius and Belize. 
Given the worldwide surge of interest, conferences and funded research studies since the 
mid-1980's on health financing reforms including NHI, inevitably, there are some articles 
and reports which were not reviewed largely because of availability or language issues. 
These included materials on French-speaking DCs and on Eastern European countries. 
Contextual information on Jamaica was derived from extensive reports and documents at 
the MOH, PIOJ and publications by the local statistical office and central bank. In 
addition, supplementary information was readily available from the nearby libraries of the 
University of the West Indies and international organizations working in Jamaica. The 
relative paucity of published documents on the private health sector posed some 
challenges. This was dealt with through more rigorous reviews of national survey data 
(STATIN and PIOJ's Survey of Living Conditions) and discussions with relevant officers 
in private health facilities and insurance companies. 
Qualitative data collection in Jamaica involved a 3-pronged approach of interviews with 
key stakeholders, use of key informants and participant observation (as a member of staff 
of the MOH working on health reform and health financing matters including NHI). In 
terms of specific materials from key stakeholders, both on their views on the 
government's GPP proposals and on their recommendations for NHI, the semi-structured 
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questionnaire was the chief instrument used to guide interviews and discussions as well as 
to organize responses to fit into the analytical framework. Efforts were made to secure 
views, responses and recommendations of stakeholders on certain matters through 
interviews guided by a checklist of questions. These were not always successful and 
triangulation techniques such as checking responses against speeches or comments in 
other settings were necessary. 
Key informants proved to be a very helpful source of data on contextual issues in Jamaica 
in relation to historical development of NHI, economic developments, health and health 
financing concerns, social norms and dynamics and stakeholders in the health system. 
Participant observation permitted tracking and monitoring the `life' of the NHI policy as 
an insider from the early design stages in 1997 to its replacement on the policy agenda in 
2001. This was done through normal employment-related interactions but also through 
close attention to public statements by government officials and stakeholders on NHI in 
the media, meetings and reports. One area which posed an understandable challenge was 
in relation to access to official, and in some cases, confidential materials and discussions 
while serving as a member of staff at the MOH. This was dealt with through securing 
clearance from higher officials for materials that could and could not be used as 
references. In this way, confidentiality was preserved. However, during the period of 
participant observation (1997-2001), it was noted that some issues deemed confidential in 
, official 
documents and meetings were sometimes ventilated in some form in public and 
other meetings and, in some instance, in speeches by policymakers and in the media. 
These provided more easily accessible materials for referencing purposes and were relied 
upon to add to the insights and quality of the data. 
Participant observation also involved direct and indirect interaction with key stakeholders 
and key informants. This necessitated trying to balance being a neutral unobtrusive 
observer as a student with being identified with and as a representative of the MOH who 
was expected to present and support the official proposals on NHI. This had both positive 
and perhaps some subjective implications in terms of methodology and data collection. 
On the one hand, first hand access to materials, meetings and key stakeholders was 
valuable in terms of the insights into issues and closeness to discussions (with clear 
observance of confidentiality provisions as described in the previous paragraph). On the 
other, this closeness may have affected to some extent the `formalness' in interviews 
from a pure research viewpoint and perhaps interpretation of some responses. In addition, 
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there might be the possibility that some responses from non-MOH stakeholders may have 
been nuanced in view of the author's status as a member of the MOH. 
Aware of these likely influences, efforts were made to minimise bias and attain 
objectivity in interpretation and analysis through comparisons of responses of 
stakeholders in different settings such as public meetings and media statements; 
approaching interviews more as a listener than an advocate and conducting interviews in 
late 1998/1999 when key stakeholders had already publicly voiced their positions on NHI 
proposals; and recruiting a research assistant for a short period to undertake a first-level 
classification of the mass of qualitative data using the check-list of questions as the guide. 
In addition, in all non-work related encounters and interviews the approach was more that 
of a listener than an advocate. The fact that all systematic data analysis took place after 
the researcher had left the employment of the MOH also serve to minimise likely bias and 
direct influence of work-related loyalties. 
The financial modelling methodology utilized frameworks and applications which are 
well-defined in the literature (Cichon et. al, 1999) and in some software packages such as 
Simins (GTZ and WHO, 2004). Assumptions and projections were required at several 
critical points in the estimates. Some of these were derived from official sources. 
However, because of some data limitations, some relied on judgments and 
approximations in relation to costs and income/revenue. Among these were the following: 
> costs of health services were derived from existing data in the public and private 
health sector. No attempt was made to second guess the financial implications of 
whether or not the health system was appropriately costed or operating efficiently. 
This meant that the financial implications of issues such as technology mix, staff 
mix, choice of drugs, patterns of procurement, alternative health services delivery 
approaches were not specifically addressed or quantified. Nor did the modeling 
estimates address the delineation of the benefit package in terms of inclusion and 
exclusion of specific services and the extent to which NHI itself may alter the 
pattern of supply and demand for health services. In other words cost were taken 
as is rather than as should be or would be. 
> the estimate of costs of NHI options may also reflect some inexactness because 
broad assumptions were made about the financial implications of single vs. 
multiple insurers/payers; different provider payment mechanisms and the spill- 
over costs of stronger regulatory capacity in the MOH; 
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on the revenue side, the model did not seek to specify income ceilings nor how to 
share contributions between workers and employers-these are commonly 
established in contribution-based plans. Nor did it attempt to specify contribution 
amounts from formal as against informal and self-employed workers. 
These were treated as details to be worked out in further research and fine-tuning of the 
core results indicators on PAYGR and percentage share of government. However, some 
attempt was made to take into account, in broad terms, the likely implications of key cost 
and revenue factors. This was done through the scenario and sensitivity analyses where 
baseline and alternative magnitudes in factors such as moral hazard, supply of services, 
administrative costs, compliance levels and copayments were estimated. 
Defined field-work especially in relation to qualitative data collection came to an end in 
2001. However, developments in Jamaica have been constantly monitored since then 
firstly through employment as a member of staff of the MOH until 2005 and latterly 
through ongoing research and collaboration with health officials and academics on 
various projects. This level of involvement meant that quantitative data have been 
updated, new policies and developments in health and health financing have been tracked 
and close familiarity with the overall socio-economic situation has been maintained. 
Despite the fizzling out of formal attempts to introduce an NHI in 2001 and the shift of 
attention to increased user fees and the establishment of the National Health Fund in 2003 
(discussed in Chapter 4), health financing constraints have persisted and references have 
been made from time to time to NHI as a financing mechanism. Some of the key 
stakeholders have changed (personnel more than positions). However, the critical features 
of the health system, the factors influencing the choice and implementation of an NHI 
option and the research methodology used remain relevant. 
8.3 Assessing the Overall Feasibility of Implementing NHI In Jamaica 
Despite formal announcement, consultations and analyses over the period 1997-2001, 
NHI in Jamaica was put on hold and basically shelved. This was not because a new 
solution had been found or the issues on health financing had dissipated. As discussed in 
Chapter 4, the two major challenges of fluctuating but generally diminished real 
allocation to the public health sector and continuing inequities in health, health seeking 
behaviour and access to care were still unresolved: 
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¢ On public health expenditure, Appendix 4.6 showed the pattern of actual 
allocation to the MOH (referred to as Nominal MOH/T) over the period 1980/1 to 
2006/7 and crude estimations of financing shortfalls using 3 simulations of 
desirable resource flows-firstly, if the percentage of the budget allocation to 
MOH remained constant over time at the (relatively reasonable) level of 6.7% of 
TGE in 1980/1; secondly, if the MOH received a real per capita increase in budget 
allocation of 0.5% per annum since 1980/1; and thirdly, if it received a similar 
increase of 1% per annum. As shown in Appendix 4.6 and in Figures 5.1,5.2 and 
5.3, the data from the simulations suggest that, there were budgetary shortfalls in 
most years compared to actual allocation/expenditure. For example, as depicted in 
Figure 8.1, in 2005/6, actual expenditure was J$13.7bn or 4.0% of TGE. Using the 
simulation variables above, this represented a shortfall in allocation of J$9.5bn or 
41% of the desired level in Simulation 1; J$4.3bn or 24% in Simulation 2 and 
J$6.7bn or 33% in Simulation 3. 
Figure 8.1 3 Simulations of Actual vs. desirable MOH Expenditure in 2005/6 
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Source: Author's estimations using data from Appendix 4.6 
¢ On some key indicators of equity in health, the data in Table 4.6 pointed to 
persistent differences with those in Quintile I (the poor) worse off than in Quintile 
5 when comparing health status, health seeking behaviour, access to health 
insurance and out of pocket spending on health as percentage of non-fi)od 
(discretionary) expenditure. 
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It seems that some key factors, singly or in concert, led to a re-thinking and lack of 
confidence among policymakers in moving ahead with implementing NHI in 2001. The 
literature points to certain health and non-health factors and circumstances which could 
affect the policy decision environment and non-implementation of a seemingly sound 
technical recommendation even when supported by financial analysis showing viability. 
(Walt, 1994; Normand and Weber, 1994; Ainsworth and Shaw, 1995; Gilson et al., 1999; 
Carrin and James, 2004; Gottret and Schieber, 2006; Mills, 2007). These may have been 
largely responsible for shelving of NHI in 2001. These factors include: 
i) Current health financing considerations 
" Extent of public tax-funded system; 
" Extent of private health insurance; 
" Extent of social security funding for health; 
" Extent of out of pocket payments. 
ii) Economic Considerations 
" Growth of the economy and of Government revenue and wages; 
" Pattern of employment and unemployment; 
" Size of the formal and informal sectors;. 
" Current tax and payroll deduction burden;. 
" Ability to raise consumption taxes 
" Ability to raise duties and tariffs 
" General inflationary trends and prices of other goods and services. 
iii) Social Considerations 
" Dependency ratio; 
" Population distribution -urban vs rural; 
" Extent of poverty; 
" Level of confidence in Government institutions; 
" Level of stakeholder support-value placed on solidarity vs charity; 
" Political will. 
iv) Administrative Considerations 
" Available management capacity; 
" Mechanisms for collecting contributions; 
9 Legal framework. 
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v) Health Services Considerations 
" Range and quality of health services; 
" Choice of provider; 
" Access to and availability of services; 
" Health reform environment. 
Table 8.1 briefly describes the status with respect to each of the above factors in 1997- 
2001 and indicates, from a policy viewpoint, the degree to which consideration of this 
status may influence or facilitate a current decision to implement an NHI. (No attempt 
was made to formally define the boundaries and magnitudes of the descriptors of 
facilitation. The designation of `weak', `questionable' and `reasonable' were largely 
based on observations and judgments from the data and from the listening to the views of 
stakeholders and key informants). The Table shows an almost equal mix of `reasonable' 
compared to `questionable' and `weak' facilitation. However, if the health related factors 
are excluded i. e. health financing and health services considerations, then the 
`questionable' and `weak' ratings exceed the `reasonable' in relation to economic, social 
and administrative factors. The inference that may be drawn is that, in the period 1997- 
2001, the confidence of Jamaica's policymakers may have been influenced by this mixed 
but generally unfavourable policy environment. In their assessment of the cost and benefit 
of implementation, policy makers may have opted for caution and consequently 
postponement of a decision on NHI. 
Table 8.1 also shows the relative status of these factors in 2006/7. As discussed in 
Chapters 6 and 7, the financial modelling showed that, theoretically, the NHI options 
especially the PT may have mitigated to some extent the resource and equity challenges 
in the health sector. Firstly, government's contribution to health would have reduced from 
56% to about 35% of total health expenditure leaving room for more (targeted) health 
spending by government. Secondly, access to health services in the public and private 
sectors would be enhanced by pooling and reducing financial barriers to care. 
In terms of contemporary or future decision-making on NHI, even with a seemingly 
viable PT, it appears that several of the factors identified in the Table are, and are 
projected to be, generally unfavourable. These are likely to feature prominently in NHI 
debates and would require noticeable improvements and remedial action before NHI may 
be deemed as implementable. 
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Table 8.1 Summary of Likely Impact of Factors on 
Feasibility of NHI in 1997-2001 and in 2006-2007 
Factor Status of Factors Relating to NIII in: Degree of 
1997-2001 2006-2007 Facilitation 
i) Current health financing system 
a) Extent of tax- " High (-56% of THE) but " More than 50% of THE in Reasonable 
funding for persistent shortfalls. 2006/7 and shortfalls persist. 
health services Opportunity for NHI. 
b) Private health " Limited to -12% of population. " Increased to about 18% in Questionable 
insurance Both opportunity for NHI to 2006. Both opportunity and 
expand coverage as well as opposition as above. 
opposition from those with 
private plans., 
c) Social security " Limited to paying sickness and " NIS voluntary health plan for Reasonable 
funded health maternity benefits. Opportunity pensioners since 2003. 
services for NHI. Opportunity for NHI. 
d)Out of pocket " High: - 30% of total health " Broadly similar levels of out Reasonable 
payments expenditure. So opportunity for of pocket spending in 2006/7. 
more prepayment in NHI. Opportunity. 
ii) Economic Considerations 
a) Pattern of " Fluctuating but generally " Positive but low-level growth Weak 
economic growth weak since 1970's. rates since 2001. 
b) % employed & " Double digit unemployment: " Slightly lower (-11%) but still Weak 
unemployed about 15% double digit unemployment. 
c) % formal and " High % of self-employed and " Continuing high percentage in Weak 
informal sector informal sector activity. 2006/7. 
d) Current tax and " Relatively high and deemed " Similar levels in 2006/7 Weak 
payroll burdensome: -31.5% for 
deductions workers and 43.5% for 
business firms. 
e) Ability to raise " Already at 15% and deemed " Increased to 17.5% by 2006/7. Reasonable 
consumption burdensome. Opportunity for 
taxes NHI deductions. 
i) Ability to raise " Already in regional e. g. " Further reduction in scope for Reasonable 
customs duties Caribbean Common Market manipulation with progressive 
and tariffs membership and international reductions in duties. 
(e. g., WTO) agreements- little 
room for manipulation to get 
more tax funds. Opportunity 
for NHI deductions. 
g) Inflationary " Floating currency with " Currency rate movements Weak 
trends and general exchange rate continue (J$70: US$ I in 
environment volatility upwards (J$50: US 1, 2006/7). 
1997) affecting general price 
levels including prices of 
basic utilities. 
iii) Social Considerations 
a) Dependency ratio " Relatively low: more working " Low with slow changes to Reasonable 
age persons than dependents. increasing dependency. 
b)% urban & rural " Almost equally divided but no " Percentage urban slowly Reasonable 
population great geographic barriers. exceeding that of rural. 
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Factor Status of Factors Relating to NIII in: Degree of 
1997-2001 2006-2007 Facilitation 
c) % persons below " Relatively high at about 20%. " Decline to about 15% in Weak 
poverty line Burden for government 2006/7. Still perceived as 
contributions. burden to government. 
d) Confidence in " Relatively weak. " Relatively weak. Weak 
government 
institutions 
e) Stakeholder " Mixed. Also less support for " Likely to be mixed. Questionable 
support social solidarity. 
f) Political will " General support for NHI in " Some support but more Reasonable 
manifestos by both major indirect references to NHI as 
'parties. part of alternative financing in 
2006/7. 
iv) Administrative Considerations 
a) Capacity to " Mixed. Public institutions like " For new NHI agency(ies) staff Questionable 
manage NIS seen as weak performers would have to be drawn from 
while private insurers seen as same public and private 
slightly better but financially institutions. 
and organizationally unstable. 
b) Mechanisms for " Formal mechanisms exist in " Persistence of weaknesses in Questionable 
registration and tax and social security 2006/7. 
collection administration - enforcement 
seen as generally weak 
especially in relation to self 
employed and informal sector. 
c) Legal framework " Process for legislation well- " Same in 2006/7. Reasonable 
defined. 
v) Health Services Considerations 
a) Range and " Mix of primary, secondary " More services available in Reasonable 
quality of and tertiary services available 2006/7 but persistence of 
services though issues of consistency quality concerns. 
and quality. 
b)Public and 
private providers 
" Mix of providers at primary 
and outpatient levels with 
public dominant in hospital- 
based services. 
" Similar mix in 2006/7. Reasonable 
c) Access and " Issues with availability of and " Similar issues in 2006/7. Questionable 
availability equitable access to services. 
Opportunity for NHI to 
improve access but private 
providers worried about 
payments. 
d) Health reform " General support for changes " Reforms seen as unfinished so Reasonable 
environment with major HRP (1997-2005). scope for more changes. 
Source: Author's estimations 
The influence of stakeholders on the decision to shelve NHI in 2001 as well as in any 
attempt to renew its consideration cannot also be discounted -this is discussed below.. 
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8.4 Strategies to, Secure or Strengthen Support of Key Stakeholders 
Stakeholders play a crucial role in reinforcing or reducing the degree of confidence of the 
policymaker and ultimately in the decision on NHI (Gilson et al., 1999; WHO-GTZ, 
2004; Atim et al.; 2006, Carrin et al, 2007). As discussed in Chapter 5, stakeholder views 
on the GPP varied. This variability was also manifest when they were asked to state the 
features they would like to see in an NHI. The position of stakeholders on NHI may have 
exerted a strong influence on the level of confidence of the government in moving 
forward with an NHI. Since several of the underlying factors for or against an NHI have 
remained, it is expected that their positions will continue to be variable and that the 
critical mass of support may not be forthcoming. 
To a large extent, stakeholder positions represented their perceptions in relation to four 
key aspects of NHI-the contribution requirements given the existing tax environment; 
the role of social solidarity and cross-subsidies; technical aspects such as the benefit 
package and regulatory role of MOH and confidence in government institutions. 
i) Contribution Requirements: Table 8.2 shows the main taxes and magnitudes in 
Jamaica in 2006/7. (In 1997-2001, the direct taxes and magnitudes were similar 
but the threshold for income tax and ceiling for NIS deduction were lower. 
Consumption tax was also lower at 15%). With deductions already at about 31.5% 
for workers and 43.5% for businesses, an NHI would decrease take-home earnings 
by a further 5.8% (in the GPP) to 9.6% (in the PT). The likely implications for 
individuals and businesses have been discussed in Chapter 7. In addition, the level 
of consumption tax is seen by most stakeholders as burdensome. 
The totality of taxes and deductions (direct such as income and corporate; NIS, 
NHT and Education deductions and indirect through the General Consumption 
Tax) and the uncertainty on likely unintended consequences of an NHI such as 
employment losses and higher inflation may have influenced the confidence of 
Jamaican policymakers in shelving NHI in the 1997-2001 period. From a 
policymaker's point of view, this is part of the `cost-benefit' calculation in making 
decisions, and technically feasible models do not always replace or override `gut' 
feelings on the likely consequences of decisions (Hogwood and Gunn, 1984; 
Grindle and Thomas, 1991; Ham and Hill, 1993; Reich, 1994; Gilson et al., 1999). 
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Table 8.2 Main Taxes and Statutory Dedcuctions Facing Workers and Businesses, 
2006/2007 
Tax-Deduction Workers Businesses Notes 
Income tax 0% or 25% -- Threshold earnings -J$ 193,440 p. a. 
Corporate tax -- 33% 
National Insurance (shared) 2.5% 2.5% Earnings Ceiling-J$250,000 p. a. 
National Housing Trust (shared) 2% 3% No ceiling 
Education Tax (shared) 2% 3% No ceiling 
Human Employment and Resource -- 2% No ceiling 
Training (HEART) Trust 
TOTAL 31.5% 43.5% 
General Consumption Tax (GCT) 17.5% Some goods and services are exempt 
Likely NHI deduction: GPP: 5.8% Sharing arrangements to be 
GPP, SAP or PT SAP: 8.8% determined 
PT: 9.6% 
Source: Compiled by Author's from data in PIOJ's Economic and Social Survey and in the Financial Model 
ii) Role of Social Solidarity: The literature posits this as a major requirement for and 
consequence of NHI (Blendon and Donelan, 1990; WHO, 2000; Cheng, 2003). 
However, as evidence from ICs and DCs indicates, this is difficult to attain, may 
have weakened over time and cannot be assumed (Normand and Weber, 1994; 
Gottret and van den Heever, 1995; Schieber, 2006; Mills, 2007). In Jamaica, there 
was sufficient evidence from stakeholders' comments that cross-subsidy and 
paying for those who `neglect their health' or `live sinfully' would be problematic. 
iii) Technical Aspects of NHI: Differing views on the technical aspects of NHI 
centred on the choice of the benefit package, the inclusion or exclusion of 
catastrophic health coverage, the role of a single insurer vs. multiple insurers and 
the extent of regulatory control by the MOH. These issues will continue to be 
disputed because there are no clear-cut right or wrong positions on them. In some 
cases, phasing in benefit packages and coverage may work. On the other hand, 
technical differences sometimes require direct resolution by policymakers. In the 
case of Jamaica, a critical point of contention in the GPP was the exclusion of 
ambulatory services from the benefit package. Some have suggested that had the 
government relented and included it in the package, the intensity of opposition 
would have been minimized. Others felt that opening the door to such a change 
would signal weakness in design encouraging others to push harder for changes 
and in the process would destroy core features of the original plan. The net effect 
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is that differences like these, if not managed, can influence the confidence and 
decision of policymakers. 
iv) Confidence in government institutions: National and personal experiences with 
government-managed institutions played a key role in the decision of some 
stakeholders to oppose NHI. This is not unique to Jamaica as evidence from other 
DCs point to similar challenges (Gilson et al., 1999; Gilson, 2000; Atim et al., 
2006; Gottret and Schieber, 2006; Carrin et al., 2007). Government institutions 
such as the NIS, NHT and RHAs have generally not won the confidence of the 
public in terms of the efficiency of their operations, quality of services and overall 
fiscal management. Scepticism is expected over any proposal or decision that a 
new government managed NHI institution will be responsible for NHI. 
The decision to implement the PT or any other version of NHI in Jamaica will have to 
take into account the views of stakeholders. Gilson et al. (1999) proposed a number of 
strategies for working with stakeholders to secure and strengthen support or reduce 
opposition. These include: 
¢ create common ground; 
> create common vision; 
> define decision making process; 
> mobilise key supporting actors; 
> meet political parties; 
> initiate strategic communications with press; 
> initiate pilots; 
> manage bureaucracy; 
> strengthen alliances with international organizations; 
> involve influential friends in planning; 
> create strategic alliances; 
¢ use back-door channels; 
> establish independent commission to block opposition/create support; 
> establish parallel processes during commission; 
> use technical information to offset opposition; 
> divide to rule; 
> mobilise powerful third party; 
> create tailored messages for public. 
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From this broad listing, specific strategies for specific groups of stakeholders will have to 
be worked out for Jamaica (deemed as `optimal fit' by Brugha and Varvasovskzy, 2000) 
to mobilize support, engender confidence and generate consensus for an NHI programme. 
8.5 Comparison and Consistency with International Experience 
Jamaica's experience with NHI (the factors leading to its choice, the process and actual 
design) bears close resemblance to that in several other DCs and ICs. On the other hand, 
there are also significant differences which can be detected. Five key areas will be briefly 
examined: the choice of an NHI response to health financing challenges; issues in 
designing NHI; the role of stakeholders; the macroeconomic environment and confidence 
of policymakers and the public. 
i) Response to health financing challenges: Countries have reacted differently when 
faced with similar (though not necessarily the same intensity) of health financing 
shortfalls and challenges. Some have. opted for NHI and community health 
insurance plans while others have preferred the route of expanding tax-based 
funding. The issues of fiscal space and ease of administration have played key 
roles in these decisions to choose contribution- vs. tax-based options. 
In Jamaica, the combination of fiscal space constraints (in terms of relatively high 
levels of taxes and limited scope for upward adjustment - see Section 8.3) and the 
opportunity provided by the HRP prompted the policy decision for an NHI. 
However, implementation did not materialize as, faced with a mix of socio- 
economic and administrative considerations, the confidence of policymakers 
seemed to have waned. Health financing constraints persisted but `muddling 
through' (Hogwood and Gunn, 1984; Ham and Hill, 1993) with a mix of tax funds, 
user fees and other sources of financing seemed to have replaced any new major 
initiative. 
ii) Design Issues: The broad features of NHI proposed for Jamaica are similar as in 
most other countries with NHI systems. Three key differences which may be 
noted among countries are whether administration is by a single insurer or 
multiple insurers; the comprehensiveness of the benefit package and the phasing 
in of coverage to the entire population. In relation to the latter it should be noted 
that most ICs took several decades to achieve universal coverage in their 
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contribution-based systems while some DCs like South Korea did so within three 
decades (Carrin and James, 2004; Gottret and Schieber, 2006). 
Jamaica's approach for immediate universal coverage in its NHI was based on the 
existence of its already well-established though under-resourced public health 
system which, theoretically, offered a spectrum of primary, secondary and tertiary 
services to all (the official policy was and is `no one seeking care should be turned 
away'). This meant that it would be socially difficult to offer any less coverage of 
benefits with a change to a contribution-based plan like NHI that, procedurally, 
would restrict access to paid-up members only. The scope for phasing in coverage 
of services was proposed in the GPP. However, this was generally opposed by 
stakeholders who felt that exclusion of outpatient consultations was destructive of 
the principles and benefits of primary care. 
iii) Role of stakeholders: In all countries, stakeholders span a spectrum in relation to 
NHI or to any other health financing mechanism whether tax-based or community 
or private insurance. Issues of technical design as well as perceptions of 
opportunity or threat characterize their positions. As Gilson et al. (1999) pointed 
out, it is essential to have multiple targeted strategies to secure and maintain 
support and to mitigate opposition. However, in the final analysis, the role of the 
policymaker maker in consensus-building is critical in securing the critical mass 
of support for moving forward. 
In Jamaica, stakeholder support varied widely. On some core NHI proposals, key 
stakeholders with major influence such as the Medical Association, employers and 
worker groups and even the Ministry of Finance and some key officers in the 
MOH strongly differed or expressed serious doubts. These served to undermine 
confidence of supportive policymakers, who, despite recognizing the technical 
merits and long-term viability of NHI, were not prepared to incur some of the 
likely short-term costs. 
iv) Macroeconomic environment: In most countries, this plays a crucial role in the 
choice and timing of implementation of NHI. However, there are differences of 
opinion as to whether a prospering economy is essential for an NHI. Saltman et. al 
(2004) indicate that Germany commenced its contribution-based system at a time 
when it was relatively poor. Others rejected this approach when they were faced 
with economic difficulties eg. UK in 1946 and Italy in 1979. This is an issue 
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which is still unresolved since there are several facets of the macroeconomy 
which may actually be conducive to an NHI even in times of slow growth. 
In Jamaica, persistent macroeconomic difficulties since the mid-1970's narrowed 
the fiscal space for policymakers in terms of more tax-funding for health. 
However, while these difficulties made NHI appear attractive especially as it 
would require payments by the fairly large informal and self-employed population, 
the administrative challenges in registration and collection faced by other public 
institutions and most likely by the NHI insurer (s) (as well as having to make 
decisions on denying access to care by non-members) served as an effective 
counter-balance to this optimism. 
v) Confidence of policymakers and the public: There are several aspects and factors 
which determine confidence in a health financing system and in the likelihood that 
it will work and will produce the intended and not unintended consequences. 
These factors are readily identified and perhaps could be weighted by researchers 
in decision matrices. However, the reality in each country and. at particular points 
in time mean that these factors are perceived, understood and interpreted 
differently by policymakers and the public. This is an area for further research and 
analysis in Jamaica and in other countries which have or are contemplating NHI 
programmes. 
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CHAPTER 9: CONCLUSIONS AND FURTHER RESEARCH 
9.1 Summary of Scope, Objectives and Methodology of Study 
Largely driven by the need to address pent-up frustrations and deficiencies in its tax- 
funded public health system and motivated by the opportunity presented by the 
imperatives of the policy package in its externally-funded Health Reform Program, 
Jamaica followed the path of several DCs in initiating, designing and taking formal steps 
towards the implementation of an NHI plan in the late 1990's. However, sustained action 
in the research and development process was put on hold by 2000/2001. 
In light of this policy collapse or more appropriately policy freeze, the overall goal of this 
study was to examine and evaluate in an ex-ante approach feasible NHI options for 
Jamaica by drawing government's NHI proposals (1997), the international experience and 
lessons with NHI approaches and the perspectives of key local stakeholders on an 
appropriate NHI design. In particular, the study sought to: 
> identify the contextual factors (socio-political, economic, health, health financing 
and external) that led to the policy decision for an NHI plan; 
> define the key elements of potentially feasible options by drawing on the existing 
government's proposal (1997); recommendations of key stakeholders on their 
version of an NHI plan; and on the `best practice' that seems to be emerging from 
the international experience; 
> quantify the financial implications of each option in terms of cost of the package 
and administration and the contributions required from the population and the 
State to cover these costs; 
> evaluate the likely impact of each option in relation to key criteria such as 
coverage, equity, efficiency, net revenue and contribution requirements; 
> examine the likely implications for stakeholders and the health system of 
implementing the preferred NHI option emerging from the evaluation 
As outlined in the study's conceptual framework, a mix of methodologies were utilised to 
generate the data and findings. These included: 
a) theoretical, contextual and comparative country analyses drawing on literature 
reviews, official and unpublished documents on Jamaica and the international 
experience with health financing particularly social health insurance; 
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b) qualitative data gathering methods including direct explorations of key issues with 
key informants, interviews with key stakeholders using a semi-structured, pre- 
designed checklist and participant observation; 
c) quantitative data collection drawing on secondary data as well as standard 
estimation techniques; 
d) analyses of qualitative data using stakeholder and political mapping tools as well 
as content analysis; 
e) financial modeling of key variables in NHI programmes and mathematical 
mapping of equations to generate estimates of cost and financing of NHI options;. 
f) appraisal of NHI options using selected criteria such as coverage, efficiency, 
equity, net revenue generation, the share of workers (using the PAYGR) and 
government in meeting costs. 
9.2 Key Findings and Extent to which Objectives were Achieved 
The main findings of the study include the following: 
a) Wide variation internationally in health financing choices and motivations for 
policy changes: International attention to health financing issues has grown 
significantly in the last two decades with major policy reforms and operational 
changes in varying stages of implementation in ICs and DCs. Formal or implicit 
health reform programmes provided the launching pad for re-thinking health 
financing in most countries. For ICs, with NHI or tax-funded systems, the 
concerns have largely been centred on cost control, efficiency in risk pooling, 
administration and purchasing as well as fiscal sustainability. For DCs (middle 
income as well as low income countries), whether with NHI or tax-funded 
systems, the agenda of issues related to universal coverage, additional resources 
for health, equity in cost sharing and efficiency in administration and purchasing 
health services. The international debate continues to waver on how best to attain 
key health goals such as universal coverage, financial protection and value for 
money through NHI, tax-funding or strategic combinations of these alongside 
private and community health plans. 
b) Wide variation in NHI approaches and performance: Among ICs and DCs with 
NHI-type financing systems, there is wide variation in the approaches and 
performance. The time-frame for full population coverage, the emphasis on single 
payer vs multiple payers, the coverage of services in the benefit packages, 
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provider payment systems and the role of copayments reflect some of the major 
differences in design even among countries with fairly similar structural features. 
These factors also play key roles in determining the overall performance of 
countries with NHI-type financing systems when criteria such as universality, 
financial protection, equity in cost sharing and efficiency are applied. 
c) Mix of socio-economic, political and health factors influence policy choice of 
NHI: Official considerations of NHI-type financing in Jamaica span several 
decades with `stop-go-stop' policy decisions by different political parties in power. 
The constant concerns have been underfunding of the tax-financed health system 
given persistent budgetary difficulties; inequity in access given deficiencies in the 
availability and quality of public health services; and the high cost of available 
services in the growing private sector. A formal, externally-funded Health Reform 
Program together with an influential minister of health provided the impetus for 
the first comprehensive attempt to establish an NHI system in the late 1990's. 
d) Differences between government and key stakeholders on an appropriate NHI 
design: Government's proposals for NHI, as reflected in their Green Paper (1997) 
received mixed responses from key stakeholders including senior officers within 
the Ministry of Health. Not unexpectedly, the most serious opposition came from 
the Medical Association, private insurance companies and employer groups. Even 
though there was general support for an NHI system, differences centred on 
particular aspects of the Green Paper proposals such as the benefit package, the 
establishment of a statutory body (public health insurance company) to manage 
the plan, and the regulatory framework. For evaluation of optional designs, these 
differences were merged and simplified into a broadly measurable SAP to enable 
comparisons with the government's GPP and a PT which was theoretically 
defined based on `best practice' emerging from the international experience with 
NHI systems. 
e) Conceptually, the PT is the most feasible NHI option for Jamaica when applying 
evaluation criteria ex ante: In applying the evaluation criteria (i. e. universality of 
coverage, extent of risk-pooling, depth of benefit package, net revenue, equity in 
cost sharing, administrative efficiency and contribution sharing) the prototype 
emerged as the most feasible NHI option for Jamaica. This was followed by the 
GPP and the SAP. Given that the focus of the study is on the design of NHI 
options, the feasibility of the prototype does not mean readiness for 
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implementation or that other health financing strategies do not have a role in 
overall financing of health services in Jamaica. Neither does it mean that an NHI 
is the best option for Jamaica in financing health services since rigorous 
examination of alternatives was not part of the analysis. 
f) Major role for government despite statutory NHI contributions: Based on the 
design parameters, it is expected that government would still have to play a key 
role in financing health services no matter which NHI option is considered for 
implementation. This is because it is expected that, for universality and equity of 
access, government will make contributions on behalf of the indigent population 
(assumed to be about 20% in all options). In addition, it is expected that 
government would share in contributions by its workers, continue to fund certain 
essential public health services (e. g. sanitation, surveillance, health education and 
promotion, regulation and standards) as well as meet the cost of capital works in 
the public health sector. 
g) NHI may be burdensome for firms and workers given other taxes: Given the fiscal 
environment where approximately 31% of earnings of individuals and a higher 
percentage of earnings of business firms are already being deducted through 
income tax and other statutory deductions, a new NHI deduction of 5.8%-9.6% 
(depending on the NHI option) will represent a real burden for all contributors. 
This burden may be heavier on formal sector entities in view of the long history of 
tax non-compliance by the self-employed population and the large informal sector 
in Jamaica. 
h) Supportive developments and institutional changes: The practical feasibility of an 
NHI option will depend on several supportive developments and institutional 
arrangements for successful implementation in Jamaica. These include continued 
macroeconomic progress, strengthened systems for identification and registration 
of the poor, design of appropriate IT systems, rigorous measures to bring more 
self-employed and informal sector workers into the contribution net and 
implementation of facilitating legislation. Additionally, given the large self- 
employed/informal sector groups, serious consideration should be given to a 
different approach to revenue generation for an NHI system through more indirect 
than direct deductions thus reducing the contribution burden by the formal sector 
wage earning population. 
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In general, the objectives of the study (identifying NHI policy context; defining NHI 
options; quantifying financial implications; determining a preferred option and examining 
implementability) have been achieved. The literature review, context analysis, review of 
documents in and on Jamaica and field work generally proceeded according to plan. 
Except for some deficiencies in the availability of data on the private health sector (which 
were dealt with through reliance on proxy estimates from national survey data), the range 
of required quantitative information on macroeconomic and social context, health 
services utilisation and health financing in Jamaica was secured largely from local official 
publications and supporting data sources in international organisations. On the qualitative 
aspects of the data collection, `triangulation' through elite interviews, discussions with 
key informants and participant observation yielded generally acceptable information. In 
this respect, the technique of participant observation may be said to have been quite 
helpful in getting access to stakeholders and key informants as well as in tracking the 
`life' of and responses to NHI as a policy initiative. 
The data generated from literature review, context analysis and quantitative and 
qualitative methodologies facilitated subsequent analysis in terms of definition of NHI 
options, evaluation of feasibility and exploration of implementability. 
9.3 Conclusions and Usefulness of Results 
In reviewing the international experience, the historical and contemporary approach to 
development of NHI in Jamaica and the outcome of the evaluation of NHI options, there 
are certain main conclusions and lessons which can be highlighted. These are as follows: 
a) Influence of Macro-economic Context: it is more difficult to implement a major 
public policy like NHI during periods of severe macroeconomic difficulties. It 
appears as a most desirable option to cash-strapped governments during these 
periods but it is precisely these conditions which make design, popular 
acceptability and implementability more difficult and less likely to get off the 
ground given the requirements for new deductions. 
b) NHI may be technically feasible but the political dynamics of change and 
stakeholder support may derail implementation: There is a major gap between the 
design, acceptability and implementation of what may be viewed as a technically 
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efficacious public policy like NHI. As attempts at implementing NHI in other DCs 
such as sub-Saharan Africa including South Africa (Gilson et al., 1999; McIntyre, 
Gilson and Mutyambizi, 2005; Atim et al., 2006), central and eastern Europe 
(Carrin and James, 2004; Gottret and Schieber, 2006) and Latin America 
(Homedes and Ugalde, 2005) indicate, there are complex social, political, 
ideological, economic and institutional challenges to overcome to get an NHI 
system accepted and operating in an efficient and sustainable manner. In many of 
these countries, as in Jamaica, confidence in the ability/capacity of the 
government or a new statutory body to efficiently manage NHI cannot be taken 
for granted. Such confidence is built up slowly but lost easily. This is a factor 
most readily espoused by the middle and upper income groups as well as formal 
sector unionised workers who are more likely to have some form of private health 
insurance coverage and who view private insurers and the free choice of insurer as 
more efficient than public sector agencies. 
c) NHI and other health system goals: NHI cannot be conceived purely as a health 
financing mechanism without reference to the overall goals and vision of the 
sector. There must be a clear understanding of what are the health generating 
models; the health delivery models and the health impact models so that the 
intended consequences of NHI can facilitate rather than frustrate the achievement 
of health goals such as equity, efficiency, quality, choice, cost control and 
incentives for responsiveness. 
d) NHI and other health financing mechanisms: The health sector is too large and 
health interventions too numerous to be financed by NHI alone. It requires careful 
specification of NHI's objectives and other financing mechanisms (including tax 
funds, private insurance and out of pocket payments) which collectively can 
produce much more health benefits than if each was conceived in isolation. 
e) Role of Consultation: Consultation is essential in the design and development of 
NHI since there are several key stakeholder groups whose support or opposition 
may be critical in securing acceptability. However, consultation has to be timely, 
purposeful, time-bound and cost effective or else discussions could be controlled 
or captured by the powerful. In addition, those who oppose are usually more vocal 
than those who support a plan so that leadership, vision and technical competence 
are crucial to ensure good intentions in a policy are not derailed to benefit the few. 
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fl Role of Cultural factors: In several DC's where established tax-funded health 
systems predominate, the shift to NHI financing raises several critical issues of 
social norms, political behaviour and `culture'. These need to be systematically 
addressed to achieve desired results. Some of the cultural factors include: 
> Free care: to what extent `free care' and promises of `Government will 
provide' by politicians have become so entrenched in the national psyche that 
a mandatory contributory plan is seen as inherently unworkable and apt to be 
abused by free riders even though many persons are willing to pay for private 
care and health insurance plans; 
¢ Prepaid vs. out of pocket: to what extent is there a culture of paying for 
services only when sick rather than when one is healthy in a prepaid plan; 
¢ Solidarity vs. individualism: to what extent is solidarity or the willingness to 
pay and pool resources to subsidise those who are or say they are unable to 
pay a commonly shared trait in the contemporary period as compared to a few 
decades ago; 
> Private health providers: to what extent do private medical traditions of fee for 
service and autonomy in health encounters as well as the growth of private 
health insurance limit the development of financing mechanisms such as NHI, 
which for efficiency, may insist on capitation plans or cost control and 
utilisation review measures; 
> Public health providers: to what extent are public health providers, governed 
by traditional public sector regulations and backed by strong unions, prepared 
to compete openly for funds with the private sector if an NHI agency takes on 
the role of `active purchaser' by seeking the best value for money on behalf of 
contributors and patients so the `money flows where the patient goes'. As the 
experience of the NHF in Jamaica indicates, more members/patients may seek 
care in private than public facilities so that the additional funds may end up in 
the private sector. 
9.4 Areas for Further Research 
In terms of further research, there are 3 major aspects emerging from the study. 
a) Theoretical Issues. Despite much review and analysis, there is still ongoing debate 
and division in both IC's and DC's on the following areas: 
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> how best to. establish a universal coverage NHI plan largely contributions- 
based in a previously dominant tax-financed health system so that there is 
adequate coverage of members and health services i. e. essential public health 
functions, personal and curative services, training and capital development; 
> how to balance and evaluate the competing efficiency claims of single payer 
administrative arrangements for NHI versus multiple decentralised payers; 
> what should be the mix of services in the benefit package and how to manage 
and `ration' access to tertiary care needed by all socio-economic groups given 
resource constraints, the increased demand to do more once the technology is 
available and patient expectations. 
b) Policy Implications. There are four main areas which require further attention. 
¢ whether NHI's coverage of the population and of health services should be 
approached in phases or as part of a `big bang' policy initiative and the likely 
implications of some persons denied access to care under NHI because of not 
making contributions; 
> what is the extent of the fiscal space available to the government in 
implementing an NHI plan which may require more inflexibility in resource 
allocations and some fiscal guarantees for operations; 
> whether indirect taxes should play a more significant role than contributions as 
revenue sources for NHI especially in countries where there are large groups 
of self employed and informal sector workers and the income tax collection 
system is relatively deficient; 
> whether inefficient public health facilities should be allowed to close down or 
scale down if they lose out in the competition for patients in an NHI system 
where `money follows the patient'. 
c) Operational Implications. The matters needing further research are as follows: 
> further refinement of the benefit packages to specify benefit catalogues; 
> further development of the provider payment systems and contracting 
proposals to ensure value for money, cost control, limit fraud and abuse and 
coordinate benefits and payments with private insurers; 
> strengthening mechanisms and processes for systematic assessment and 
identification of the poor and other groups needing subsidies, improving 
collections and compliance and securing stakeholder support. 
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POSTSCRIPT 
At the time of writing (December 2008), Jamaica had not taken a formal decision to 
renew efforts towards implementing an NHI plan. The largely externally-funded Health 
Reform Program came to an end in 2005 and the push towards NHI seems to have 
dissipated. Even before 2005, government's enthusiasm for and confidence in an NHI had 
waned due to a combination of continuing macroeconomic difficulties, uncertain support 
from key stakeholders and institutional weaknesses. On financing matters, attention 
focused more on enhancing collections from user fee, increasing contributions from 
donor groups and on the establishment and operations of the statutory National Health 
Fund (NHF). 
The NHF commenced operations in 2003 as a supplementary financing initiative with the 
objectives of assisting patients with selected chronic diseases to meet the cost of their 
prescription drugs in public and private pharmacies and providing additional extra- 
budgetary capital funds to the public health sector. The first objective (chronic disease 
prescription drug benefit) represents an expansion to all age-groups of the 1996 Drugs for 
the. Elderly Program while the second (capital funds) supplements planned and 
spontaneous grants by donors, local and foreign, in off-budget funding of public health 
sector capital developments. The NHF is financed through a mix of the following: a levy 
on sales of tobacco and tobacco products; a 1% transfer of social security (national 
insurance) deductions and an annual allocation from the Consolidated Fund (Lalta and 
Barrett, 2004; NHF Annual Reports 2005-2007). 
After being in power for 18 years, general elections in mid-2007 led to a change in the 
political party controlling the reins of Government. In mid-2008, in keeping with its 
election promise, the government revoked the user fee policy and public facilities stopped 
collections. No new sources of financing have been implemented. As macroeconomic 
constraints persist and the challenges of financing of health services by the State and 
individuals grow, there seems to be some continued but low intensity interest in 
implementing some version of an NHI. However, no new proposals have been formally 
presented to the public either by current or opposition policymakers. 
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APPENDICES 
Appendix 2.1 List of Health Services Typically Covered in, and Excluded from 
Full Package Insurance Plans 
I. Professional Medical Services and Supplies 
1. Physician office visits by referral from other specialist or from the primary health care 
2. Provision of, or Primary Care Physician referral for, Emergency care on a 24-hour per 
day, 7-day per week basis. 
3. Diagnostic/Therapeutic: 
a) Diagnostic and treatment services including, but not limited to, consultation and 
treatment by Specialist Physicians, routine eye examinations limited to one per 
Member every 12 months, surgical procedures, laboratory, x-ray services, 
injections, application of casts and dressings, radiotherapy and administration of 
anesthesia. 
b) Prescribed x-ray and laboratory tests, services and materials, e. g., diagnostic x- 
rays, mammograms, x-ray therapy, chemotherapy, fluoroscopy, 
electrocardiograms, electroencephalograms, and therapeutic radiology services. 
4. Other Professional Services: 
a) Voluntary sterilization and Contraceptive methods are covered Contraceptive 
Services are limited to the following: Condom, IUD, diaphragms. 
b) Vision and hearing screening is covered with a referral from Primary Care 
Physician. 
5. Maternal, Newborns and Infertility: 
a) Prenatal and postpartum care 
b) Care of a newborn child is part of the primary health care level, including home 
visits. 
6. Reconstructive Surgery: 
a) A malignant or non-malignant neoplasm 
b) Repair of anatomical impairment to improve or correct a physiological functional 
disability if a congenital anatomical functional impairment. 
c) Breast reconstruction following 
,a 
covered mastectomy 
d) Plastic surgery following an accidental injury within 2 years of the accident 
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7. Prosthetic Devices: Prosthetic Devices as determined to be Medically Necessary, and 
when ordered or approved by a Health Plan Physician and such devices meet the 
criteria for coverage under the rules of eligibility. 
S. Health Education 
II. Hospital Services 
1. Medical/Surgical: The following acute inpatient services are provided at hospitals: 
a) Room and board. Private accommodations and special diets will be covered if 
medically necessary as determined by Plan 
b) Diagnostic and interventional radiology services, clinical laboratory and other 
diagnostic tests, anesthesia, oxygen services, radiation and respiratory therapy, 
encephalography, cardiography 
c) Approved drugs, medications and biologicals 
d) Use of operating room, intensive and coronary care units, recovery room and 
special treatment rooms. Use of outpatient hospital surgical treatment rooms or 
outpatient surgical facilities 
e) Physical and respiratory therapies when ordered by physician. 
f) Administration of blood and blood products 
g) Pre-and post-hospital planning and referral to community and social welfare 
resources 
2. Physical Rehabilitation: 
a) Inpatient - Short-term Inpatient rehabilitation services due to injury, trauma or 
surgery will be provided when prescribed. 
b) Outpatient - Physical, on an outpatient basis will be covered when prescribed. 
3. Kidney Disease and Dialysis: All Medically Necessary services for dialysis for renal 
disease and for kidney transplants, regarding end-stage renal disease including 
equipment, training, and medical supplies required for home dialysis, and directly 
related reasonable medical. 
4. Mental Health/Chemical Dependency: Inpatient services at a Participating Hospital on 
order of a Health Plan Physician and approved by Plan for direct care and treatment of 
the acute phase of a mental condition is covered. 
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5. Emergency and Urgent Care Services: 
a) Emergency Services are those services that are needed to evaluate or stabilize an 
Emergency Medical Condition. Examples of an Emergency Medical Condition 
include, but are not limited to, symptoms of heart attack, stroke, poisoning, labor, 
loss of consciousness or respiration, haemorrhaging, and convulsions. During 
retrospective claim review, the determination as to whether or not an Emergency 
Medical Condition existed will rest with the package. 
b) Transportation Services. In cases of an Emergency Medical Condition, or when 
authorized by the Primary Care Physician and Plan, transportation services to the 
nearest medically appropriate facility are covered. Certified air ambulance will 
be 
covered if Medically Necessary. 
III. Other Facility Services 
1. Some Skilled Nursing Facility Services and Home Health Services. 
IV. Pharmaceuticals and Pharmacy Services 
V. Exclusions 
1. Cosmetic or plastic procedures including surgery except as Medically Necessary. 
2. Heart, lung, heart/lung, liver, pancreas, pancreas, bone marrow and bowel transplants. 
3. Weight loss treatment including but not limited to gastric reservoir reduction surgery, 
gastric stapling, by-pass or diversion and any other weight reduction programs. 
Dietary or nutritional supplements for gaining or maintaining weight are excluded, 
except for charges for non-milk or non-soy formula required to treat diagnosed 
diseases and disorders of amino acid or organic acid metabolism, protein sensitivity 
resulting severe chronic diarrhoea, and severe mal-absorption syndrome resulting in 
malnutrition, provided the formula is prescribed by a Participating Physician, and the 
Physician furnishes supporting documentation to Health Plan. The benefits will be 
limited to those conditions where the formula is the primary source of nutrition as 
certified by the treating physician by diagnosis. 
4. Custodial or domiciliary care; personal comfort items such as television, telephone, 
private rooms (except as Medically Necessary) in a hospital or skilled nursing facility; 
housekeeping services and meal services as a part of Home Health Care. 
5. Experimental medical, surgical, or other health procedures including experimental 
drugs. 
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6. Trimming of corns, calluses and nails except for diabetic conditions approved in 
advance. 
7. In vitro fertilization (IVF), embryo transplant services (GIFT, ZIFT), reversal of 
voluntary sterilization, and outpatient self-administered infertility prescription drugs. 
Infertility injections or medications normally self-administered will not be covered. 
8. Abortions and any related procedures, unless Medically Necessary. 
9. Transsexual surgery and related services. 
10. Speech therapy. 
11. Experimental organ transplants. 
12. Private duty nursing. 
13. Contact and corrective lenses and eyeglasses. 
14. Growth hormones or steroids used for growth and development. 
15. Cranial electrotherapy units. 
16. Counselling for marital or relationship conflicts, employment counselling and 
vocational rehabilitation counselling services. 
17. Sclerotherapy for spider angiomas. 
18. Breast augmentation and/or reduction surgery. 
19. Hearing aids. 
20. Penile implants and erectile devices. 
21. Services rendered primarily for the convenience of a Member in the absence of a 
specific clinical requirement. 
22. Charges for completion of forms and reports other than for the patient's medical 
record. 
23. Surrogate and/or gestational pregnancy and any related procedures. 
24. Alternative medicine/therapy including but not limited to: non-prescription drugs or 
medicines, vitamins, nutrients, food supplements, biofeedback training, neuro- 
feedback training, hypnosis, acupuncture, acupressure, massage therapy, 
aromatherapy, chelation therapy, rolfing and related diagnostic tests. 
25. Laser treatment including Candela, V-beam and photodynamic therapy for rosacea, 
port wine stains and other skin disorders. 
26. Extra Corporeal Shock Wave Therapy (ESWT) for conditions of the feet elbows and 
shoulders. 
27. Removal of skin tags. 
Source: Data from various private health insurers plans. 
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Appendix 4. la Jamaica: Key Demographic Indicators, 2006 
Indicators Magnitude 
1. Area (sq. km. ) 11,000 
2. Population (millions) 2.67 
3. Density of population (persons per sq. km) 243 
4. Population growth rate 0.5% 
5. Crude birth rate (per 1000) 17.0 
6. Crude death rate (per 1000) 5.7 
7. Total fertility rate (children per female of child-bearing age) 2.5 
8. Contraceptive prevalence rate (%) 66 
9. Sex Distribution (% males to females) 49.3: 50.7 
10. Rural-Urban Distribution (%) 49: 51 
11. Age Distribution (%) 
a) 0-14 years 
b) 15-64 years 
29 
63 
c) 65+ years h 
12. Age Dependency ratio [(1 la+1 lc)/11b] 58 
Source: Compiled from data in PIOJ Economic and Social Survey of Jamaica and MOH Annual Reports. 
Appendix 4.1b Jamaica: Selected Health Indicators, 2006 
Indicators Magnitude 
1. Infant mortality rate (per 1000) 19.2 
2. Child (under 5) mortality rate (per 1000) 16.2 
3. Immunization rate (% children 0-1 year) 87 
4. Maternal mortality rate (per 100,000) 106.2 
5. Population with access to safe water (%) 86 
6. Population with access to sanitary facilities (°/a) 95 
7. Practising physicians (per 1000) 0.9 
8. Nursing persons (per 1000) 1.7 
9. Hospital beds (per 1000) Acute: 1.44 
All: 2.14 
10. Healthy life expectancy-HALES (years) 65.1 
Source: Compiled from data in PIOJ Economic and Social Survey and WHO (2004). 
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